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Abstract
Philadelphia is one of many distressed American urban school districts, from Chicago to New Orleans,
that has embraced market-based responses like school closures to tackle entrenched problems of
funding and academic performance. While urban districts have increasingly appropriated closures-aspolicy, little scholarship interrogates the sweeping social and organizational changes in governance and
praxis that schools make when faced its explicit ultimatum: compete or close. Applying a framework
developed in the anthropologies of branding and value, this dissertation explores school leaders’ fraught
responses to imminent closure as they attempted to make their “value” legible in an expanding
marketplace of school choice. Through a three-year ethnographic case study of an ethnically diverse
neighborhood school slated for closure, I examine how the school’s strategies to remain open hinged on
the selective enrollment and retention of students deemed “valuable” to their imagined brand. As these
practices indexed raced notions of “value”, I analyze how school branding processes deepen racialized
disparities in educational provision.
Methods include over 200 semi-structured interviews with students, teachers, and administrators,
participant observation in classrooms, district offices and meetings, and document analysis. As closures
continue to threaten urban public schools across the United States, this study uniquely captures the
dilemmas that surface in educational practice and philosophy when schools prioritize the business of
survival over the business of educating. Further, I contribute to emergent literatures in educational
commodification and marketization by explaining how school branding, prompted by closure threats and
competition for school survival, extend inequities in opportunity structures for vulnerable youth.
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ABSTRACT

BRANDING AGAINST CLOSURE: NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF RISKY FUTURES
Julia A. McWilliams
Kathleen D. Hall
Philadelphia is one of many distressed American urban school districts, from
Chicago to New Orleans, that has embraced market-based responses like school closures
to tackle entrenched problems of funding and academic performance. While urban
districts have increasingly appropriated closures-as-policy, little scholarship interrogates
the sweeping social and organizational changes in governance and praxis that schools
make when faced its explicit ultimatum: compete or close. Applying a framework
developed in the anthropologies of branding and value, this dissertation explores school
leaders’ fraught responses to imminent closure as they attempted to make their “value”
legible in an expanding marketplace of school choice. Through a three-year ethnographic
case study of an ethnically diverse neighborhood school slated for closure, I examine how
the school’s strategies to remain open hinged on the selective enrollment and retention of
students deemed “valuable” to their imagined brand. As these practices indexed raced
notions of “value”, I analyze how school branding processes deepen racialized disparities
in educational provision.
Methods include over 200 semi-structured interviews with students, teachers, and
administrators, participant observation in classrooms, district offices and meetings, and
document analysis. As closures continue to threaten urban public schools across the
vi

United States, this study uniquely captures the dilemmas that surface in educational
practice and philosophy when schools prioritize the business of survival over the business
of educating. Further, I contribute to emergent literatures in educational commodification
and marketization by explaining how school branding, prompted by closure threats and
competition for school survival, extend inequities in opportunity structures for vulnerable
youth.
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION: SCHOOL CLOSURES AND THE PUBLIC
EDUCATION CRISIS IN PHILADELPHIA

Photo: Water damage in a neighborhood school classroom.

Johnson High is a century-old, non-selective neighborhood high school serving
approximately 650 students in Philadelphia. On rainy days in 2011, the academic year
that I first began tutoring at Johnson High, water streamed from the ceiling onto students’
shoulders as the leaky roof went unrepaired. In the winter, the furnace fired on all
cylinders, spiking classroom temperatures as students laid their heads on desks, trying to
pay attention to their teachers amidst the sleep-inducing heat. As I walked through an
empty top floor of the building, I peeked through door windows of locked classrooms to
see old chairs piled high as mice gathered in corners to nibble on dust balls (Fieldnote,
4/13/11). The administration had sealed off this floor several years ago due to alleged
asbestos contamination. The principal and several teachers complained of the bed bugs
1

infesting the furniture, but there was no room in the budget to hire an exterminator.
Students pointed fingers at the mold growing on classroom walls that aggravated their
asthma and sent them to hospitals. The school was suffering from a steady, decade-long
decline in enrollment, holding only half of the students in 2011 that it did in 2000 as
shiny charter schools cropped up in both the surrounding neighborhood and throughout
the city, poaching students and leaving empty seats in their wake.
When the School District of Philadelphia leaked a consultants’ report in June
2011, slating Johnson High for potential closure, the school community went into a state
of panic, searching for a comprehensive strategy to keep the school alive (Herold and
Mezzacappa 2011). In spite of the century-old building’s shortcomings and school’s
growing vacancy, those that remained couldn’t imagine an academic home anywhere
else. Referring to the Johnson High community as a “family” with long-embedded
histories in the neighborhood and school, parents, teachers, and even administrators
having attended Johnson preceding their children, understood the school’s closure to
signify the erasure of those roots, the death of an historic institution that had served
generations of their families.
Johnson High managed to evade the closures that rocked neighborhood schools
across the city for two years after the district’s initial school closure announcement. From
2012 to 2013, the School District of Philadelphia closed 30 district-run neighborhood
schools, in part to address a $1.35 billion budget gap (School District of Philadelphia
2013). Twenty-four closures coincided with passing of the “doomsday budget” in June
2013 as cuts in state-funding precipitated a $300 million fiscal shortfall for the AY 20132014 school year (Strauss 2013). Philadelphia joins 70 other large and mid-sized urban
2

school systems in the last decade that have closed neighborhood schools as they have
increasingly embraced the charter sector as a route to expand “school choice”, mitigate
“poor academic performance”, and cope with severe fiscal shortfalls, particularly in the
wake of the Great Recession (Engberg et al. 2012). New York City and Washington D.C.
have carried out school closures en masse over the course of the last ten years. Chicago
however is the nation’s leader, pioneering mass school closures beginning in 2001 as it
turned district schools over to charter school operators, pressured by philanthropists,
billionaires, and policymakers to increase competition and choice in its district’s
educational portfolio.
While Philadelphia has garnered international attention as a laboratory for
experiments in market-driven education reform (Denvir 2014) through its exponential
charter school expansion (Leitner 2014), contracts with educational management
organizations (EMOs) (Cucchiara, Gold, and Simon 2011), and partnerships with nonprofit and philanthropic organizations (Limm 2014; Hardy 2014), the years of 2012 and
2013 marked the district’s first foray into mass school closures. For a district attempting
to maintain essentially “two education systems”, the charter school network and districtrun neighborhood schools, district leadership framed closures as an inevitable policy
option in the context of increasingly scarce resources and national and state-level
incentives to fortify “school choice” options for families (School District of Philadelphia
2013; Hite 2013). Displacing over 15,000 students from chronically “low-performing”
and or “dangerous” schools, the closures raised controversial questions, not only about
the short-term and long-term effects on the children and communities affected, but also
concerning the precarious arc of education reform in the city (Gym 2015a).
3

In Philadelphia, as in other large, poor, post-industrial American cities, school
closures, at their core, index myriad tensions arising from the intensified and long-term
mapping of federal accountability measures and top-down policies encouraging
privatization onto public education in the country’s poorest urban districts. Standardized
metrics of “school quality” like school infrastructure costs, enrollment numbers, and test
scores naturalize school closure as a policy that privileges the laws of the market.
Promoted as a reform model through the No Child Left Behind Act and Obama’s Race to
the Top program, school closings have been framed at the national level as a way to
improve “efficiency”, “choice”, and “quality” as schools compete in the “marketplace” of
educational options to attract students and raise efficacy or ultimately shutter for
persistent “failure” (Linkow, Streich, and Jacob 2011). Driven by problematic
assumptions that the closure threat first motivates schools to improve their performance
and that second, schools have the resources at their disposal to support improvements in
performance, the policy unmoors schools from the range of environments and actors that
produce “school failure”.
At the heart of this dissertation is an exploration of how the problematic
assumptions that undergird school closings articulate with the complex social realities
that stem from their enactment. As Jack and Sludden (2013) point out, school closings are
rarely a policy option pursued by school systems serving affluent constituencies.
Operationalized largely by “failing” urban districts in the midst of severe fiscal distress,
school closings, like other punitive market-based reforms (i.e. high stakes standardized
testing, teacher merit-pay), inject high degrees of risk and uncertainty into education
systems already reeling from decades of disinvestment and overwhelming student needs.
4

The policy, as a marketized bureaucratic apparatus, distills schools into an amalgam of
seemingly “objective” measures that rationalize an ultimatum for schools: demonstrate
“quality” through competition or close. These measures are divorced from neighborhood
geographies, school histories, the relations of the educators and students, student
demographics, and nuanced ways in which other district-level and state-level
accountability mandates, fiscal crises, and bipartisan politics converge to complicate the
work of teachers and administrators trying to keep their schools afloat amidst rising tides
of uncertainty and fiscal distress. In turn, the policy wrongly assumes that schools are
independent entities capable of governing their own fates, dissociating schools from the
layered neighborhood and district contexts that influence their resources and capacity for
“success” (as defined by the policy).
Whereas punitive yet not fatal measures such as annual defunding or labeling as
“persistently failing” accompanied other market-oriented policies (i.e. high-stakes
testing) historically, mass closures represent the next evolution in the marketization of
public education by creating zero-sum predicaments where neighborhood school
communities must find ways to demonstrate “quality” according to the laws of the market
or lose their buildings and livelihoods. In other words, by treating schools like businesses
and closing them for underperformance, the policy induces prophylactic action to respond
to the terminal stakes of failure. Understanding how neighborhood school communities
react to their positioning as endangered commodities in an urban education marketplace,
made ever more ominous by closures, provides insight into how the introduction of a
closure policy in a district transforms educational practice in threatened schools as
schools must minimize risk to their performance. Such insight further offers a window
5

consider how those practices align with or contradict several of the broader, principled
goals of urban education reform: equity and social justice for poor youth of color (Giroux
and Saltman 2009).
To examine closures’ implications for educational practice and reform, I trace
how neighborhood school leadership, staff, and students perceive the threat of closure
and how those perceptions shape their organizational structures, climates, and
relationships within neighborhood schools qualifying via standardized criteria for the
pool of potential closures. Moreover, I investigate how school communities narrate,
process, and strategize around fiscal crisis, resource scarcity, privatization creep, and the
construction of school failure at the state, district, and school levels – common conditions
that discursively inform the legitimacy and inevitability of neighborhood school closures.
In other words, unlike the bulk of research on this policy, I do not consider the impact of
school closures on youth and communities where schools have already been closed, but
rather how the risk and uncertainty around the policy threat influences the social and
cultural politics of schools working to resist closure.
Taking into account one of the central assumptions of this policy, that schools will
strive to improve the “quality” of their services (Smarick 2010), I argue that a careful
ethnographic examination of this policy as an interpretative process within schools is
needed to illuminate the complex responses and potentially unintended consequences of
the policy on the ground (Deeds and Pattillo 2014). I anchor my study at Johnson High, a
nonselective neighborhood high school in Philadelphia that has been identified as a
school “fit” for closure by the criteria established by the School District of Philadelphia
(School District of Philadelphia 2012a). It’s aged building, declining enrollments, and
6

regressive academic performance over the course of the last decade marked the school as
closure-worthy in 2011 when the district first issued school closure recommendations.
Over the course of the three years I spent conducting research, the threat of closure set
into motion a problematic assemblage of practices, discourses, and relationships that
contradicted one of the central missions of public education: to “ensure access to equal
educational opportunity for every individual” (U.S. Department of Education 2015). The
school, one of the most ethnically diverse neighborhood schools in the city, served as key
site to explore the ways in which the school closure hazard shaped Johnson High’s
cultural and racial politics and ensuing strategies around keeping the school open.
By also conducting ethnographic fieldwork in AY 2013-2014, the year of the
“doomsday” budget, I captured how political and organizational tumult at the state and
district levels came to powerfully influence student and staff narratives over their
capacity to survive as a school with increasingly unavailable resources and capacity to
perform. Conceiving of school closure policy as a process that involves the “negotiation,
contestation, or struggle between different group who may lie outside the formal
machinery of official policy making” (Ozga 2000:2), my ethnographic approach allowed
me to observe the productive capacities of the policy’s widespread circulation by
attending to not only one school community’s response, but also its vertically scaled
logics. I explored district and state-level policymakers and officials rationales for the
necessity of closures in the midst of a budget crisis, taking note of how their narratives
and actions conflicted or resonated with the grievances of school-level administrators,
educators, and students. In contrast to statistical approaches to studying education policy
that bring the gaze to decontextualized, bottom-line performance metrics, oftentimes
7

providing fodder for market-principled justifications for closure, ethnographic attention
to closures as process suggest several analytical advantages:
First, scaled ethnographic engagement at the school, district, and state levels
allowed me identify and problematize the driving assumption and therefore rationales for
the policy, that schools improve their “quality” when faced with the risk of closure. I do
this by showing how district and state policymakers constructed the methodology for
failure and how teachers, administrators, and students at Johnson High came to interpret
and act upon the criteria that the district used to define “quality” schools. These
interpretations informed a set of strategies that the administration, staff, and students used
to makeover the school into one “deserving” of being kept open yet brought into relief
the ethically muddled, racialized, and exclusionary dimensions of their response.
Second, the racial and moral tensions that these strategies surfaced had larger,
negative implications for peer relationships, the in-school experiences of students deemed
a “threat” to the “quality” of the school, and also educators’ sense of purpose and value
as advocates, mentors, and caregivers for all students. The fraught consciences of
leadership that I capture at the school, district, and state levels demonstrate that school
closures are not merely an inevitable process that shutters building and sells off public
infrastructure, but an impetus behind shifts in educational practice that have larger
implications for age-old purposes, aims, and values of non-selective public education. It
was only through immersion as a participant observer that I could watch this closure
process unfold in real time, documenting the lived experience of closures as well as their
unintended consequences in schools that did not ultimately did not close in this first
round, but perceived themselves as perpetually vulnerable to an impending round.
8

In the following sections, I will situate my ethnographic case study of Johnson
High in relation to literature on market-driven education reform, race and education
policy, and namely the scant research on school closures. I will further discuss what this
work contributes to these bodies of work. From there I will introduce the theoretical
framework that I use to problematize school closures as policy as well as identify the
central mechanisms through which closure-as-threat sets the process of becoming a
“worthy” school into motion. Finally, I will delineate the research questions and
subsequent methodology I used to investigate this process.
Literature Review
Market-Driven Urban Education Reform and School Choice
In her canonical work The Life and Death of the Great American School System,
Diane Ravitch (2011) attributes the turn to markets to solve educational problems to the
release of the 1983 report, A Nation at Risk (ANAR) by the National Commission on
Excellence in Education. The 36-pg. report delineated a “crisis” in public education by
examining declining test scores, pervasive functional illiteracy, stagnant teacher salaries,
and growing turnover rates among educators. Likening the crisis to a “war” on “failure”
that America must wage in its schools in order to avoid economic ruin, ANAR tethered
educational mediocrity to ominous market predictions. Embraced by the Reagan
administration, ANAR paved the way for an era of technocratic, market-driven tactics to
restore “excellence” to the educational system.
While Ravitch describes this turn to markets as rooted in panic about the “failing”
state of public education as defined by the United States’ decline as an economic
powerhouse, Mehta (2013) links marketization to one of a series of paradigm shifts
9

throughout the 20th and 21st centuries that have shaped a politics of accountability in the
education sector to “reduce variation and discretion across school in favor of increasingly
formal systems of standardized top-down control” (1). Within the current iteration of
these reformers, academics, and politicians identify unwieldy school bureaucracies, lack
of standards, and direct democratic control of schools as the roots of “failure.” Framing
“failure” as a problem rooted in institutions, reformers aggressively pursued policies
promoting “school choice” and “school competition” to improve schools and student
achievement (Chubb and Moe 1990; Hanushek 1986). Endemic to this movement was the
assumption that market-driven policies that held failing institutions accountable and
incentivized “success” (defined vis-à-vis standardized testing metrics) would galvanize
schools to improve their “quality.”
Social scientists and education scholars alike have broadly used the term
“neoliberalism” (Harvey 2005; Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; Lipman 2011; Brenner and
Theodore 2002; Apple 2001; Hursh 2008; Giroux and Saltman 2009) or “market
fundamentalism” (Somers 2008; Cucchiara 2013) to capture the rising moral authority of
markets in the governance and provision of traditional public goods since ANAR’s release
in the early 1980s. For the purposes of situating school closure policy in a scholarly
discourse at the intersection of markets and the citizenship rights to equitable educational
opportunities, I draw on Margaret Somers (2008) coining and defining of market
fundamentalism as “an ideational regime” that “subjects all social life and the public
sphere to market mechanisms” (2). Market fundamentalism has been powerful and
widespread restructuring force in the governance and provision of public goods in the last
30 years, particularly public education in major American cities. Intensified high-stakes
10

standardized testing, charter school and school of choice expansion, and privatization of
public school operations all fall under what Bartlett and her colleagues (2002) describe as
the “marketization of education,” or the embedding of business-oriented principles into
policy, school operations, and discourses around public education’s purposes and aims.
Education scholars have pointed to the roots of market fundamentalism in the
theoretical assumptions generated by neoclassical economists like Frederic Von Hayek
and Milton Friedman (K. Saltman 2007; Johnson 2013). These economists posited in the
1950s that only through unfettered markets could individuals maximize their potential.
Following this logic, they argued that market fundamentalism necessitated the
privatization of public resources to improve their efficiency and quality and therefore
empower individuals through expanding market opportunities. Social scientists have
traced the historical uptake of these once peripheral theories into mainstream social
policy in the 1980s under the political leadership of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald
Reagan, (Katz 2010; Harvey 2005; Hall 2005). Katz (2010) specifically argues that
market-driven education reform mirrors the erosion of the Keynesian welfare state from
the 1980s to the present. He writes,
The war on dependence, the devolution of authority, and the application of market
models also run through the history of public education in these decades. The
attack on "social promotion," emphasis on high-stakes tests, implementation of
tougher high school graduation requirements and transmutation of
"accountability" into the engine of school reform: all these developments are a
piece with the war on dependence. They call students to stand on their own with
rewards distributed strictly according to personal (testable) merit…In both
education and public assistance, the mechanism of reform became the
centralization of acceptable outcomes and the decentralization of the means for
achieving them (55-56).
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Sharing Katz’s view, Lipman (2011) similarly links the turn to market drivenreforms in education with decline of the welfare state, pointing to a shift in the social
imaginary that transformed both (poor) urban youth and their families from citizens with
naturally endowed rights to education to consumers of educational services. Making an
explicit link between this strain of thinking and school choice movement, Lipman writes,
“People are “empowered” by taking advantage of the opportunities of the market…One
improves one’s life situation by becoming an “entrepreneur of oneself”, cultivating the
image, persona, and resume that enhances one’s competitive position in the marketplace
of “human capital”” (11). This framing of youth as “entrepreneurs of the selves”,
similarly transforms schools from publicly funded democratic institutions to competitive
enterprises responsible for producing human capital for the larger economy. Saltman
(2007) argues that this tendency for market-driven reforms to fold politics into economics
translates social issues like educational inequality into business-oriented concerns with
possibilities for profiteering. School choice and voucher plans in education reinforce
conceptions of schools as largely serving the needs of the economy rather than the
inculcation of democratic and civic sensibilities (Apple 2006, 39).
These transformations induced by market-reforms in education have prompted
researchers to examine their stratifying effects and subsequent implications for social
inequality and citizenship (Cucchiara 2013; Lipman 2011; Brown 2012; Ball 1994).
Philadelphia, among other major cities like Dallas, New York, New Orleans, Detroit, and
Chicago, has become a vanguard for market-driven educational policies, particularly in
the last ten years. As market fundamentalist logics have gained political and discursive
credence through the passing of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2002 and
12

Obama’s Race to the Top program (RTTT) in 2009 (Ravitch 2013), scholars have used
cities including Philadelphia as a urban laboratory to study the application of these
policies. Research on reforms in Philadelphia in particular draws attention to the markets’
heavy incursion into educational provision and management through contracts with forprofit and non-profit management companies, the alignment of curriculum with highstakes testing, and the explosive growth of charter schools (Cucchiara, Gold, and Simon
2011; Christman, Gold, and Herold 2005; Gill et al. 2007; Gold, Christman, and Herold
2007).
Cucchiara’s (2013) recent exploration of the Center City Schools Initiative
(CCSI), a public-private partnerships between the Center City District, a powerful
business improvement districts (BID), serves as a prime example of the tensions that arise
from introducing market models of governance to public education. Predicated on a
particular vision of urban prosperity, the policy targeted public schools in Philadelphia’s
most affluent neighborhood for bolstering and branding in order to retain upper middleclass families. However, the policy positioned these families as privileged consumers of
educational amenities while further marginalizing lower-class families that fell beyond
the catchments. My intent is to draw on this work to situate school closures in
Philadelphia within the national arc of market-driven reforms over the course of the last
30 years. In doing so I hope to examine school closures as a consequence of these
reforms as well as an extension of market-driven logics as they come to restructure
neighborhood geographies and the urban youths’ relationships to their schools.
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Race, Education Policy, and the Construction of Failure
Critical theorists studying market-driven education reform argue for the centrality
of race as a lens to understand the functions of educational policy and their effects on
marginalized communities of color. Fundamental to this literature is the notion that
“colorblind”, technocratic representations of educational outcomes to assess student and
school “quality”, mask the powerful links between academic achievement and the racial
organization of society (Bonilla-Silva 2009; Yosso 2005; Zamudio et al. 2011; hooks
1990; Ladson-Billings 1995). Several scholars argue that A Nation at Risk (1983) first
ushered in the notion of the “at risk” youth through the tacit lamination of academic
failure onto particular racial groups (Margonis, 1992; Winfield, 1991). Policymakers and
researchers defined the label “at risk” in relation to groups’ inadequate educational
achievement, providing a rationale for the positioning of African-American and Latino
students as posing the greatest risk to the nation’s global competitiveness (Gadsden,
Davis, and Artiles 2009). By using abysmal achievement data to construct educational
crisis in ANAR, O’Connor, Hill, and Robinson (2009) contend that race significantly
shaped the discourse around risk in education from the beginnings of the accountability
movement.
Despite these early efforts to elucidate the institutional and structural forces that
placed children at risk, at-risk status was commonly reduced to an internalize trait
or inherent characteristic and rapidly became synonymous with "minority" status
(2).
Within a similar frame, other scholars have traced the ways in which educational
legislation pushing privatized, technocratic solutions to educational inequities have
further perpetuated the conflation of risk and race and the rendering of “institutional and
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structural” forces shaping the educational opportunities of “risky” students invisible
(Giroux and Saltman 2009b; Gillborn 2005; McDermott 2007). School reforms
characterized by high-stakes testing and punitive accountability mechanisms that
followed the passing of No Child Left Behind in 2002, they understand, as concealing the
systemic barriers that children and their families confront like health disparities,
institutional racism, and generational poverty through a language of “tough love and
harsh sanctions” (Leonardo 2009, 137; Lipman 2011). Terming market-driven reforms
like those stemming from the passing of NCLB as an “acts of whiteness”, Leonardo
(2009) maintains that they contribute to a “white common sense” that reduces academic
disparities along racial lines to the natural outcomes of group competition or cultural
explanations for the inferiority of people of color. In other words, “failure”, is assigned to
racial categories and normalized through the taken-for-granted scientific logic of the
policy. Market-driven reform correspondingly frames schools serving high numbers of
“failing” students (of color) as “failing”, further collapsing failure and race through
technocratic rationalities. Since urban schools serve large groups of high-need students
(English Language Learners, poor children of color) and suffer from chronic resource
shortages, many claim that technocratic, accountability-centered policy regimes like
NCLB produce failure by establishing impossible targets without more funds to meet
student needs (Darling-Hammond 2004; Epstein 2012; Saltman 2007).
Joining high-stakes testing and accountability, others have pointed to the cultural
politics of race as focal to the rise of market-oriented reforms like charter school
expansion, privatization, and school competition. Borrowing from Haymes's (1995)
racialized metaphors of concepts of the ‘public’ and ‘private’ as equated with ‘good’ and
15

‘white’ and ‘bad’ and ‘black’ respectively, Lipman (2011) maintains that the cultural
politics of race have provided the fodder to privatize public goods like education. In a
similar vein as Katz (2010), she attributes the privatization of public education as part
and parcel of a larger racialized project that constructs people of color as pathological and
lazy in order to diminish state responsibility and end “dependency” (13). Colorblind,
market influenced discourses around these reforms relieve the state of responsibility for
mitigating racial inequality and disinvestment in communities of color and ultimately
shifts the burden onto those communities to overcome the structural and ideological
obstacles to realize their fundamental rights as citizens.
Individual effort, entrepreneurship and personal accountability are the path to
success. This paves he way for cultural explanations of poverty and race-neutral
policies and furthers market solutions and disinvestment in the public sphere
(Lipman, 2011, 13).
As Lipman highlights, embedded within the rhetoric of “school choice” especially, lies
“racially coded” justifications for the handing over of public institutions to the private
sector. Pointing to the rollback of affirmative action, “culture of poverty” discourse
penetrating explanations for educational failure, and individual choice as a route to
equitable educational opportunities, she understand deracialization as a “silent partner of
markets.”
Given that school closures are a policy adopted by primarily urban districts
serving disproportionate percentages of low-income youth of color, I borrow from critical
scholarship that assumes race as central to the construction and production of academic
“failure.” As districts close “failing” schools, they draw on the technocratic language
inscribed in policies like NCLB that prescribe market-driven solutions to school failure.
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Those solutions do not account for the ways in which race and poverty as powerfully
intertwining structuring forces come to bear on schools, nor how the fiscal crises that
plague school districts are often exacerbated by market reforms like charter schools that
further drain resources and students from already disinvested neighborhood schools. By
using race as a lens through which to understand the dynamics of school closure, I also
am able to document how race and racism impact the experiences of students of color in
schools under consideration for closure (Zamudio et al. 2011). The processing of race in
schools through the praxis of teachers, administrators, and students is of particular import
to my study as “decisions” made in classrooms and offices are informed by decisions at
the district and state-levels that rely heavily on the discursive rationalities of cold
markets. Understanding race’s role and impact in schools under the threat of closure
requires an multi-level analysis of how race is produced across institutions (Dreeben and
Barr 1987; Vavrus and Bartlett 2006).
School Closure as Policy
The rationale for school closures is rooted in the same technocratic, marketoriented discourses around institutional failure that have characterized more extreme
educational reforms since the passing of No Child Left Behind. Smarick (2010), in his
piece, “The Turnaround Fallacy”, argues that closing underperforming schools trumps
other reforms because within the for-profit sector, businesses fail to make space for
successful businesses in the market, therefore “raising all ships.” Without a market to
hold schools accountable for their “quality”, low-performance will continue in schools
unchecked. Sunderman and Payne (2009) tout further benefits to closing schools such as
transferring students in underperforming schools to better schools, driving existing
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schools to improve their performance through the closure threat, and creating
opportunities for the development of new schools. Informing this logic, again, is a
Friedmanite economic “shock therapy” that envisions school closures as a means to purge
the market of inefficiencies and allows private providers like charter schools to develop
more “innovative” educational models (Johnson 2013). Closure policy further articulates
with accountability rhetoric embedded in national-level discourse around reform as
educators are held responsible for failing to deliver on the promise of quality educational
opportunities for children (Duncan 2006, 458).
According to Deeds and Pattillo (2014), although school closings have received
considerable attention in the media as a controversial reform, scholars have been slow to
look at closure empirically. The small pool of school closure-focused studies has tended
to examine their impact on student achievement and districts’ savings. Some studies have
suggested that students displaced by school closures experience adverse effects on
achievement and attendance in the short-run but diminish within the first year of transfer
(Pew Charitable Trust and Philadelphia Research Initiative 2011; Engberg et al. 2012;
Ozek, Hansen, and Gonzalez 2012). Other studies portend that the negative effects on
student achievement endure over several years, but that can be mitigated by students
transferring to higher-performing schools (de la Torre and Gwynne 2009). A report
released by the Pew Trust and Philadelphia Research Initiative (2011) that conducted a
study of six major cities’ experiences closing schools en masse suggested that the cost
savings of closing schools is limited, particularly with the growth of charter schools that
continue to empty seats in district schools. Costs such as maintenance of shuttered

18

buildings, transportation for dislocated students, and moving furniture and schools’ other
assets diminished both short-term and long-term savings (Jack and Sludden 2013).
A even smaller but growing literature on school closures has begun to look at its
political and social dimensions, exploring not merely closures’ “measurable” outcomes
but how those relate to questions around equity and notions of social justice. The New
York Working Group on Social Transformation (2012) conducted a study of New York
City’s mass closings and found that closed schools had greater numbers on average of
low income, special needs, African-American, and English Language Leaners than other
district schools. These same schools also experienced influxes of these high-need
populations five years before their phase-out, suggesting that exponential charter school
growth in NYC contributed to a sorting of high needs students into district schools
(Gabor 2014). The same pattern characterized the schools in the considered pool in
Philadelphia’s initial foray into closures in AY 2011-2012 (Research for Action 2012).
This sorting further indicates that the stratifying effects of school choice and
accountability policies contributed to the conditions of “failure” that qualified
neighborhood schools for closure.
Other scholars point to the flawed logics of school closures as they assume that
students will sort into higher performing schools once the “failing” school are identified
and shuttered. Pointing out the unlikelihood that the majority of displaced students will
have access to the mixed-incomes schools that are located primarily in gentrifying
neighborhoods of cities (Lipman 2011; Aggarwal, Mayorga, and Nevel 2012; Bierbaum
2014), and that existing higher-performing neighborhood schools are overenrolled and
oftentimes still labeled “underperforming” by the standards of No Child Left Behind
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(Shaw and Schott 2013), research raises doubts about whether closing schools actually
accomplishes the intended objectives of the policy. The geographical concentration of
“low-performing” schools considered for closure in the most economically disadvantaged
and segregated areas of cities helps to explain these flaws as school “failure” becomes an
index for racially textured poverty (Research for Action 2013). Consistent with Lipman
(2011), closures often eliminate schools that serve as anchors in the poorest
neighborhoods. In Chicago, where she does her work, school closures occurred in
neighborhoods with the highest concentrations of low income African-Americans (55).
Here one can see the intertwining of race, class, failure, and closure, bringing into relief
the ways in which the methodology of closures elides important social considerations
such as the presence of supportive neighborhood-centric institutions tied to community
histories.
Closures have also instigated controversy over what becomes of the buildings that
are forfeited. While many districts have looked to compensate for budget shortfalls
through the selling of empty buildings, large proportions of closed schools have been
turned over to charters, further propagating conspiracy theories of the mass privatization
of public education (Kristen Graham 2014). According to Jack and Sludden (2013),
growth in the charter school sector has driven districts to embrace closures because of
intra-district enrollment shifts as students leave district schools in exodus to enroll in
charters. In Philadelphia, a consultant report estimated that the district loses $7,000 for
every student that leaves for a charter school as the transfer creates new costs for the
district in payouts to the charter school and fixed costs for the student’s former school
remain constant (Herold 2012). The “financial strain” of the “inefficiencies” imposed by
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maintaining essentially two separate educational systems, has served as a guiding
rationale in studies conducted by independent consultants that have recommended
closures in Philadelphia and other cities (Boston Consulting Group 2012; Socolar 2012;
Pew Charitable Trust and Philadelphia Research Initiative 2011). These studies
recommend “consolidation” through closures in order to mitigate the fiscal insolvency of
almost bankrupt districts.
Other work suggests that many cities have seen a decline in their number of
school-age children with the rise of the “knowledge class”, young professionals between
the ages of 25 and 35 that have delayed marriage and children as they focus on careers,
therefore increasing the overall population of the city, yet decreasing the number of
children attending schools (Cucchiara 2013; Sanchez 2013). Such studies argue that with
buildings “half empty”, it does not make sense to keep the schools open. The rise of
charters however complicates this reasoning as well as raises questions around the
pressures of gentrification to close schools and privatize. Bierbaum's (2014) investigation
in the role of gentrification in pressuring the closing and sale of school buildings looks to
illuminate population and neighborhood change as an impetus behind the location and
concentration of closures.
The explosion of charter schools has raised further questions for scholars about
the dangers privately managed public schools pose to democratic governance of these
institutions. As Grant and his colleagues (2014) argue, schools have historically been
considered democratic spaces of collective responsibility. However, school closings that
precipitate charter takeover have turned schools into commodities that can be bought and
sold without community participation or deliberation (Saltman 2007; Harwitt 2015).
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Appointed boards also usually govern charter schools, truncating accountability to
parents and communities. Many show that charter schools deprive community members
and parents’ of their right to an active role in their children’s education (Buras 2014;
Lipman 2011). As previously mentioned, this robbing of rights to participation
compounds political and economic disenfranchisement historically experienced by the
communities that school closures disproportionately impact.
As I have demonstrated, the limited work on school closures has examined the
implications of closures for student achievement, district finances, and costs to students.
A small group of scholars have considered more philosophically the problems school
closures pose for equity and democratic governance. Therefore, the literature generally
straddles the technical characteristics of closure policy and the larger political context,
but very few that examine the political forces at work ‘on the ground’ that shape district
reforms like closures. More integrated work is needed on this issue to understand what
Trujillo et al. (2014) writes as central to holistic educational policy studies,
We need to attend to the political factors that shape district policymaking and
reform…[and] the ways in which a district’s political history is encapsulated by
specific stakeholders, and how individuals’ positionalities shape their
interpretations of district reform. (896)
Jeffrey Henig (2009; 2013;1995)’s and Dorothy Shipps (2012; 2003)’s argue that
attention to local politics and paradigm shifts at different levels of scale is needed to
capture school choice movements’ impact on neighborhood school governance, yet this
work remains seminal within studies of school closures. Two researchers very recently
framed school closure policy as a scaled political process by borrowing from work in
organizational dynamics. Deeds and Pattillo (2014) argue that studies have often wrongly
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conceptualized school failure as an outcome instead of an “interpretative process” in
“pluralistic institutional environments” among diverse stakeholders. Studying school
closure as a process instead of an outcome, they show how competing conceptions of
legitimacy played out politically between technocrats and the assemblage of students,
teachers, and community members in a closing school, divergently defining, enacting,
and contesting failure.
Johnson (2013) provides a compliment to their work by not just looking at the
organizational dynamics of closing schools but the cultural and ethical changes that the
threat of closure induced. By ethnographically tracing how the school interpreted what
kind of an institution it would have to become to “merit” staying open, she demonstrates
how the policy placed the onus on the school to remake itself anew without additional
resources. She contends that this shift in responsibility to the school itself “reflects a
cultural and moral shift in the conception of public schools” as social institutional
networks protected from the effects of markets and competition to entrepreneurial actors
responsible for their own fates. Such a conception resonates with Somers’s (2008) notion
that market fundamentalist logics shift social risk onto the backs of vulnerable
populations.
In this dissertation, I seek to build on the work around school closures that
conceives of failure as a socio-political process that envelops multiple stakeholders,
geographies, and institutions. Little work on closures has used this frame or examined
what Johnson terms the “cultural and ethical” changes that schools feel forced to make
when confronted with the “threat” of closure. I am interested in the productive work that
the closure threat does in the institutions that feel its weight, and how the strategies that
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teachers, administrators and students use to contest the threat, come to bear peer and
educator relationships and school climates and identities.
I am also interested to the degree that race and risk become conflated as schools
chart their futures based on assessments of which students pose the greatest danger to
their fate as a school. As long as the “school choice” movement continues to garner
strength in cities across the country, driving fierce competition for students and resources,
school closures will remain a policy priority in districts suffering from severe fiscal crises
and hemorrhaging student bodies to charter schools (Hangley Jr. 2012). As a result, the
threat of closure will endure for neighborhood schools trying to keep their doors open. In
contrast to studies that have merely examined the impacts of closures in the same
technocratic ways in which they are defined by the policy, I contribute to understandings
of perceptions of threat and the nuanced interpretations and responses of school
communities to closure.
Theoretical Framework
School closure, at its core, is a policy that injects high degrees of risk and
uncertainty into educational systems as schools are frequently audited by districts vis-àvis consultants to determine their cost-effectiveness, quality, and overall worth.
Neighborhood schools resisting closure therefore must strategize around how to
demonstrate worthiness to meta-level auditors within an educational marketplace that
positions them as inferior in the realm of school choice. I therefore draw on three
theoretical concepts to guide make sense of this process of becoming a school deemed
worthy of remaining open according the measurable criteria of the school closure
methodology. This is a process of both intertwined resistance and complicity to the
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criteria through which the district determined school “worthiness.” First, I bring in
critical policy literature to ground my project in an approach that foregrounds social
justice and equity as its values and explores policy in its development as a contested
process at multiple levels of scale, as well as a process with the capacity to set other
socio-political processes into motion. I move to social theories of risk and uncertainty
that focus on the social construction of these concepts as they relate to racialized readings
of value and danger. These theories help me to understand how risk and uncertainty are
produced and processed across state, districts, and schools. Finally, I draw on
anthropologies of branding and value to illuminate how schools fashion worthiness via
their racialized readings of risk in a market-driven policy environment.
Critical Policy Studies.
School closures are not only a pervasive policy priority in urban districts but also
a product of an assemblage of policies in the last 30 years that have pushed districts
toward markets as a dominant form of educational governance. Contrary to
understandings of policies as having linear, circular trajectories (Colebatch 1998; Clay
and Schaffer 1984), I situate my work in a tradition of research that considers policy as a
practice of power that implicates diverse agents both inside and outside of formal policymaking bodies. I conceive of policy as “authorized text” that “circulates by various
means across the various institutional contexts to which it applies” and interacts with
other agents in dynamic processes (Levinson, Sutton, and Winstead 2009, 779; Koyama
2010). Using the concept of “appropriation”, Levinson and colleagues (2009) see the
interpretation and incorporation of elements of policy into agents’ “schemes of interest,
motion, and action” as central to understanding how policy is both officially and
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unofficially contested and enacted in peoples’ lives (p.779). This lens is couches policies
within social and cultural worlds that both create as well as reflect those worlds (Ball
1994). As Shore and Wright (2003) explain,
Policies are not simply external, generalized or constraining forces, nor are they
confined to texts. Rather, they are productive, performative, and continually
contested. A policy finds expression through sequences of events; it creates new
social and semantic spaces, new sets of relations, new political subjects and new
webs of meaning (5).
This view illuminates the ways in which networks of individuals at different
levels of scale imbue school closure policy with meaning and legitimacy. Further, it helps
us to see the productive capacity of the policy’s circulation as teachers, administrators,
students, and district officials interpret it, craft responses, and forge relationships in their
support or resistance for its implementation. Drawing on the ontological and
epistemological traditions of anthropology, this analysis asks what policy means in local
contexts, how does it work, who does it serve, and what are its effects on the social?
Critical policy studies assume the problematic nature of policies as they attempt to
depoliticize inherently political terrains like schools by making themselves seem
incontrovertible. Defining “failure” of a school vis-à-vis a series of “standardized”
metrics therefore becomes self-evident within a policy regime that privileges the
employment of purely quantitative measures of evaluation.
The critical policy tradition also allows one to attend to power relations as they
articulate with social forces like race, class, and gender (Cucchiara 2013; Ozga and Jones
2006). With regards to the evolution of educational policy in the United States, racial
politics especially have been central to the structuring of educational opportunities from
the nation’s beginning, naturalized by the dominant rationalities around race over time.
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Thrupp and Willmott (2003) argue that uncritical ‘policy science’ oftentimes minimizes
or neglects to attend to the structural and historic relations that shape school-based
problems. Critical policy analysis calls for an interrogation of structuring forces like race,
as struggle, conflict, and politics over issues of equity and social justice that “lie at the
heart of processes through which policy is shaped” (Gillborn 2005:4). I use this lens to
examine the role that conceptions of race blur with the technical rationalities of education
policy in school closures and to situate closure within the social, economic, political and
cultural urban contexts where they overwhelmingly operate (Lipman 2011; Grace 1984).
Following this tradition, I do not see school closure policy as a bounded, linear
entity that trickles down, but as a process that engages actors across sites to create “new
rationalities of governance and regimes of knowledge and power”(Shore and Wright
2003:2). Understanding policy as “text” processed across diverse institutional sites allows
me attend to not only how school-level actors manage the threat of closure, but also how
closure as policy is created, interpreted, and executed in other realms of educational
governance. In other words, I am able to not only capture the process that ensues when
the district produces its methodology for closures but how its circulation further spurs
interpretative processes of that methodology between and within school communities
among a range of actors including non-profit partners, neighborhood coalitions, and
national and city-level philanthropists. I focus particularly on the moral dilemmas that
school-level actors face as they attempt to respond to not only the threat of closure, but
also how the threat interpellates other difficult everyday realities of work in a high-need,
resource-poor conditions.
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At its core, this dissertation focuses on what school closure means to the
communities made most vulnerable through its logics. Through the application of this
particular theoretical conception of policy, I contribute to understandings of not only the
mechanisms and assumptions that influence the construction of school closure policy at
macro-levels of scale, but also how school-level actors make sense of their positioning,
urgency of action, and the logistics and possibilities for resistance. Capturing this sensemaking process brings into relief how the introduction of a closure policy to a district
initiates controversial changes in the organizational and social dynamics of threatened
schools that come to bear directly students’ outcomes, educational experiences, as well as
school climates that cultivate exclusion, fear, and risk management, rather than
belonging, creativity, collaboration, and risk taking in pursuit of academic and social
exploration.
Risk Management
Since school closure signifies what Johnson (2013) refers to as a kind of “social
and civic death”, it serves as a form of injected “risk” into already unstable educational
systems. Gene Rosa (1998) defines risk as a “situation or event where something of
human value (including human themselves) has been put at stake and where the outcome
is uncertain” (28). This conception departs from more technical, scientific understandings
of risk that examine “objective” probabilities of a particular set of circumstances arising,
usually grounded in the ontological assumptions of actuarial science. Rosa and other
social scientists understand risk not as grounded in a “real world” but constructed and
mediated through the defining of social problems and their management in relation to
actor-oriented values and power relations (Zinn 2008). In other words, they understand
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“risk” as socially situated and entailing a state of uncertainty where something of value is
at stake but not inevitably designated for destruction. From here, they question how
people identify, understand, and manage uncertainty in context. These questions resonate
with cultural approaches to risk that see not only knowledge but also individuals’
sociocultural values as central to their perceptions of risk (Douglas 2013; Wildavsky and
Dake 1990). These theorists claim that individuals’ values are culturally and historically
embedded and cannot be separated from conceptions of morality and danger across
communities (Tulloch and Lupton 2003; Kearney and Donovan 2013; Boholm 2003).
According to Bialostok and Whitman (2012), while cultural approaches to risk
have gained prominence across the social sciences and “risk-talk saturates the field of
education” (1), few scholars have theorized risk in relation to the field of education. They
point to A Nation at Risk (1983) as starting point for the explosion of risk terminology in
education research, and the naturalization of the analytic category, “at-risk”, to describe
and predict student failure, specifically among children of color. Policy discourses
ushered in by the Reagan administration that marketed fear about the direction of
education prompted what Bialostok and Whitman argue as an era of “large-scale risk
management in American public schools” (22). These scholars argue however that “atrisk children,” “achievement gaps,” and “illiteracy,” pervasive in this discourse, are not
part of nature’s reality but naturalized through the defining of problems and subsequent
creation of these phenomena through human systems. In the current moment, “risk” in
education is produced through market fundamentalist logics. They write,
In education, we see the emergence of a rationality of the market over other
rationalities, intensification of standards, intensified control of teacher and student
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work, and students educated to state their own uncertain futures and pro-actively
manage potential risks (9).
As Zinn explains, the most general assumption of all conceptual approaches to risk is
“that the future can be altered – or at least perceived as such – by human activities” (5).
This turn to markets as a mechanism to manage risk in education is intrinsically
connected with what Ulrich Beck (1992) described as the “rise of the risk society” to
suggest that in modernity, people must plan their own life trajectories in response to the
hazards brought about by modernization. Within “risk societies” capitalist markets
become not only a consequence of modernization but also a mechanism for controlling
the risks associated with free market economies – underperformance, ineffiency,
bankruptcy, and fiscal insecurity. Power (2004) argues that by the mid-1990s, both the
private and public-sectors were “invaded by varying degrees by ideas about risk and
management…This phenomenal expansion of the risk industry reflects a number of
different but convergent pressures for change in organizational practices for dealing with
uncertainty” (9). The growing strength of market fundamentalism as an “ideational
regime” in the governance of public goods therefore historically coincides with the
expansion of risk management, subjecting public realms like education to market laws
and “enabling citizen-consumers to take responsibility for their own well-being” through
markets (Rose 1999:141–142). Somers (2008) reminds us that under market
fundamentalism, governments have shifted the risks of capitalism onto “individual
workers and vulnerable families” (2), echoing Rose’s (1999) claim that the market has
not usurped the government but rather that the primary role of government has become to
enable the market to function effectively.
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Within public education sector, this current paradigm has manifested most
prominently in urban districts in two major ways. First, districts like Philadelphia have
operationalized “school choice” through charterization, creating and facilitating an
education market which charges poor students and families of color to orient themselves
toward uncertain futures and select and consume “quality” education as an antidote to the
risks of cyclical poverty. Second, and more pertinent to this dissertation’s focus,
education markets, created through policies like privatization and closure, transfer the
risks and consequences for failure onto school communities. Schools must succeed within
these state-enabled markets by managing in-school social and organizational dynamics as
they relate and implicate measures that risk their survival as institutions.
Because I examine in this dissertation the response of a school labeled closure
worthy, I draw on this literature to understand not only the how the policy constructs and
introduces risk and uncertainty, but how schools respond to the deepening marketization
of public education that this particular policy instantiates. At the district-level, officials
formulate closure as a response to the construction of school “failure” vis-à-vis highstakes testing, declining enrollments in neighborhood schools due to the expansion of
charter schools, and chronic budget crises that make the renovation of older buildings
difficult to finance. The policy assesses school value in relation to a narrow series of
measures that embed risk in the form of fiscal and numeric “inefficiencies” yet does not
account for the nuanced nature of school environments, community-derived
understandings of school value, and variables that remain entirely outside of educators
and students’ control (i.e. building quality) that introduce “risk” to their performance. In
turn, it induces preemptive action where school communities must systematically deal
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with the insecurity and uncertainty that accompanies the threat of closure without the
control and oftentimes capacity to perform to the standards set by the policy.
I am suggesting here that the concepts emergent within the anthropology and
sociology of risk are helpful to understand schools within the current system as small
societies that must chart their own courses in response to perceptions of risk within an
increasingly aggressive and austere education market – a market reified and deepened by
urban school districts (with support from their state and federal governments) that adopt
closures. Further, social constructions of risk not only illuminate the macro-level effects
of school closure on a larger system of schools, but also how that risk gets translated into
practice and official and unofficial school policies that seek to manage subjects perceived
as posing a “risk” to a school’s performance and reputation.
Drawing on the work of critical race scholarship in education, the social
construction of risk, specifically as it relates to students, is deeply influenced by
institutional racism. Research has pointed to the disproportionate disciplining and
policing of Black students, particularly males, driven by an anti-black imaginary
naturalized within neoliberal education reform (Leonardo 2009; Ladson-Billings 2005).
The Black male stereotype crystallizes the behavior and characteristics antithetical to a
reform movement that seeks to “save” pathologized subjects from themselves through
educational uplift (Leonardo 2004). Many ethnographers have linked the prison industrial
complex to the criminalization and perverse treatment of Black children in schools,
reinforcing notions of “natural difference” between Black students and White and other
students of color (Rios 2011; Ferguson 2001; Alexander and West 2012). I use this frame
in conjunction with the social processes accompanying the construction of risk to
32

understand the anti-Black racialization of risk in urban schools competing to remain
open.
Anthropologies of Branding and Value
The commodity exists in a liminal space, caught between itself and what it is not
but what it reaches for, what it can become (Nakassis 2013:112).
In the previous section, I argued that the marketization of urban education through
the closure of ‘failing schools’ parallels the intensification and proliferation of “risk
management” within the public sector in the last 30 years, making theories of risk useful
to understand how districts and school communities interpret school-closure threats. Here
I argue that understanding school communities’ responses to the possibility of closure,
requires theories of branding as schools compete within an “urban education
marketplace” of school choice (Cucchiara 2008). Closures, as an extension of market
fundamentalist logics, have further commoditized the nature of urban public education by
subjecting schools to market laws like competition and deregulation (Jabbar 2015a; Buras
2014; Kasman and Loeb 2012). The demands of market competition transform schools
into commodities striving to not only stimulate consumption, but also to create an
impression of “quality” that will sustain consumption and drive value over time. Bastos
and Levy (2012) write that
At the root of all branding activity is the human desire to be someone of
consequence, to create a personal and social identity, to present oneself as both
like other people (e.g. to belong) and unlike other people (e.g. to stand out), and to
have a good reputation (Bastos and Levy 2012:349).
I draw on theories of branding to understand the process of value-creation that
neighborhood schools must engage to succeed in an ever-privatizing education market.
They must become institutions of “consequence” through identity makeovers and brand
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differentiation. As Nakassis (2013) explains, brands authenticate relationships between
consumers and producers by transcending their use and exchange values to invoke an
immaterial imaginary based on “goodwill, reputation, loyalty, and even love” (113). As
cultural, ideological, and sociological objects, brands have mimetic power to create
affective attachments between themselves and their consumers (Comaroff and Comaroff
2009; Chanock 2000; Schroeder, Salzer-Mörling, and Askegaard 2006). According to
Meenaghan (1995), “brand choice is based on emotional and intuitive feelings about
brands…how these brands satisfy consumer’s needs and fit into the consumer’s
relationship with his/her world” (15). More simply, the “image” of a commodity matters
as much or more than its function, benefits, facts, or features – it is the way that the brand
exploits human affect that gives it the capacity to extract further profit within the market.
I apply this notion of affective attachments to understand relationships between
families and urban schools in the current moment, as the marketplace necessitates strong
consumer-producer attachments to enable school survival in the face of competition. While
an emergent scholarship in educational commodification has appropriated this frame to
explain how organizations like business districts and ethnic associations have “branded”
schools to selectively attract students (Cucchiara, 2008; Gulson & Webb, 2013), they explore
these processes in relation to broader institutional efforts to revitalize urban space and
commodify ethnic identities. I build on this work by distinctively linking branding to the
cultural politics and exclusionary practices propelled by market-driven policies like school
closure as schools manipulate raced and classed symbols of “quality” to broaden their
consumer bases, instantiate their worth, and with any luck, succeed in the educational
marketplace. Viewing the traditional neighborhood school as engaged in a process of
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“becoming” valuable to the market through branding exposes how the selective pursuit of
youth-familial-consumers that both enhance as well as minimize risk to a school’s brand,
index racialized, classed, and potentially discriminatory educational practices.
Understanding how and the nature of the cultural politics and educational
practices surface around a school’s branding process has several analytical advantages for
educational governance and theory. First, branding requires school leadership to shift
their focus to managing perceptions around their school rather than directing their
energies toward meaningful and time-intensive improvements. Canonical scholarship
focused on “school improvement”, namely stemming from the Consortium on Chicago
School Research, identifies the centrality of curricular coherence (Newmann et al. 2001),
investments in school leadership, and sustained alignment of community and school
governing structures, to positive student outcomes (Bryk 2010; Bryk et al. 1998). While
branding does not necessarily preclude these efforts, as a process it obliges school
leadership to spend vast amounts of time advertising and marketing their schools in order
to reinforce symbolic associations between their brand imaginaries and their studentfamily consumer bases. The gaze therefore falls on improving perceptions of educational
“quality” rather than improving praxis itself – a process that Gewirtz, Ball, and Bowe
(1995) call “glossification”. This theory allows me to trace the tensions and conflicts that
emerge when leadership must straddle the fine line between marketing and improving
their schools.
Since the laws that govern the education market also differentially position
neighborhood schools by giving charter schools they discretion to fundraise corporate
dollars to supplement their budgets and remove students that violate their disciplinary and
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academic policies, neighborhood schools operate at a relative disadvantage within the
market. Overcoming this disadvantage entails finding new ways to effuse impressions of
“quality” in order to attract enrollments that match the brand imaginary. In spite of their
mission to serve all students, branding a neighborhood school successfully requires the
creation and maintenance of exclusivity within the brand. Therefore neighborhood school
branding processes rest on a central contradiction: non-selective schools must build
selective brands in order to compete with charter schools.
Using branding theory to explore this contradiction will shed light on the muddled
moral and ethical responses to school closure, as schools must purge themselves of
undesirable symbolic associations in order to establish marketable school brands. Such a
process problematically transmutes the mission of the neighborhood school to
indiscriminately operate in the service of every child. Further, understanding how other
structural forces like budget crises, demographic shifts, and other detrimental policy
changes outside of neighborhood schools’ come to interfere with this process, will help to
explain the limits of this strategy to resist closure as forces beyond the control of schools
stifle or enable schools to “merit” remaining open.
Research Questions
Thus, unlike the bulk of research on this policy that looks at the impact of
closures on districts and communities, this framework uniquely positions me to explain
how risk, uncertainty, and value-creation, induced by closure-as-policy, shift the practices
and purposes of public educators’ work from pedagogical and democratic, to
entrepreneurial and managerial. Moreover, understanding how those practices embed
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racialized notions of risk and value illuminates how school branding processes, prompted
by closure threats, exacerbate and extend inequities in educational opportunities.
Pursuant to this theoretical framework, my research questions explore school closure
policy as a practice of power that implicates an assemblage of different stakeholders
including state, district and local administrators and officials, educators and students in
all neighborhood schools, as well as affiliated partners and community members of
neighborhood schools, interrogating how risk management and branding work as
overlapping and tandem processes at different levels of scale.
1) In what ways does the School District of Philadelphia define and construct risk within
its rationale and subsequent methodology for school closures?
a. How has the history of marketization in the School District of Philadelphia’s
internal policies shaped their rationale and methodology for closing schools?
b. How are current fiscal crises and partisan politics within the state and district
influencing their sense of urgency to close schools?
o How have the district’s decade-long expansion of charter networks
fueled this urgency?
2) What strategies do school leaders use to signify/create educational value through
school branding?
a.

How do educators and youth working in and attending neighborhood schools
facing the threat of closure, perceive the risk and uncertainty around their fate
as a school?

b.

To whom and how do educators and youth assign blame for their
predicament as a potentially closed school?
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c.

What risk management strategies do they understand as necessary to “save
the school”?

3) How do strategies to brand schools around selective consumer identities produce
ethical tensions in educational practice and service provision in non-selective
neighborhood schools?
a. What cultural politics surface as schools forge brands around particular kinds
of student identities?
b. How do these strategies perpetuate and possibly deepen racialized disparities
in educational provision and performance for students with the greatest needs?
Methodology
The aims of this study are two-fold: 1) To understand how urban districts like
Philadelphia use technocratic discourses of risk to inform their rationales and
methodologies for rolling out mass school closures. 2) To explain how neighborhood
schools’ responses to the deepening marketization of public education (vis-à-vis closures)
are affecting their social and organizational dynamics as well as educational practice.
To explore both the historical process that led to Philadelphia’s mass school closures but
also the subsequent responses that closure policy set into motion in neighborhood schools
across the city, I conducted a vertical ethnographic case study in a Philadelphia
neighborhood school slated for closure, Johnson High. Vavrus and Bartlett (2006)
describe vertical case studies as different from traditional ethnographic case studies in
their “concomitant commitment to micro-level understanding and to macro-level
analysis” (96). Vertical case studies are grounded in primary sites like schools, but attend
to the ways in which scaled social structures, historical trends, and international, national,
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and local processes shape the site. They write,
Local understandings and social interactions should not be considered
demographically or geographically bounded. Instead, in a vertical case study,
understanding of the micro- level is viewed as part and parcel of larger structures,
forces, and policies about which the researcher must also develop a full and
thorough knowledge.
The approach allowed me to understand how the school closure policy came to affect the
social and political dynamics of a particular school vis-à-vis an assemblage of other
“structures and forces” like national and district-level politics, policies, and budget crises
that contributed to a meta-level discourse of inevitability and “common sense” around
employing privatization and closures as a means to cope with School District of
Philadelphia’s profound fiscal instability and “failure” to provide “quality” educational
opportunities to its students in district schools. The vertical nature of this case study
provided a window into the iterative exchange between state and district level
policymakers encouraging competition, charter expansion, and austerity, and a
neighborhood school’s internal policymaking and practices as it sought to calibrate topdown demands and pressures with its unique demographics, needs, and constraints.
Data Collection
Data collection for this study took place over two main periods of part-time and
full-time fieldwork. My interest in tracking the experiences of recently resettled refugee
youth in urban schools first motivated my initial entry into Johnson High in early 2011.
During this phase I served as a part-time volunteer in several classrooms, working with
teachers and non-profits organizations serving refugee youth both in the school and in the
larger neighborhood for an average of 15-20 hours per week. I sought through interviews
and participant observation at this stage to learn about the history of the school, its social
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context, and the ways it fit into the larger political and social fields of the city and school
district.
However, as I volunteered and tutored refugee youth from October 2011 to
August 2013, a number of charter schools opened in the neighborhood surrounding
Johnson High, damaging the school’s enrollment. The School District of Philadelphia
also issued a list of potential schools for closure, on which Johnson High ranked as high
priority. It became clear at this point that charterization, school closures, and fiscal
austerity were the central forces shaping Johnson High’s concerns and practices as an
endangered institution, and, in turn, the refugee youth that I was tracking. This original
work in the first phase therefore provided a window into the problem that I ultimately
tackled in this dissertation.
When I entered the second phase of my research in September 2013, I shifted my
focus to these drastic reforms, attending to the effects of 31 school closures and a
“doomsday” budget crisis that wreaked havoc on the district and school during AY 20132014 (Gabriel 2013). I paid more attention to the “verticality” of the school closures
policy, visiting district offices and conducting 40 structured, semi-structured, and
informal interviews with state and district-level officials, and observing education reform
hearings and meetings at city-hall, the district’s headquarters to understand how the
budget crisis and necessity of closures unfolded in state and district policies. I also
covered local and national news sources and attended district and state-level policy
meetings to understand the ways in which crisis informed the discourse around school
closures. This archival data that I drew upon came from the Philadelphia Inquirer, The
Notebook, The New York Times, Al Jazeera, Washington Posts, blogs of politicians and
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education activists, Philadelphia Magazine, Penn Gazette, policy documentation at
district level such as reports, statistical analyses of school performance, and press
statements.
I spent my days in classrooms as Johnson High to observe the concomitant effects
of the schools closures and budget crisis in the lives of students and staff. I developed
close relationships with the school’s administration, its teacher leadership, and a range of
philanthropic and non-profit players that the school drew upon to both fill critical
resource gaps, gain political capital and clout with connected individuals at the city-level,
and contribute to the school’s overall branding process. This immersion at Johnson High
proved the most illuminating as over 800 hours of participant observation, 160
interviews, 5 focus groups, and document analysis illuminated how school-level
interpretations of the school closure threat dramatically altered the ethos, climate, and
educational practices of Johnson High’s educators.
Table 1.1: Data Collection Phases
Phase

Data Collected
• 45 semi-structured interviews with
students, non-profit staff
• ~800 hours of participant
observation in school, partnering
non-profits, and neighborhood
• Document/media collection of
district budget crisis and school
closure
• ~160 structured, semi-structured,
and informal interviews with
teachers, administrators, students
• 5 focus groups with heterogeneous
samplings of students at Johnson
High
• ~800 hours of participant
observation in school, district

I
(October 2011-August 2013)
Part-time

II
(September 2013-June 2014)
Full-time
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headquarters, community meetings,
weekend and after-school nonprofit programming, and city-level
political institutions
• Continued document/media
collection of district budget crisis,
school closure
• Document collection of schoollevel and district-level data, reports
on performance

Why Johnson High?
Johnson High provided an extraordinary site to capture the ways in which the
school closure policy spurred subsequent processes of risk management and branding
within threatened schools, transforming educational practice, climate, and the identity of
the school writ large. As previously mentioned, Johnson High received notice early in
my fieldwork that the district had identified it as closure-worthy using criteria
recommended by the URS Corporation and the Boston Consulting Group. Based on
enrollment, building quality, academic performance, and safety, these two firms, charged
with conducting district-wide audits, scored Johnson High poorly. For the two calendar
years between initial recommendations for the closures and the closure of 31
neighborhood schools district wide in June 2012 and June 2013, the school had an
ultimatum: improve by metrics set forth by the auditors, or accept the chopping block.
Johnson High’s slating for closure in 2011 therefore offered a starting point to consider
how the threat of closure influenced staff and student responses.
The school is also one of the most ethnically variegated in the city, serving
increasing numbers of immigrant and refugee students not only from the neighborhood,
but also from across catchment lines. Several factors contribute(d) to its diverse
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composition. Johnson is nested in a neighborhood that has served as a traditional
immigrant gateway since the late 19th century, accommodating vast numbers of white
ethnic Europeans through the first half of the 20th century, and later waves of Southeast
Asian refugee families beginning in the 1970s (Dubin 1996). Each block around the
school also served as a home to a particular enclave. In recent years, the neighborhood
gained increasing numbers of refugees from Bhutan and Burma, a trend that significantly
altered Johnson High’s demographic (Shaw 2014). These newer waves joined second and
1.5 generation Cambodian, Vietnamese and Lao families, as well as longer-standing
Irish-American, Italian-American, and African-American communities with claims to
particular streets and business districts.
From 2011 to 2013, Johnson High saw a 10 percent increase in its Asian
population and a 10 percent decrease in its African-American population. One can also
see a moderate increase in the Latino population. The latter can mostly be attributed to
high volumes of unaccompanied Central American minors, mostly from Honduras.
Table 1.2: Johnson High’s Racial Breakdown1

Asian
Black
Hispanic
White
Two or More
Races
Total
Enrollment

1

2008
25.1%
54.7%
9.6%
10.0%
.6%

2010
31.6%
48.3%
10.9%
8.2%
1.0%

2012
43.0%
35.4%
9.3%
10.9%

2014
51.2%
25.0%
13.6%
8.8%

0.7%

1.3%

668

581

588

725

Civil Rights Data Collection (Ed.gov)
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However, this 10 percent increase in the Asian and Latino populations does reflect the
significant ethnic and generational diversity of the Johnson High. As the principal
explained, district-level data collapses 17 ethnic groups into the Asian category alone.
Layers of immigration history transposed onto the school by earlier waves of
Southeast Asian refugees as well as recently arrived populations of Southeast and South
Asian refugee youth, Chinese immigrants from both the neighborhood and other parts of
the city, and a small population of Pakistani and Bengali students, complicated notions of
“Asianness” among the student and staff. “Latino-ness” also became a point of
contention as Central American students, mostly from Honduras, grew in number
throughout the year, joining more long-standing 1.5 and second generation Mexican
youth in their classrooms. At the end of my fieldwork, Tigrinya and French-speaking
refugee youth from Eritrea and the Democratic Republic of Congo were beginning to
arrive.
Table 1.3: Johnson High’s Ethnic Breakdown (2013-2014)2
Ethnicity
Paw Karen
Sgaw Karen
Indian
Tadem Chin
Hakkah Chin
Rohinga
Khmer
Vietnamese
Thai
Chinese
Taiwanese
Bhutanese-Nepali
Tunisian
Lao
Malay
Indonesian
Pakistani
Eritrean
Puerto Rican
2

Status

Generation

refugee
refugee
Green card/citizen
refugee
refugee
refugee
Refugee/citizen
Refugee/citizen
Green card/citizen
Green card/citizen
Green card/citizen
refugee
Green card/citizen
Citizen
Green card/citizen
Refugee/citizen
Green card/citizen
refugee
Citizen

1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st and 2nd
1st and 2nd
1st and 2nd
1st and 2nd
1st
1st
1st
2nd
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st and 2nd

Observed through 3 years of classroom observation – intensive, full-time in AY 2013-2014.
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Honduran
Nicaraguan
Mexican

1st
1st
1st and 2nd

Undocumented
Undocumented/green card
Undocumented/green
card/citizen
Green card/citizen
Green card

Bangladesh
Congolese

1st
1st

Table 1.4: Languages Spoken at Johnson High (2013-2014)3
None Reported
Vietnamese
Tigrinya (Etheopia)
Spanish
Pashto…
Nepali
Laotian (Lao)
Karen (Burma)
Indonesian
Hakka (China)
Gujarati
English
Chinese…
Chinese…
Chinese…
Cambodian…
Burmese
Bengali
Arabic
0

100

200

300

Johnson High’s extraordinary diversity provided a rich context to witness to
which students that the school community assigned risk to their school’s performance
data and reputation. What is more, this diversity offered a window into the racial and
cultural dimensions of the branding process as administrators, teachers, and students
made decisions around which students the school could build a valuable brand.
Perceptions around which student populations were disposed to violence, poor academic
performance, and truancy, criteria through which the district measured “quality” in their
3

Source: Johnson High Central Office
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closure methodology, influenced strategies to contain and/or expel “risky” students and
attract students that would boost their school’s brand. The school’s vulnerable status as
well as its diversity therefore brought into relief how cultural politics and successive
process of racialization powerfully intertwined with the school’s risk management and
branding processes.
Community Partners Landscape
Throughout my three years at Johnson High, the number of “community
partnerships” ballooned. By AY 2013-2014, sixteen partnering organizations provided
most of the after-school programming, case management, and counseling at Johnson
High (Fieldnote, 5/17/14). The absence of a counselor, nurse, adequate staff, and large
class sizes throughout the school year shifted the role of the partners working at the
school from supplemental service providers to becoming the core programs that Johnson
offered. Witnessing the growth of partners and what kinds of organizations were attracted
to the school and why, offered insight into non-profit partnerships as one of the school’s
primary branding strategies. Who they served in the school, their stability, and their role
in a milieu of resource desperation, provided a window into the consequences of making
non-profit partnerships one of the cornerstones of a school’s survival strategy.
Table 1.5: Johnson High’s Community Partners
Organization
*Career Ready

*Service for
Salvation
*College Dreams

*Guitars and

Focus
College-going
and career
preparation
Service-learning
College
preparation at
career prep

Music and

Resources
Part-time staff, limited
internship opportunities,
curriculum support
2 full-time staff, supply
and field trip budgets
1 full-time college
counselor, supply and
field trip budgets,
college workshops and
site visits
After school music, art,
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Stabili
ty
Low

High
Low

High

Type and Funding Source
Non-profit –
corporate/philanthropic funding
Non-profit –
corporate/philanthropic funding
Federal-City initiative with nonprofit and for-profit partners

Non-profit –

Hoops

athletic
programming

*Refugee Aid

Tutoring and
supplemental
education
services

athletic, and science
programming; weekend
supplementary
programming; supply
budgets; 4 part-time
staff
3 part-time staff, fieldtrip budget for college
trips

corporate/philanthropic/state and
federal funds blend

Moder

Federal/non-profit initiative –

ate

blend of federal and
philanthropic funds

Case Managers
United

Preventative case
management and
truancy support

2 part-time case aides

Latino Advocacy

Advocacy for
Latino issues

Low

Non-profit

Refugee Case
Management

Mental health
services for
refugee youth and
adults
After-school
programming,
summer
internships, credit
recovery
programming,
college
counseling
Programming for
students with
special needs
Advocacy and
case management
services for
Vietnamese youth
Provided a
coordinator to
oversee
collaboration
meetings and
facilitate
communication
between partners
Summer
internships,
truancy case
management,
resources for
Southeast Asian
youth, academic
enrichment
programs
Anti-bullying and
racism training
programs for
youth

Infrequent in-school
and out-of-school
programming
Infrequent in-school
and out-of-school
programming

Low

Non-profit

Infrequent in-school
and out-of-school
programming

Low

Non-profit

Infrequent in-school
and out-of-school
programming
Infrequent in-school
and out-of-school
programming

Low

Non-profit

Low

Non-profit

1 Full-time staff

Low

Non-profit

Infrequent in-school
and out-of-school
programming

High

Non-profit

Infrequent in-school
and out-of-school
programming

Low

Non-profit

Neighborhood
Central

Special Needs
Support
Vietnamese
Community
Coalition
Partner
Coordination

Refugee
Communities
United

Anti-Bullying
Advocates

Low

Non-profit – blend of federalstate and private grants
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Analysis
I followed Glaser (2006) in treating the analysis of data not as not a distinct stage
of research but something that begins in the pre-fieldwork phase. Analytic notes and
memoranda emerging from two years of extant data collection, coupled with themes
related to my theoretical framework and data from full-time fieldwork throughout AY
2013-2014, informed the refined coding schema I used to analyze my corpus in Dedoose,
qualitative coding software (Maxwell, 2005). The development of the coding schema
occurred in two phases. In the first phase I conducted a read of all of my data in on place,
creating a spreadsheet of emic codes, or short words or phrases that condensed data into
smaller themes.
From there I grouped codes into more etic categories, or broader themes that
corresponded with my theoretical framework as well as the “verticality” of my
methodological approach. For example, etic categories like “district level” and “schoollevel” and or “brand strategy”, “risk management”, “market-speak”, categories that I
assigned as an outside observer based, allowed me to index more emic categories that
emerged from participants’ data like “budget crisis”, “charter school critique”, and
“blaming.” This process was far from linear as emic and etic categories and codes
overlapped, corroborating the theoretical underpinnings of the study but also pushing
back. Teasing apart the confluence of forces shaping the schools’ social and
organizational dynamics proved difficult within the coding as some groups within the
school focused heavily on the effects of the budget crisis while others remained fixated
on an impending round of closures.

48

I recorded all interviews and transcribed all but 10 of the interviews myself. As a
member of the Institute for Education Sciences, Grant #R305B090015 funded the 10 onehour transcriptions of interviews. I also typed fieldnotes directly after I returned from the
field to assure that I re-recorded and refined observations within a few hours in order to
guard against memory loss. I returned many of the interview transcripts to my
participants to “member-check” my transcription as well as give them the opportunity to
strike anything they felt uncomfortable including (Creswell 2007). I have written several
articles and conference papers, circulating that work to participants to make sure that the
conclusions I’m drawing are in accord with the data they provided. To refine the
theoretical framing, I participated in several colloquiums with discussants that are
familiar with Philadelphia’s educational landscape and the reform history. Their feedback
bolstered my analysis of secondary data from documents and reports. They also forced
me to consider other angles from which to approach the data, enriching my theoretical
framing of the study.
Researcher Reflection
I entered Johnson High in my first year of graduate school after having taught Lao
youth in the Lao Peoples’ Democratic Republic for several years after finishing my
undergraduate studies. My initial intent at Johnson High was to track recently resettled
Southeast Asian refugees, namely Burmese ethnic groups from refugee camps in
Thailand, in their school-to-work and college transitions. I sought to understand how the
education crisis in Philadelphia was impacting their aspirations and trajectories as
resources, staff, and support services diminished over time. Since many of these youth
and their parents in initial interviews cited educational aspirations as their primary reason
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for applying for third-country resettlement, I questioned how educational opportunities
for these youth translated into disappointment or fulfillment of the “humanitarian
promise” made to refugees arriving to the streets of Philadelphia (Fassin 2011). I
hypothesized that these students would be invisible, that their needs would go
unrecognized, and entered Johnson High as not only a researcher but an advocate and
member of the non-profit cottage industry developing there.
In beginning part-time fieldwork, I represented what many of the non-profit
coordinators mirrored: a white, idealistic, mid-20s, female graduate student from an elite
university with an interest in the experiences of refugee youth. As a result, throughout the
first two years, I primarily focused on these youth while spending time in their
neighborhood, classrooms, after-school programs, and at ethnic events. I became a
therapist, college counselor, job-finder, bills translator, and tutor. In a formal capacity, I
taught English classes on Saturdays and I became a familiar face in the community.
Parents and their kids referred to me as a “teacher” and a source of English translation.
However, as I volunteered with the non-profits and began to immerse myself in
classrooms, I realized that I would not fully understand their experiences unless I
broadened my lens and studied these students in relation to the social dynamics and
resource economy of school more holistically. Though I focused mostly on refugee youth
in my part-time fieldwork, fieldnotes and informal interviews and conversations with
teachers and administrators were rife with concerns about Johnson High’s potential
closure. Concurrently, more non-profit organizations were forging partnerships with the
school and suddenly I was one of many white, idealistic young adults working at Johnson
High with refugee kids.
50

This feeling of being “one of many” folks in the school interested in the
experiences of refugees did not sit well with me. I noticed that compared to other
students, remarkably the native-born kids, that refugee kids received disproportionate
support through this non-profit network. They qualified for special programming through
not only the partners, but also within the larger schema of immigrant entitlements like
public assistance, social security, and some medical care. I struggled with this idea that I
had been privileging the hardship of these students for two years, focused so narrowly on
their experiences that I neglected to understand them in relation to other immigrant and
native-born youth of color at Johnson High. Therefore, during my full-time fieldwork, I
expanded my questions to address those of market fundamentalist education reform and
their impact on the school and therefore the refugee youth that I was following. This turn
to the school as a case occurred at a tragically advantageous time: the “doomsday” budget
crisis and mass school closures.
Ethnographic Work in Crisis
I had served as a part-time tutor in several of Johnson High’s ELL classes as well
as a tutor and teacher for two non-profit organizations serving refugees, but conducting
fieldwork in the midst of a district-wide fiscal crisis proved much more challenging
psychologically and methodologically. Ruth Behar (1996) in The Vulnerable Observer:
Anthropology that Breaks Your Heart, writes of the emotional toll exacted by conducting
ethnographic work with vulnerable populations and of the ways that we come to
“witness” and “know” precarity.
Anthropology…is the most fascinating, bizarre, disturbing, and necessary form of
witnessing left to us at the end of the twentieth century. As a mode of knowing
that depends on the particular relationship formed by a particular anthropologist
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with a particular set of people in a particular time and place, anthropology has
always been vexed about the question of vulnerability (5).
I turned often to Behar and George Devereux’s work to cope with the blurring of
boundaries between “anthropologist” and the host of other ill-defined roles I played at
Johnson High, particularly during fieldwork in AY 2013-2014 at the height of the
district’s budget crisis and political tumult following the closing of 31 schools. Not only
did I question my prior work as an advocate for refugee youth, but I also became a source
of extra labor in a school. Teachers and administrators daily used me as a sounding board
for the innumerable stresses of working in an increasingly under-resourced school as well
as their more existential qualms about the direction of the district and their profession.
More of an “observant participant” than a participant observer, I became not only a tutor
and chaperone but also a pseudo-therapist for a traumatized staff and student body.
Initially I embraced the role of therapist, believing that collecting “good data”
meant that I needed to position myself to capture the crisis of the school from every
angle. However, with no resources and overwhelmed by need, obliging teachers’ and
administrators’ requests for help in their classrooms, tutoring students after-school and on
weekends, as well as absorbing the palpable anxieties of everyone weathering the crisis,
began to wear on me. Depressed that so little could be done about the state of the school
and district, I found myself reluctant to go to the field toward the end of the year as I
knew that I would be comforting a crying teaching or committing to a weekend of
helping students look for part-time jobs to help their families. With no clearly defined
role, I played every role.
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The lack of discussion around the profound loneliness of conducting ethnography
in a crisis-ridden context came to eventually strike me toward the end of the year.
Holding the stories of teachers, staff, and students throughout my fieldwork without the
ability to mitigate their suffering rendered me powerless, a steward of their trauma and
documentarian of the unprecedented existential and practical professional distress. Every
“education policy researcher” that I knew at my graduate school pulled their data from
large data sets, wrote their code, and ran their significance tests. I do not make the
comparison between my approach to studying policy to diminish the rigor or difficulty of
quantitative research, the dominant form of methodological training in education, but
rather to point out that anthropologists of education policy are a minority presence in the
broad field of education policy research. Studying “crisis” and its “effects” required me
not only to position myself within a school but to forge relationships in difficult
conditions, collapsing boundaries between my personal life and theirs, and experiencing
the full weight of Philadelphia’s public education crisis with them as they felt their
livelihoods and school community quickly slipping away.
As anthropologists of policy, we must further interrogate the effects of “vicarious
trauma” on our work, or how “bearing witness” to vulnerability and precarity textures our
observant participation in context. Quantitative researchers implicitly maintain a distance
from the everyday realities of the contexts they study, therefore protecting them from the
psychological toll that witnessing tragedy exacts. Ethnographers aim for immersion,
becoming part of the process they wish to study through participation in their context and
deep relationship building. If we admit that such work is needed to further understand
how these difficult realities influence the kinds of questions we are asking about schools
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as scholars and policymakers, then in what ways can we support not only this work
within the academy but also the people conducting this work? My isolation as the sole
qualitative researcher/ethnographer in a policy program raises important questions about
the contributions this work can make to field where qualitative work is less valued, but
also the cost to the ethnographer without having an academic community to engage these
conversations and seek company in this endeavor.
Overview of Chapters
Given that I have chosen a vertical ethnographic case study as my approach, the
following chapters move from a macro-level analysis of the policy regimes that have
shaped the “road to closures” in Chapter 2, to five ethnographic chapters that illuminate
the predicament and response of a school threatened by closure, Johnson High. Chapter 2
discusses the school choice movement in Philadelphia in relation to broader trends in
national public education legislation that have pushed for privatization and punitive
accountability for “underperforming” schools. This chapter argues that school closures
are merely an evolution in policies that have divested historically disenfranchised schools
of resources as well as reconstructed and displaced the risk of “failure” onto vulnerable
student populations and their educators. In turn, this section of the dissertation
historicizes closures within the longer trajectories of marketization in urban districts.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the strategies that Johnson High’s
administrators set into motion to resist closure, detailing their rationales for the institution
of problematic branding and risk management mechanisms. Chapter 4 tethers the fraught
consciences of educators around the strategies introduced in Chapter 3, to ethical
questions around the shifting mission of traditional neighborhood schools in the
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expanding educational marketplace, and implications for equity and access to quality
public education for vulnerable student populations. Educators in this chapter narrate the
moral dilemmas they face as school competition induced by the marketplace coerces
them into performing racialized readings of risk and value in their students, building
school brands around specific categories of student that will not taint their reputation or
endanger the school’s performance data.
Chapter 5 turns to the role of community partnerships’ in Johnson High’s
branding process and the ways in which the threat of closure has further spurred the
forging of relationships with private organizations to both brand the school and fill
critical resource gaps. This critical, private resource economy within the school of
selectively serving organizations providing core services as conditions worsened in the
district, raised questions over the degree to which a closure threat necessitated the
school’s privatization. Moreover the paradox of providing selective yet core services
through partners generated further ethical tensions over the disproportionate targeting of
particular student categories (i.e. race/ethnicity, immigrant status) for resources,
compromising the school’s commitment to the inclusive service of all students.
The final chapters are more descriptive. Chapter 6 draws on students’ voices and
their responses to both the district’s consideration of Johnson High for closure and the
school’s survival process. Chapter 7 serves as both an epilogue and conclusion,
demonstrating how the unethical underpinnings of the school’s survival strategies created
an unstable, vulnerable brand that began to unravel shortly after the conclusion of my
fieldwork. This final chapter collates lessons learned from the ethnographic chapters with
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the moving target that is education policy in Philadelphia, concluding with policy
recommendations and directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2 – THE ROAD TO SCHOOL CLOSURES IN THE SCHOOL
DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA
“Standing on the Edge of a Cliff”
Mr. Riley (school district official): I was watching Chris Hayes I think, like last week,
and he had on this drug policy specialist that was discussing the effects of a product when
the resource is limited. So he was talking about tobacco and the way that people think
about tobacco use in the world where you can get it anywhere versus the way it’s thought
about in a prison where people have to engage in contraband. Once tobacco is treated as
a commodity, it changes peoples’ perceptions and the tensions around it. I think about
that when I think about the limitations on the number of quality seats in this district and
the response. The School District of Philadelphia has been failing for a long time. I don’t
think five-year plans are really being developed and executed because how can you with
so much uncertainty? I think the vision is to prevent the district from going bankrupt and
that’s a big challenge in itself. We’re not talking about like oh, we might need to move
money from here to there. It’s more of an existential challenge. It requires resources that
we don’t have for a whole bunch of reasons that people like to broad-brush as the District
mismanaging money when that’s not really true. When I think about the superintendent
and the assistant superintendents that supervise the schools, they’re dealing with this
existential crisis, like “Oh snap! We need $300 million dollars to pay for counselors!”
People need to realize that it’s hard to strategically plan when you’re standing on the
edge of a cliff.
Julia: Then are charter schools the answer to that because they can fundraise and inject
private money into a large system that’s going bankrupt?
Mr. Riley: Maybe. (Interview with Mr. Riley Thompson, District Official)4
**********************************
In a press release following the May 2013 “doomsday” budget cuts, a spokesman
from the Republican majority in the Pennsylvania State Senate, Erik Arneson, claimed,
“At this moment there’s no obvious path to reach the outcome being sought by the
School District of Philadelphia” (Gabriel 2013). In my conversations and interviews with
district-officials, they echoed Mr. Arneson’s sentiments. Endemic to these discourses was
a paralyzing sense of uncertainty over the future of the district and questions over how
they could work to improve educational outcomes when the battle to balance the budget
4

Given the extremely precarious and politicized context that officials worked under in AY 2013-2014,
consent forms were written to exclude not only their names but also mention of their home departments and
positions.
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required increasingly Herculean efforts. Mr. Riley, a school district official who I spent
time with in planning sessions for policy-pitches to the School Reform Commission
(SRC)5, described the immediate pressures faced by the district as they simultaneously
coped with the decline in existing school enrollments, slashed funds from the state to
supplement their budget, and exploding costs of charter schools. Likening charter school
expansion to the commodification of tobacco, Mr. Riley alludes to the “existential
challenge” of stabilizing a district while reconciling two zero-sum political agendas. The
first required district officials to recover a public education system in free fall while the
second pressured them to expand semi-private charter school networks that further
imperiled their finances.
Caught in the crosshairs of disparate demands on their time, energy, and ethics, I
examine in this chapter the political and economic forces shaping this dilemma for
officials in the School District of Philadelphia. I pay close attention to the contradictions
between state and district policy rhetoric and officials’ practical actions as they stood “on
the edge of a cliff”, unable to develop a “vision” beyond preventing “bankrupt(cy).”
Their narratives offer a window into the bureaucratic crunch induced by the deepening
marketization of public education in Philadelphia and the social forces policy
mechanisms that contributed to what officials perceived as the “inevitable” mass closure
of neighborhood schools across the city.
A Decade of Privatization Experiments in Philadelphia: The Road to Closures
While Mr. Riley emphasized the extraordinary uncertainty texturing the work of
district officials and administrators in the year of nationally headlined crisis, he also
5

The SRC is a five-member governing body that has worked as the driving policy and decision-making
apparatus since the State of Pennsylvania took over the School District of Philadelphia in 2002.
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alluded to its construction through the large-scale commodification of public education in
Philadelphia in the last decade (e.g. “Once [tobacco] is treated like a commodity, it
changes peoples’ perceptions and the tensions around it). It is not my goal in this section
to perform an exhaustive excavation of the School District of Philadelphia’s historical
instability, but to outline what makes this crisis and the heightened uncertainty
surrounding the future of the district unprecedented.
Shortly after the passing of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2001, the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania took over the school district, imposing a five member
governing body, the School Reform Commission (SRC). With three appointments from
the governor and two from the mayor, the SRC since its inception has championed the
principles of “accountability” and “choice” at the heart of NCLB through massive
experiments in privatization and public education. As Gill, Zimmer, Christman, and
Blanc (2007) highlight, NCLB prescribed state takeover and private management to lowperforming districts as reforms to develop more effective, efficient public education
systems. Beginning with the diverse provider model (DPM) in 2002, the SDP contracted
seven private for-profit and non-profit companies to manage 46 low-performing schools
and restructured 21 more under the auspices of district-executed “turnaround” schools
(Jack and Sludden 2013). Aggressively forging these partnerships, federal policymakers
lauded Philadelphia for becoming the forerunners of these reforms (Christman, Gold, and
Herold 2005).
However, at the time of the DPM, the district had 237 district-managed schools
and only 40 charters (Bulkley, Henig, and Levin 2010). Today there are 86 charters with
an open application process fielding 40 more applications for 2015 (The Notebook 2015).
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Pushing charters as a solution to fiscal instability, “failing” schools, and the demand for
“quality” seats, Republican Governor Tom Corbett addressed a crowd of students at First
Philadelphia Preparatory Charter School on November 17th, 2011, distilling the state’s
stance toward the support of charter school expansion.
I want to talk to the men and women in Harrisburg that pass the laws about
schools. You are a very good example of how we can reform the schools. You are
a special kind of school here. You are a charter school and that’s new. We didn’t
have charter schools 20 years ago. It’s new to Pennsylvania and it to the country.
We want to look at kids that live in areas where the worst schools in the state are
– the 145 worst buildings in the state. When I say worst, I don’t mean the people
are bad, but that they’re not performing. They’re not getting the grades. And
they’re at the very bottom in Pennsylvania. So we want a student that goes there
to be able to take the money that the state gives to that school district and go to a
charter school. There are a lot of people that are opposed to that, but I don’t know
how you can be opposed to allowing a young boy or girl to leave the worst
performing schools in the state to have a chance to have the education that you
have here…We need to give options. We need to give choices to your parents and
to the parents of kids like you all across Pennsylvania to have an opportunity to
grow – an opportunity to compete. (Corbett 2011)
Corbett’s statement embeds notions of “competition” and “choice” that ran through statelevel discourse and policy around school reform statewide. Within this rhetoric, charter
schools, or schools of choice that operated largely outside of the authority of the school
district, became the answer to mitigating “failure” within the district system. Of the 145
“failing” schools identified by Corbett, not ironically, almost all of them were in poor zip
codes across the state; the lowest performing were in Philadelphia. Creating a
marketplace of school choice, Corbett and his successive conservative administrations
bolstered charter expansion through legislation that prevented enrollment caps and the
issuing of new charters in cities identified as loci of school “failure” (Jack and Sludden
2013). Enrollment in schools in Philadelphia therefore did not so much decline in the last
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decade, but shifted toward charters, propelled by state-level policies to increase “school
choice” within, to use Corbett’s words, Pennsylvania’s “worst” districts.
The Unexpected Costs of Charters
While the charter presence in Philadelphia certainly preceded the state-takeover,
NCLB, and the subsequent implementation of the DPM, enrollment in the city’s charters
increased by 40,000 students as the district-run school enrollment has decreased by
50,000 students from 2002 to 2012. This amounts to a loss of approximately 5,000
students per year and an increase from 12 percent of the districts’ students to 33 percent
attending charter schools in 2013 (Gabriel 2013; Hurdle 2013). This unfettered expansion
of private options through charters and their unexpected soaring costs in the midst of
shrinking block grants from the state, contributed to a hemorrhaging budget by 2008 – a
budget that worsened through 2013. As public-private partnerships with the district, the
state mandated that the district pay charter schools $8,417 per student and $22,307 for
students who use special education services to charter schools (Graham 2014). Even
though the district had internally instituted agreements for enrollment caps at many
charters, other schools refused to agree to enrollment parameters based state legislation
that prohibited caps. In the midst of legal battles between the School Reform Commission
and state auditors, many schools greatly exceeded their caps, generating unexpected
costs, upwards of $25 million in AY 2013-2014 alone (Woodall 2014a).
To complicate the SDP’s financial picture, the district assumed other fiscal risks
associated with both charter schools’ contributions to state pension plans as well as the
financing of new charter buildings as charter expanded throughout the decade. Dozens of
charters remained delinquent in recent years in pension payments for their teachers.
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During AY 2012-2013, the district shouldered $1.3 million in pension payments for 22
charter schools (Woodall 2014b). Further, while charter schools used to inhabit
repurposed supermarkets or storefronts, a recent analysis of bond documents shows that 1
in 3 charters have constructed newer and larger school buildings using tax-exempt bonds
with extremely high interest rates (Wigglesworth and Briggs 2015). Carrying risky
ratings, charter schools have paid for renovations through these “junk” bonds at costs of
double to triple what the district would pay for a new school building using government
bonds channeled toward infrastructure improvements. Financing processes and real estate
transactions have also required charter school networks to pay millions in consulting and
legal fees. Increasing percentages of charter schools’ budgets service their debts, creating
pressure to reduce labor, instruction, and other service costs or overenroll students to
stabilize their budgets. When charter schools overenroll students, the district shoulders
the burden as they pay schools per capita while also maintaining the fixed costs of the
district schools that students leave.
Red-Blue State Dynamics and the Catch-22 for District Officials
The unexpected costs of a reform meant to both increase quality and “efficiency”
in the system plagued the consciences and work of district officials. Many described
ironies of state-level demands to increase expand “school choice” while also stabilizing
the district’s finances. Underscoring charter school expansion as the crux of this Catch22, they cited a dissonance between the state’s agenda to legislate in favor of charters and
their evisceration of the school district’s budgeting troubles. Many lamented the short
sightedness of charter laws and their implications for poor urban contexts like
Philadelphia. Contrary to critiques of “440 Broad Street,” a colloquial expression used at
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the school-level to pejoratively address upper-level administration, I found distraught
district officials in a similar place as teachers and students: trying to reconcile what they
perceived to be an increasing stream of conflicting mandates with decreasingly available
human and monetary resources to execute them. Mr. Riley explained his predicament.
The District doesn’t have the authority to give money to charters or not. It’s a
state mandated conversation about how charters get funded. I mean, in
Philadelphia we deal with red state-blue city dynamics all of the time. One of
those dynamics is that people at the state-level that tend to support the charter
movement also tend to be conservative and pump money into the charter-sector in
Philadelphia to show that it will work. Why do you think that Mastery Charter is
able to fundraise at the level that it does? Because there are people in the state that
want to see charters work philosophically, separate and apart from what happens
with these kids in charters and in the rest of the district. So in terms of where the
district goes in five years, it all starts with the state. Is there going to be a decision
made at the state level to set up a funding situation that doesn’t pit charters versus
the district for use of the same resources? I don’t know. (Interview, 3/14/14)
Pointing out “red-state, blue city” dynamics, Mr. Riley highlights the “philosophical”
battle he saw as being waged at the state-level “separate and apart” from its implications
at the local-level through the pushing of charter legislation and the backing of
conservative politicians and foundations. At its core, he understands the School District
of Philadelphia, with so few resources, to remain at the mercy of state support for
charters schools. He bemoaned in his interview however, not only the assumptions
involved in the unfettered expansion of such a sector, but also ignorance of how
continuing to carve up the system will impact the overall financial health of the district.
In other words, should the “funding situation” continue to “pit charters against the
district” and deplete the already scarce resources of the district, the privatization
experiment might ultimately collapse on itself.

63

The Beginning of the End for 30 Schools: AY 2012-2013
The explosive growth of the charter sector, a product of the lamination of statelevel mandates onto SDP policy and the larger privatization movement in urban public
education, generated a fiscal crisis for the district’s leadership by AY 2009. Recognizing
the inflexible costs of running underutilized district schools and the expenses of
supporting the ever-expanding charter system, Arlene Ackerman, the then superintendent,
addressed the tenability of continuing to stretch the district’s declining resources in the
2009 Facilities Master Plan. Recommending the closing of “half-empty” district schools
to cut costs (School District of Philadelphia 2012a), this document served as a template
for the 2012 and 2013 school closures. Hiring the URS Corporation, in December 2010
the district set in motion a process to identify underutilized, “failing” schools for closure
(Socolar 2010). By June of 2011, the Philadelphia School Notebook, an independent
publication that reports on public education issues in Philadelphia, had released a
confidential document prepared by URS entitled the “Preliminary Options Report” that
listed schools recommended for closure (Herold and Mezzacappa 2011). From this list,
Ackerman’s predecessor, Leroy Nunery, identified 10 schools for closure based on
enrollment trends by October 2011, and had shuttered 6 of them by June 2012.
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Graphic 2.1: Utilized Seats by Planning Area

To compound matters, from 2010 to 2013 Tom Corbett, a Republican governor
notorious for his “no-tax” mantra, slashed education budgets across the state (Hurdle
2013). In press interviews, Corbett used the loss of federal stimulus money flowing into
the Pennsylvania Department of Education’s coffers as the reasoning for the cuts. In an
interview with a Philadelphia reporter over the his stance on education budgets, he
explained,
These are difficult economic times. I am consistent in that we will not spend any
more than we have. When I took office, and I will repeat this until the day that I
leave office, when I took office, there was a 4.2 billion dollar deficit because of
outrageous spending from years past. The general education budget for K-12 and
higher ed was replaced after 2008 by federal, one-time stimulus money of over a
billion dollars and it went away in a year. [Snap] Like that. The tax increase that
would be required to replace that would be $930 on every taxpayer in PA to
replace that…I wasn’t going to place that on the people of Pennsylvania. So we
didn’t cut. We just didn’t replace the money from the federal government because
we didn’t have it (Governor Tom Corbett on Education Cuts 2013).
Corbett’s refusal to raise taxes in spite of its consequences for Philadelphia, created a
$287 million dollar deficit for the district by AY 2011-2012, resulting in a loss of $1,327
per student (Lin and Couloumbis 2014). His attitude reflected a general callousness at the
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state-level toward the Philadelphia’s plight and a shedding of responsibility for its
funding predicament. Pointing the figure at the federal government for the “cuts” and
pledging to not raise taxes for the “people” of Pennsylvania, Corbett placed the onus on
the city to seek a “long-term” solution to its funding problem internally. His explanation
further highlights the ideological distance between a conservative state legislature and a
poor, blue city in desperate need of resources and support.
Without short-term help from the state, the budget cuts exacerbated feelings of
urgency to dramatically reduce the district’s spending. Philadelphia, like many poor
districts, relies heavily on state funds to supplement upwards of half of their budget
(School District of Philadelphia 2012b). As these cuts increased in frequency and scale,
district officials hired yet another firm, the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) to conduct
an audit of the district’s projected costs and to establish a protocol to mitigate the
looming fiscal deficit. The BCG report, issued in August 2012, operated similarly to the
URS report by focusing on the “underutilization” of district schools and recommending
mass school closures. Calculating an average of $7,000 incurred for the loss of each
student to a charter (Boston Consulting Group 2012), BCG recommended that the only
way to stabilize the budget and minimize inefficiencies would be to execute a mass
closure of 88 underutilized schools and transfer students to other district schools,
displacing between 22,000 and 31,000 students district-wide (Gym 2015b).
The district expected the closures, along with grade reconfigurations and colocations, to eventually achieve $24.5 million in annual savings and improve utilization
rates from 67 to 78 percent (Jack and Sluddens 2013). The federal government closures
also incentivized closures as part of an accountability framework for schools that did not
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meet national performance standards (Hurdle 2013). The district’s Chief Recovery
Officer, Thomas Knudsen, incorporated these recommendations in a 5-year financial plan
for the district released in September 2012. The plan recommended the closure of 40
schools, well below the number of schools recommended to the SRC by BCG, and
intended to erase a budget deficit of $1.35 billion over the course of the five years
(Socolar 2012; The Notebook 2012).
While the Notebook was able to leak the URS report to the public prior to the
September 2012 closings, BCG consultants presented their report in a “secret meeting”
with the SRC that the district withheld from circulation. Claiming that they would be
taking the multi-million dollar recommendations into consideration, Nunery’s successor,
William Hite, and the Office of Strategic Analytics, announced in December 2012 the
district’s plan to close 37 schools and restructure the grade figurations of 18 more at the
end of AY 2012-2013 (Limm 2012). In his statement to the public, Hite explained, “We
are undertaking this process now because we have few options, but we also believe that at
the end, we will have a school system that is better run, safer and higher performing”
(Statement by Dr. William Hite, December 13th, 2012). Arguing that the district could
barely afford to renovate its utilized schools, Hite pointed out that continuing to pour
precious resources into schools with high percentages of empty seats would be
irresponsible (Hite 2013).
Criteria for Closure – Inducing District-Wide Paranoia
A “Summary of Recommendations” as well as a “Process and Methodology”
document came attached to a modified “Facilities Master Plan” that listed the 37 schools
slated for closure and described the criteria the district used to identify the pool. Selection
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for closure occurred in two stages. First, the district relied on a highly informed
technocratic analysis using the recommendations by the BCG report to identify schools
based on a combination of building quality, academic performance, utilization, and cost.
These measures pulled district-wide quantitative data on all 180 schools, scored them
based on these criteria, and prioritized the lowest scoring schools for further analyses. As
the slide below demonstrates, slightly less than 1/3 of the district’s schools were selected
for further auditing.
Graphic 2.2: School District of Philadelphia Closure Methodology (’12-’13)

In an interview with a district official that participated heavily in this process, she
describes the magnitude of the closures and the process of prioritizing schools using this
methodology.
Ms. Crow: From an academic perspective, we look at AYP as a flag, so if you
think about it, a filter mechanism. From that point, we look at the test scores by
grade level. Over time, we look at their growth score. We look at their feedback
score, their attendance, their violent incidents, and suspension rates. So basically
it’s a mixture of climate and academic data in our decision-making process. We
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look at the facility condition index which basically determines what cost it would
take to bring the school back to good repair. From a student impact perspective,
we look at how far the average student would be going to transfer. From a
financial perspective, we look at how much savings closing the school would
yield. So those were kind of the chunks. We went from academic to climate to
facilities to finances. So it was fairly comprehensive across the board.
Julie: Are there certain criteria that are weighted over others?
Ms. Crow: It’s a case-by-case basis. I have to be honest with you (pause)… it’s a
little bit hard to disaggregate because we we’re trying to close so many schools at
once. A lot of it was messy. (Interview, 5/4/14)
Ms. Crow’s testimony demonstrates the highly technocratic nature of the school closure
methodology as they collated a range of criteria through their two-stage audit process.
However, she also admits that the process, in spite of its well-ordered methodology, was
still “messy” and complicated by the “case-by-case” selection of schools. When I pushed
Ms. Crow in her interview to explain if and how decision-makers weighted the criteria,
she apologized, “I have to be honest with you (pause), it’s a bit hard to disaggregate
because we’re trying to close so many schools at once.”
Though the district released this methodology and communicated its intention to
incorporate “community feedback”, which schools closed ironically hinged on officials’
subjective, last minute decisions. The “messiness” of this process was rooted in the
growing tension between the decontextualized, market-driven conceptions of managing
“school failure” and district officials’ calibrations of those conceptions with other
pressures in context. The district attempted to create a guise of objectivity around closing
schools by using a techno scientific rationale to define and pool schools of “low quality”
based on seemingly “objective” measures. The measures were intended to divorce
politics from decisions and craft inevitability and legitimacy around closures. However,
the measures remained unmoored from the effects of more than a half of a century of
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perpetual disinvestment and the more recent creep of charterization and ensuing
stratification on district schools’ performance. Officials like Mr. Riley recognized
blindness in the methodology’s defining of the problem,
[Preventing bankruptcy] requires resources that we don’t have for a whole bunch
of reasons that people like to broad-brush as the District mismanaging money
when that’s not really true. (Interview, 3/14/14)
Yet in the face of the district’s potential collapse, they felt that they had no choice but to
rely on they prescription of BCG’s “experts” to close school en masse.
This urgency to balance the budget ultimately stifled the democratic process
around closure decisions, minimizing “community meetings” as a significant source of
input. Barred from participation in deciding on the closure of schools, vehement
opposition crystallized outside of the 440 Broad Street from December 2012 to February
2013 as two “closures lists” circulated and officials removed and added schools without
public deliberation. On March 7th, 2013 at an SRC meeting, 24 schools of the 37 were
unilaterally voted upon for shuttering on June 30th, 2013 (Socolar 2014). Of the 32 people
that spoke at the meeting in front of the SRC, only one supported the closures, therefore
bringing into question which “community” mattered: the consultants or the public?
Representative W. Curtis Thomas declared on the headquarters’ steps during large
protests, “The process by which the Philadelphia School District decided on school
closures was flawed and must be rejected” (Hurdle 2013).
AY 2013-2014: The Perfect Storm
This unilateral vote and inconsistency between policy rhetoric and the actions of
the district incited district-wide paranoia over whom the district would target next for
closure. Conspiracy theories emerged among leadership and educators in neighborhood
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schools over whether the district was operating in collusion with private consultants,
conservative state legislators, and most importantly, charter school networks and their
powerful connections in philanthropy and “corporate America” to destroy public
education in Philadelphia (Fieldnote, 9/10/13). The passing of a “doomsday budget” in
the Republican-dominated Pennsylvania state legislature in June 2013 that coincided with
the closures only reinforced these sentiments. Diverging dramatically from steady cuts to
education spending since 2011, the state spending cuts had particularly dramatic
consequences for Philadelphia.
As previously mentioned, almost half of Philadelphia’s budget stems from state
supplements. With a $419 million dollar cut in June 2013, the district ran a $304 million
deficit for the AY 2013-2014 school year. In addition to the closures, the district’s “longterm” cost savings strategy, 440 Broad Street issued pink slips to 19 percent of the
school-based work force, including all 127 assistant principals, 646 teachers and more
than 1,200 aides (Gabriel 2013). Many of these staff were also critical support staff like
nurses and school counselors, earning Philadelphia the title of a “city on the brink” of
educational collapse and the epicenter for the “slow extinction of public education”
(Kerkstra 2014; Ravitch 2014; Strauss 2013; Popp 2014).
Questions and anxieties circulated over how the summer around how the district
would transition the 15,000 students displaced by the closures as well as balance the
administrative tasks of closing 24 schools with dramatically less resources than initially
anticipated. Further, how would the district continue to pay for the rising costs of charter
school expansion in light of the budget cuts? These scaled fears of educators and district
officials came to fruition on September 9th, 2013 as schools managed to open their doors
71

on what the Philadelphia Student Union documented in their blog as the “Worst of
#Philly1stday” (Philadelphia Student Union 2013). Classes in some schools swelled to
40+ students and principals operated main offices without support staff to answer phones
and enroll streams of students coming from closed schools. Without nurses, aids, and
counselors, students went without transcripts as they tried to finish college applications
and sick students did not receive medical care. Emotions spilled over on September 25th
when Laporshia Massey, a 6th grader, died of an asthma attack at a school without a
nurse, Bryant Elementary (Denvir 2013). Protests and pleas for emergency funds
pressured Governor Corbett to release $45 million to rehire 400 teachers, assistant
principals, secretaries, and counselors to select schools in mid-October, almost six weeks
into the school year (Snyder, Worden, and Graham 2013).
However, the rehiring of these staff complicated the process of “leveling” schools
by October 31st, the state deadline for aligning staffing with enrollments at district
schools (McCorry 2013). The district operated under the assumption that the overall
utilization would increase but could not predict the skewed distribution of transfers across
remaining district schools. While some schools received large numbers of students,
others gained few. Overall enrollment fell below 4,000 students as some students showed
up at the doors of charter schools and other went missing entirely. Expecting 135,000
students, only 131,000 arrived in district-schools. Enrollment at charter schools grew to
67,000, 2,000 more than slotted for in the district’s precarious budget, as many charters
exceeded their enrollment caps to accommodate the overflow. Six-hundred students
continued to go unaccounted (Langland 2014). In some schools, administrators had to
combine grades into one class to cope with the teaching shortage. With the turbulence
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brought by the school closures and budget cuts, the leveling deadline came and went.
McCorry (2013) described the leveling process as “robbing Peter to pay Paul,” as some
of the schools that received a larger proportion of the transfers also received a counselor
or several extra teachers. In the majority of cases, these transfers were predicated on the
loss of one school’s staff member for another school’s gain. As one teacher at a South
Philadelphia elementary school decried, “It should not matter whether my child is in a
school of 300 or a school of 1,200. Every child deserves a full-time guidance counselor, a
full-time nurse, and a teacher for every grade. It's not rocket science. It's responsibility."
As schools struggled to accommodate the complex accounting of their students
and redistribute scarce resources accordingly, sobering analyses of the school closures
began to surface in reports. Not only could the district not account for 600 students, but
the majority of the closures also took place in the city’s north-central region where onethird of the city’s “Corrective Action” schools are located. These areas were not
unexpectedly, in parts of Philadelphia with the deepest poverty. In other words, the
closures concentrated their social, fiscal, and spatial fallout of the closures in areas of
greatest disadvantage. A Research for Action study found that while 22 of the receiving
schools for these students boasted stronger achievement, 20 performed at similar levels
and 16 performed worse. The majority of the better-performing schools are also still
considered “low-performing” as measured by the standards of NCLB, and were at or over
capacity at the time of the closures (Research for Action 2013).
The Ironies of “Accountability”
In conversations and meetings with district and state officials, discourses around
charter school expansion and neighborhood school closure inextricably intertwined. At a
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hearing at City Hall, organizations and individuals gathered to address state legislators
visiting to understand the impact of state-supported charter school expansion on the
district and the recent impact of closures. The Auditor General, Eugene Depasquale,
among several state representatives and administrators sat in front of a long line of
testimonies that spoke to issues of access, equity, and the ironies of “accountability” in
the current climate. Believing that unfettered charterization of the district without
evaluating its consequences for the financial health of neighborhood schools represented
an glaring contradiction in district policy, Helen Gym, Philadelphia’s nationally
renowned firebrand education activist, and leader of several parent and advocacy
associations in the city, admonished the state.
For a district paying out $700 million to 86 charter schools per year, their
performance is underwhelming. It’s amazing to talk about standards when the
state won’t ensure that our students in neighborhood schools get the most basic of
resources. It’s a tragedy and a national disgrace. The cost to charters and
neighborhood schools alike are enormous and you’re literally driving people out
of the system. People won’t be able to stay in Philadelphia if this continues. It’s a
mistake to keep closing public schools. It’s not accountability but instead
shedding accountability by putting families out on the street. So please don’t use
that term when discussing the rationale for closures. These kids have no
affiliation with their schools because their schools offer nothing…Two-hundred
counselors for 131,000 children isn’t going to cut it. Charter schools should not
exist at the expense or in lieu of public schools. (Fieldnote, 3/14/14)
Testimonies like Gym’s continued, decrying the pitfalls of unfettered charter expansion
without proper legislation and detailing investigations into the enrollment barriers that
specific populations faced when applying to charters. Closing schools, Gym argued, was
not a form of holding failing schools accountable but instead “shedding accountability”
by failing to fund neighborhood schools so that they could adequately serve their
students. She also criticized the state-level push for charter school expansion when no
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overwhelming evidence existed that charters performed better than neighborhood schools
when serving the same kinds of students, namely ELLs and special education students.
In spite of the demand for them with so many students on waiting lists to get into
charter schools, Gym maintains that chronic underfunding is “driving people out of the
system,” forcing parents to consider charters that perhaps would send their children to
neighborhood schools. “Charter schools should not exist at the expense or in lieu of
public schools,” Gym cautioned, pointing to the zero-sum predicament facing district
officials, as they must close neighborhood schools to open new charter schools. By
pushing charterization and simultaneously defunding of the district system, Gym draws
attention to the perverse logic of market-driven policies like closure as they misdiagnose
the roots of district “failure.” Locating school “failure” at the state-level where policies
that purport to boost performance, in reality, deprive neighborhood schools of already
scarce resources, Gym points out a central problem of mapping market models onto
public good like education. By placing the onus on individual schools to “perform”
without acknowledging the interconnectedness of policy decisions at different levels of
scale that define and produce “failure”, her critique illuminates the paradox facing
neighborhood schools, as they are held accountable for “failure” yet not given the
resources to adequately serve their students.
Market Stratification
Donna Cooper of Public Citizens for Children and Youth (PCCY), in an
impassioned delivery at the same meeting, described the inequities that her organization
identified in their research on Philadelphia’s charter schools, pointed to other flaws in this
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policy, as legislators assumed that within the “marketplace” of school choice, students
would have equal access to charter school lotteries.
People aren’t just going to operate on an honor system in the marketplace. That’s
naïve to think. Charters have fewer ELL and special education students than
traditional neighborhood schools. They should be aggressively recruiting from the
bottom in they believe that their models work to initiate change. We identified in
our study that there were 111 barriers to enrollment at these schools, many which
lied in the recruitment process itself. Some of the recruitment for these schools
was done at country clubs. Because we currently have 4 people overseeing 86
charters and nobody at the state level, this grand experiment is one that’s about to
collapse of its own weight. (Fieldnote, 3/14/14)
Ms. Cooper describes the underbelly of charter school autonomy as they exclude
“undesirable” populations from enrollment through recruitment barriers. Instantiating the
tension that so many scholars have written about that arise from the tacit lamination of
market-reform onto public sector goods like education (Bartlett et al. 2002; Cucchiara,
Gold, and Simon 2011), she echoes critiques that charters benefit small numbers of
students at the expense of the masses. Leaving the education “market” to do its work and
using performance indicators alone to monitor “performance”, Ms. Cooper underscores
the stratification that occurs when information and access barriers that preclude particular
populations’ access to the market go unchecked. She further elaborates on the irony
embedded in Gym’s testimony that as school closure as a policy functions to heighten
accountability for “failing” district-run schools, there are virtually no accountability
mechanisms in place to monitor charter schools. This irony is particularly stark at the
state-level where there are no officials appointed to oversee charter schools.
Mass budget cuts and the fiscal hemorrhaging at the district-level partially explain
this lack of accountability for charter schools. Several officials pointed to the problem
arising from the simultaneous layoffs of district officials and the expansion of charter
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schools, in turn diminishing the district’s capacity evaluate the effects of the expansion
and oversee enrollment practices of charter schools with so few staff. In AY 2013-2014,
the year of my full-time fieldwork, the Charter School Office had a total of 3 staff to
supervise the operations and compliance of 86 charter schools district-wide and had an
executive director vacancy for over a year (Fieldnote, 3/14/14). Each of the staff was
responsible for monitoring 25+ schools each, writing policy and procedures for
acceptance and renewal of new charters, representing the office at local and district
meetings, and fielding the concerns and calls of the public over particular schools
(Interview, 3/14/14). One of the coordinators admitted at an SRC meeting, “Yeah, I don’t
sleep very much these days” (Fieldnote, 3/17/14).
Again, budget cuts account for only part of the lack of accountability mechanisms
for charters. Several officials pointed to larger existential questions at the state and
district levels concerning the ideological and legal principles that should guide their
growth and governance. The original intent behind the establishment of charters was to
devolve authority to schools and allow them to develop their own governing frameworks.
Within the state’s charter law, charter schools “operate independently from the existing
school district structure as a method to…encourage the use of innovative teaching
methods.” Within that same article, charter schools must agree to not discriminate on the
basis of admission and be held accountable for their performance through “measurable
academic standards” (Pennsylvania Department of Education 2009). Many district
officials highlighted the contradictions that arose in the evaluation of “school quality”
when the charters were subject to less scrutiny outside of their test scores compared to
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district schools. Ms. Turner, an official, discussed the tradeoffs of difficulty of
monitoring charter schools when the law allowed them to operate autonomously.
Five years ago, the parochial system was a primary vehicle for educating middleclass kids. People are concerned about charters because as the parochial system
fades away, charters will just become the replacement, which feels bad. Many
middle class kids are getting into charters but so are kids who need help. I mean,
if you look at the number of FRL6 kids that go to charters is less than the District
but it’s not zero. It’s still 65 percent. The District is 87 percent Free and Reduced
Lunch, so it’s just a different world, but it doesn’t mean that the charters are
serving kids caviar. I think if you’re thinking about charters and vulnerable
populations, you have to look at the four big buckets. There’s FRL or just poor
kids. Can poor kids get into charter schools and that’s mostly a question of choice
and access? Then there’s the ELL bucket. If a parent doesn’t have a command of
the English language, or the systems of Philadelphia, how can they help their kid
apply? Then there’s the special education bucket, the kids that are costly to
educate. The fourth bucket is kids with discipline issues. The question is, if we’re
going to say that charters get to operate and have different and innovative
models, is it ok for them to say that you need to behave in a certain way to stay?
That they are only designed to serve certain kinds of kids? (Interview, 5/3/14)
Breaking the students that disproportionately attend district schools instead of charters
schools into “four buckets”, Ms. Turner highlights that though charter schools are serving
vulnerable populations (i.e. “it doesn’t mean the charters are serving kids eating caviar),
the most vulnerable still attend underfunded district schools because of questions of
access. Even though charters are not legally allowed to practice selective admission,
navigating a unanimous lottery system requires a type of institutional knowledge that puts
vulnerable student and parent populations at a disadvantage. These skewed enrollment
types therefore reflect a number of barriers to enrollment. The most important question
Ms. Turner raises comes at the end of her analysis however when she asks whether it is
justified for charters to be selective about the “kinds of kids” that they serve. The
question calls attention to issues of ethics and equity and whether, in the spirit of
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“innovation” and autonomy, charter schools have obligations to serve students that do not
fit their model?
Here enters the question of charters’ obligation to equitably serve all students. If
the law empowers them to act largely outside of the bureaucratic governing structure of
the district, developing their own accountability systems, tailored curriculums for
particular “kinds” of students, and rules that make admission contingent, then how can
one not expect stratification across charters and district schools? This tension between
market stratification and equity plagued officials’ consciences. Several complained that
the current research on the effects of charters on vulnerable student populations like
special education and English-Language Learners was not “sophisticated” enough,
particularly in Philadelphia, to warrant continued expansion (Interview, 4/28/14). In other
words, the state was not taking into consideration how the education market worked to
stratify students along lines of race and class in their acceptance to charter schools.
Returning to Mr. Riley’s tobacco metaphor from the chapter’s opening vignette, he
admits:
Mr. Riley: You’re dealing with the same tobacco issue from before. These
charter decisions help some kids at the expense of other kids. That’s just the fact
of it, right? I think there’s an open question whether the dialogue can get
sophisticated enough to have that conversation, and there are real and legitimate
reasons why people don’t want that to be a conversation. How could you
legitimize a charter school not supporting special education kids? But by the same
token, how could you not legitimize a charter school that has a discipline policy
that enables them to have a safe space? Do you see how thorny this gets?
(Interview, 3/14/14)
While these officials felt conflicted about the ethics around charter schools practices, they
felt powerless to resolve these “thorny questions.” As Mr. Riley put it, “These charter
decisions help some kids at the expense of other kids.” If they system was deliberately set
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up around selectively serving schools with incentives to reduce their costs, what might
happen to the city’s most vulnerable kids that cost the most to educate? Secondarily, what
costs would pursuing this reform have for the remaining district schools that
disproportionately serve the city’s most vulnerable youth?
Returning to red state-blue city dynamics, in a context of limited resources and
political enthusiasm for continued expansion at the state-level, officials collaborated with
a non-profit firms specializing in educational law to try to address some of the equity
issues around school funding and charter expansion. An interview with Mr. Dell, a
lawyer at one non-profit law firm, described the predicament in pursuing lawsuits on the
basis of charters’ access barriers and equity in service.
I mean, it’s always so hard to prove this stuff, that charter schools are deliberately
excluding certain populations. We’ve done a lot legislative advocacy and
sneaking around the Commonwealth to examine the disparities in the charter
sector. English-Language Learners (ELLs) are the biggest disparity with about 80
percent of ELLs in district schools and less than 3 percent in charter schools. The
ELLs that they have, they’re upper-level ELLs. We know that non-English
speaking families go into charters, get told by the secretary that “We’re sorry, but
we don’t really have services.” But then if you go to the school, they say, “Of
course we never said that.” So it’s difficult to prove that it ever happened. You
basically have to file with the Department of Justice and they have to do an
investigation. It’s tough to know where to file this. Do you file it against
individual charters or do you file it at the state level where it may or may not have
any chance of helping kids in Philly? There’s nothing being filed at the moment at
the systemic level against charters because of the political climate at the state
level that supports charterization. Enrollment caps are something that the district
is trying to institute, but many charters are ignoring them, and the state court has
so far ruled in their favor. (Interview, 5/27/14)
Mr. Dell highlights two issues that make legal recourse for the district difficult. First, the
devolution of governance and accountability systems for charters statewide complicates
the filing complaints against charters. Further, the process of conducting an investigation
into individual charters practicing exclusive admissions is expensive, time-intensive, and
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may not have any impact systemically. Second, the tidal force of conservative support for
charters at the state-level (as evidenced by court rulings in favor of abolishing enrollment
caps) on the basis of not encroaching upon students and families’ rights to “school
choice” (Woodall 2014a), evinces a fear of sinking time and resources into cases that go
against the state’s political grain. Mr. Dell describes again, the issue of powerful interests
at the state-level that protect the liberties of charter schools, legislatively coercing
districts’ to diversify their “choice” portfolios. Philadelphia’s status as a poor city that
barters with the state for supplemental funding therefore disadvantages its bargaining
power in state courts that rule in favor of conservative political agendas that favor procharter education policies.
Salvaging Value in a Devalued System: The Impetus to Brand
Interviews and conversations with district officials yielded insight into
overwhelming feelings of powerlessness as they sought to recover value from what they
perceived to be an increasingly “devalued system.” Pointing to a deepening stratification
between populations attending district and charter schools – as enabled by policy
decisions at the state level that greased the wheels for charter school expansion – many
officials watched the neediest kids continue to pool in the schools with increasingly
unavailable resources. Confused and scattered by the churn of staff and their status as
mediators between the state, the district, and their schools, many felt that this churning
thwarted their best efforts in changing the direction of what they deemed as questionable,
if not morally reprehensible policy reform. Ms. Smith, an official interested in major
policy-changes for accommodations for vulnerable student populations, explained.
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I mean, since I’ve been in this position, everything has just felt very transitional.
It’s hard to know how much to try if you feel like, tomorrow there’s going to be a
whole other regime. A superintendent comes is in and they have their plan and
everyone tries to get their policies in place within the structure, and then three
years later there’s someone new and we start all over again. We’re burnt out and
it’s hard to not get sucked into the mentality that any work you do will be for
naught. (Interview, 4/29/14)
Another official explained how the turnover, particularly with the budget cuts, impacted
her feelings about the district’s future,
So many different people have rolled the district out so many different times in so
many different ways. Like I was thinking the other day I’ve been here a little over
six years. There was one year where I didn’t have a boss for an entire year
because she was let go. In six years I’ve had eight different bosses. So the state of
change is so rapid there’s no memory, no way to even have a vision. I think that if
the district—whatever direction they want to move in – they have to rally the
support of the folks that are here. But with budget cuts and charter pressures,
there’s no vision. The vision is, don’t go bankrupt. That’s about it. (Interview,
3/28/14)
Many officials voiced that in spite of their qualms with the direction of reform and their
implications for equity, pointing to charters as the lightening rod in their work and the
contradictions in internal policy that it produced. Yet, the “rapid change” and the lack of
institutional “memory” stifled their ability to combat the hazardous, long-term
vicissitudes of unencumbered market-inspired charter growth. Caught in the momentum
to “cut costs” in spite their problematic and enduring effects for vulnerable youth
populations in particular, officials capitulated to marketized notions of “quality and
“success” and set plans in motion to close schools.
With what they felt was the inability to lead and develop a lasting “vision” at the
district level, many district officials placed the responsibility on schools to compete with
charter schools. In Action Plan 2.0, an internal policy document released in 2014, the
district promoted the internal marketization of public schools through the development of
82

public-private partnerships with non-profit, philanthropic, university, and community
organizations. This strategy encouraged schools to attract private resources to both
supplement their declining budgets and sport programming that would attract higher
enrollments. In other words, the policy encouraged schools function like charter by
finding private investments to capacitate services and therefore their marketability. While
the district had created the Office of Strategic Partnerships several years prior to promote
partnership development between itself and private city, state, and national organizations,
the director’s position had laid vacant. In the 6-pronged strategy plan to meet four of its
anchor goals, Action Plan 2.0 prescribed the cultivation and sustainment of
“partnerships” at the system and school levels as the central tactic of “Strategy 5” to
“Become an innovative and accountable organization” (23).
The District will continue to develop and maintain partnerships with
philanthropic, business, non-profit, higher education and community
organizations and others, and collaboratively determine where and how partners
can support our goals. The District will also maintain and expand collaboration
opportunities with current City and institutional partners to provide and prioritize
academic and behavioral supports, ensure student safety, and offer extracurricular
opportunities for students in the early grades. During a period of significant
financial challenges and transitions, City agencies, philanthropic and community
organizations, and families have been extraordinarily supportive of the District
and its schools. Over $10 million was secured in SY12-13 to supported transition
of District students, to enable the expansion of high quality schools, and the help
sustain the important student-focused programming (The School District of
Philadelphia 2014:23).
In this document, while describing partnerships as a “supplemental” measure to improve
the progress “already achieved by district schools”, Action Plan 2.0 underscores the
centrality of the resources that partnerships provide, particularly in the midst of a fiscal
crisis. The “$10 million” secured in 2012-2013 refers to the funds provided by
organizations like the Philadelphia School Partnership (PSP), a non-profit dedicated to
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garnering philanthropic funds for investment in “turnaround” and private schools, for
covering the costs of the schools closures. Though the district created the Office of
Strategic Partnerships years prior to the budget cuts to develop partnerships, and
partnerships between private organizations and the district have long history in
Philadelphia (Harkavy and Puckett 1991), in this iteration of the district’s goals
partnerships represented a core rather than supplemental tactic for resource garnering.
Many officials oversight but concluded that the only way for district schools to
survive in the crisis was to attract partnerships. Partnerships, in their view, could
accomplish two, interrelated goals – 1) to fill chronic resource gaps 2) brand schools to
bolster their enrollments by offering programming and resources through “respectable”
outside organizations. By bringing locally and nationally recognized organizations to
offer services like college counseling, after-school programming, and enrichment,
schools could disseminate symbols of “quality” that students and families might read as
valuable to their children’s educational experience. These resources could also insulate
against the effects of mass budget cuts, a concern for parents that saw public
disinvestment in neighborhood schools as harmful to their long-term value and capacity
to adequately serve their children. In effect, partnerships could bring cache to
neighborhood schools through their unique services, create an aura of “value” for their
school’s brand, and in turn, sharpen their competitive edge in the market.
Within the district’s bureaucratic machinery, a district official described her plan
to build a digital infrastructure around partnerships that administrators could draw on to
lure partners to their school.
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Ms. Lily: So we would have a site like an Amazon marketplace where partners
will come in, register, say who they are, what they do, the money they would
bring, kids they want to focus on, and outcomes desired. The principal goes into
the marketplace and shops for partners. That’s the piece that doesn’t really happen
now. There are some really entrepreneurial principals but this would allow
everyone and their mothers to build their partnerships portfolio and track
everyone in their buildings. So you would see partners as a core of school
improvement plan. Say you don’t have good science professional development
but some corporation is doing externships for science teachers? So then you
would begin to see a growing reliance on partners. (Interview, 4/12/14)
In Ms. Lily’s description of her plan for an online registration forum for interested
partners, she maps marketized notions of business and entrepreneurship onto educational
service delivery, animating spaces of private resource exchange in public schools. From
her perspective, partnerships empower principals to go to a “marketplace” to browse for
resources that align with their vision for the school. With technological infrastructure to
facilitate these exchanges between private organizations and schools, Ms. Lily envisages
partnerships giving neighborhood schools the ability to indirectly fundraise and brand
their institutions like charter schools, allowing them to compete in the “marketplace” of
schools the district is attempting to create through charter expansion.
Within this discourse, district officials positioned principals as CEOs instead of
educators, charged with the responsibility of enticing partnerships to compensate for the
dearth of district-provided resources. In a conversation with a district-official responsible
for coordinating a district-wide partnership, College Dreams, she explained the
responsibility of the school’s leadership to manage partner resources and align them with
their school’s designated “brand.”
Ms. Tolentine: The only way you brand your school is to prioritize. If you have
all of these partners, you need to be strategic and coordinate them to execute your
vision and needs. If none of them do anything, the principal needs to lay down the
law. Do you know what we like to call those people? The pimps of poverty. The
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people trying to make money off of poor kids. That’s what’s happening and it’s
getting worse as the district gets worse. The principals are the ones that have to
make sure that doesn’t happen in their schools. They need to take charge and use
these people for what they bring. (Fieldnote, 2/17/14)
Aggravated with principals that she felt were not prioritizing her program in their
schools, Ms. Tolentine reinforces Ms. Lily’s notion that principals must manage their
schools like businesses, coordinating this labor and “laying down the law” for recalcitrant
or ineffective partners. She alludes to a danger in partners that are only there to profit off
of crisis, labeling these partners types as “the pimps of poverty.” School leadership, from
her perspective, must determine which partners “execute” the “vision” of the school and
trim the fat accordingly.
Problematic of Partnerships in a Crisis
While Ms. Tolentine puts the onus on stressed school-level administrations to
determine their partnership schemas, others noted that in the current climate, the pressure
for district officials and school-level leadership to run schools with so few resources
positioned them poorly to lead with their needs at the negotiating table.
Ms. Roebuck: I think the partnerships idea is great because the bottom line is that
we don’t have enough resources. But we also don’t have a framework or the
power to structure partnerships equitably. So as a result we have a lot of people
who come in, lots of non-profits and universities and with no common interest or
agreed-upon strategy. Everyone has his or her own interests. I’ve never worked
with an organization that came in and said, “What do you need?” They’ve come
in and said, “This is what we do.” So it’s always kind of like trying to fit a round
peg into a square hole. (Interview, 3/28/14)
Ms. Roebuck pointed to the discrepancy in the missions of organizations with highly
coveted resources and the needs of the district. She also brought issues of power and
equity into to relief as she described the decreasing capacity district officials have to
negotiate, direct and align private organizations’ resources with their goals. Missing key
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staff in the partnerships’ office and desperate to attract private dollars to support
programming in increasingly underfunded schools, Ms. Roebuck felt that the district
employees did not have the ability to thoroughly oversee the distribution of partners
across schools nor determine partnerships’ fit with the needs of the school. Even with the
digital forum proposed by to connect schools, schools desperate for resources would still
be at the mercy of organizations willing to provide services.
Other officials raised questions around sustainability and the distribution of
partner resources district-wide if the district continued to push partnerships in their
strategy to redress service gaps. The same official that saw an opportunity to vest
principals with the power to control their schools’ fates through partners, admitted that
building a service delivery infrastructure around partners brought its risks.
Ms. Lily: Funding from foundations and local corporations for non-profit work
are more limited and shaky, especially since the Recession. Look at the major
funding sources in the city, like United Way and the William Penn Foundation. If
William Penn is putting $30 million into educational programming, which they do
every year, the majority of that comes to kids in our schools. So that’s funding a
non-profit network. When William Penn decided to switch their strategy from
youth development into academic performance, $30 million dollars of revenue
left the eco-system. So what happened in the schools with partners funded by
those people? Services diminished from buildings. We went from having a
college readiness budget of let’s say, 2 or 3 million dollars down to zero. That’s
the risk you take with taking on a non-profit partner. (Interview, 4/12/14)
Ms. Lily couches the instability of partner funding in the precarity of the economy,
demonstrating that when the district allows partners funded by foundations to carry some
of its weight, they are vulnerable to the whims of funders. In spite of the potential she
saw for partners to invigorate school communities, making them more porous and able to
capitalize on external resources, she also saw the cyclical funding of these organizations
as reinforcing the instability that already plagued district schools.
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Another key concern around the partners’ strategy was distribution of partner
resources across schools and within schools. Several officials believed that certain
neighborhoods and schools were “better suited” to take on partners than others,
emphasizing the desirability of certain neighborhoods for organizations given their
demographics as well as geography.
Ms. Smith: I feel like South Philly gets so many more partners than any other part
of the city. It’s like where the hipsters that work in these community organizations
want to be. You know, if you don’t have a car, it’s easier to get to than the
Northeast. These programs aren’t in the schools there and it’s mainly because it’s
hard to get to and it’s not this cool, new place to live. (Interview, 3/28/14)
Pointing to gentrification as a driver of increasingly established non-profits and
community-based organizations, Ms. Smith compares South Philadelphia and Northeast
Philadelphia, two areas that differ in their concentration of school-supportive non-profits.
If responsibility for filling schools with community partners was displaced onto local
schools, she feels that certain neighborhoods would face a geographic disadvantage.
Another official also mentioned that not only geography, but also demographics within
schools might drive skewed distributions of partner resources.
Ms. Lily: I think there are definitely deserts, possibly because of the population or
geography of the neighborhood. One year I did a mapping project at a high school
that had 54 organizations serving the same 300 kids, and there were like 1300
kids in the building at the time. So I think that some of it is about people’s
perception of where they think the need is. Because the truth be told is, there’s
only about 10 organizations that can do real scale. Beyond that, it gets real mom
and poppy, 35 kids here, 35 there. I got into it with a college readiness provider
that said, “Oh, well, we want to be the premiere organization.” I was like, “Ok,
there are 47,554 high school students and you serve 500. You’re nobody’s
premiere.” So yeah, I don’t know if there are enough resources to go around at the
end of the day, but it’s something right? (Interview, 3/26/14)
Ms. Lily’s insight brings into focus the problem alluded to by Ms. Roebuck the refraction
of the districts’ needs through myriad lenses. Partners’ lenses are first determined by their
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construction of the problem, reflected in the mission of their organization, the ways they
measure impact, and the demands of their funders. This refraction, Ms. Nicholas’ points
out, can lead to a crowding of resources around students constructed as “targets” of
partner programming, while unintentionally neglecting a large majority of the student
body. This “mom and poppy” quality to partnerships has its benefits in that many
organizations operate at an extremely grassroots level with deep connections to the
communities they serve. However, with an inability to “scale” their organizations, she
harbors uncertainty as to whether “there are enough resources to go around at the end of
the day.”
Branding Through Partnerships: ELLs as Partnership Currency
The primacy of partnerships-as-strategy grew in scope and intensity throughout
the year at both SRC meetings and in interviews with officials and other administrators.
As a participant in a series of planning meetings for a presentation to the SRC on English
Language Learner policy reform at the district level, I noticed that while many of the
attendees were ELL teachers from neighborhood schools with high percentages of ELLs,
many were also the ELL-serving partners, public interest lawyers, and district officials
working on ELL policies and services in the district. The three planning meetings were
tense and complicated by diverse stakeholders coming together to build a unified agenda.
The tensions largely centered around the message that ELL-serving constituencies
wanted to communicate to the district about the needs of ELLs and the state of services
for them. With only two hours to monopolize the attention of the 5 members of the SRC,
opinions diverged over whether to “showcase” the best practices of schools serving ELLs
or to platform the dramatic loss of resources to these schools as a result of the budget cuts
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and its adverse impacts on ELLs. The designated facilitator of the meeting, Ms. Smith,
encouraged the group to use this meeting as a “showcase” for partnerships, leading with a
“positive” rather than “pejorative” tone.
We need to show that schools are drawing on all of these extra resources, parents,
community groups, non-profit organizations, etcetera to show how while we have
challenges with resources, we still developing best practices. We want good
examples of best practices like partnerships but to not gloss over the challenges.
An ELL teacher, Ms. Betty, objected to the strategy to avoid confrontation with the SRC
by painting the “resort” to partnerships in a positive light.
This might be clear to everyone but me, but what is the objective of this meeting?
What’s our tack toward the SRC? Is the point not to direct criticism or rage at the
SRC? I’m not sure what the objective is. We also want to show what the
weaknesses are with the lack of funding and that these partnerships aren’t enough
to cover the state’s responsibility to provide for ALL of these children. We would
like more funding right? Why can’t we say that? (Planning Meeting, 3/5/14)
The principal of a prominent elementary for ELL students, Mr. Savitch, responded to Ms.
Betty’s questions.
I think that because we’re addressing the SRC about ELLs, it’s about representing
people at this meeting and showing that there is this kind of support and advocacy
for our students.
Overriding Ms. Betty and several other teachers’ concerns that showcasing schools that
develop partnership cottage industries would distort the dire need for state-provided
resources and provide further ammunition to displace responsibility for resource-scarcity
onto neighborhood schools, the district representatives heading the planning committee
structured the presentation to the SRC around “Best Practices for ELLs”, center-staging
Mr. Savitch’s elementary school’s numerous partnerships as a gold-standard for building
ELL-supportive schools. Seventy-five minutes of the two-hour presentation was
dedicated to listening to the testimonies of this school’s partner leadership, plugging for
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their programming and demonstrating how their financial and human resource
commitments have mitigated the impact of the cuts on the school and its students. One
partner, a non-profit dedicated to after-school programming, boasted, “We have
assembled a parent advisory board and also found neighborhood volunteers to run the
school’s library,” while another claimed, “We have provided the students we serve with
application help to charters and special admission schools that they wouldn’t have
otherwise without counselors.” Following the testimonies, Ms. Smith addressed the SRC,
“We wanted this school be shown because they are successful in engaging their
community’s resources, a practice that needs to be more widely adopted.”
As the presentations concluded and a panel of district-officials took the platform,
a visibly distraught African-American father stood up and shouted at Ms. Smith.
It’s been great hearing about these partners have worked in THIS school doing
THIS thing for THESE kids. This is all well and great. [turning to the SRC] But,
what is the school district going to do? We can’t rely on all of these folks to do
what you’re supposed to do! Not all neighborhoods can do this. Not all
neighborhoods have immigrant kids with organizations that want to help them
(Fieldnote, 3/17/14).
Flustered and not knowing exactly how to respond, Ms. Smith assured the father that they
would be discussing the issue at the next meeting. He challenged her, “When are WE
having THIS meeting? When’s the meeting? When’s the next meeting? Tell me!” Asking
him to give her his contact information at the conclusion of the meeting, Ms. Smith
informed the father and the audience that time was running short.
After the meeting, I gathered with several teachers from Johnson High, the high
school where I was conducting my fieldwork, to walk to our cars and the subway. Their
faces were drawn, tired from the long day at school and now what they perceived to be an
91

unfruitful presentation to the SRC. Ms. Betty, a teacher usually abounding with energy,
explicated her disappointment in a dejected tone.
I just don’t know anymore. We went to three, two-hour meetings, brought
students to testify, and not even the surface got scratched. Here we have a district
falling apart and they decide to put one school on display because they’ve gotten a
lot of outside help. They parade them around like that’s what every school should
be doing. We should not be telling them that we can’t do this job with partners
alone. Our partners are underpaid and unstable in their jobs themselves. I know
that school, like all schools, wanted to give itself some visibility, to make them
known so they won’t close them down. But because of that, we sacrificed an
opportunity to tell them that we’re not ok. Things are not ok. (Fieldnote, 3/17/14)
Ms. Betty distills the ethical dilemma of increasingly relying on partners as resource
providers in public schools, as the distribution of those partnerships does not serve all
school equitably. She further critiques the instability of partnerships themselves, as many
of them remain at the mercy of the cyclical funding of the non-profit industry. Fearing
that partner reliance provides a release valve for the state in terms of pressure to
adequately and consistently fund Philadelphia’s neighborhood schools, Ms. Betty
questions the political ends that such a strategy serves as private organizations come to
increasingly perform the work and function of the state in public education. She finally
forgives Mr. Savitch’s marketing of partnerships to the SRC as evidence of the school’s
“quality”, understanding the necessity of positive press for schools as the school closure
threat circulates.
**********************************************
This chapter details the deepening marketization of the School District of
Philadelphia beginning with the passing of No Child Left Behind and the rise of highstakes testing, “performance-based” evaluation systems, and the privatization of public
school operations through school takeovers and the mass expansion of charter schools.
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Given the state-takeover of the district in 2002 and the subsequent institution of the
School Reform Commission, a body of unelected officials appointed by the state to
govern the direction of reform in the city, I further demonstrate that conservative
administrations at the state level from 2002 to 2014 influenced the adoption of school
reforms pushing for devolution, competition, and choice within low-performing schools
districts like Philadelphia. In spite of the intentions of intentions of the reforms to
improve “accountability”, “quality”, and stability in educational provision and district
finances, I argue that they operated in concert with state-level budget cuts from 2010 to
2013 to produce the district’s most precarious fiscal crisis. Supporting essentially two
separate educational systems, the district and the charter system, the School District of
Philadelphia turned to closures to “consolidate” infrastructure and attempt to minimize
their costs long-term in 2013 and 2014.
Central to my conversations with district officials were the momentum behind
these reforms in spite of their unintended consequences at the local level. Citing “red
state-blue city” dynamics, or the state’s conservative backing and imposition marketdriven reform models in a democratic, poor city like Philadelphia, officials lamented the
state’s lack of concern for equitable outcomes. Pointing out the truncated access
populations like first-generation immigrant families and special education students’
experience, they implied that unfettered education markets naturally stratify their
consumers along lines of access and privilege. Further, they raised questions about the
legal parameters of charter schools’ rights to selectively service students that abide by
their disciplinary policies and or “fit” the criteria for which their charter establishes their
services. If charter schools receive public funds but operate autonomously, to what
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degree should the district monitor them beyond their performance? To what degree can a
bankrupt district monitor the proliferation of charter school networks?
The fact that the “neediest” students were pooling in district schools afflicted the
consciences of officials. They recognized that because of stratification across the sector,
school closures would therefore have the most adverse impacts on the students that
needed the most help. Unable to stymie the demand and support for charters at the city
and state-levels, the “necessity” and “inevitability” around school closures emerged from
what many felt as forced capitulation with powerful interests pushing market-reform. The
fiscal precarity of the federal and state-induced budget crisis in AY 2013-2014 further
shaped the urgency that many felt to cut costs and improve the overall “efficiency” of the
district system. Their rationales and methodologies for the closures relied heavily on
technocratic understandings of school quality and failure, intended to map order onto the
messy, intensely political process of shuttering schools across the city. While many
officials admitted that they tried to be “objective” as possible, eliciting “community
input” to help make their decisions, the closures ultimately hinged on the unilateral
voting of the School Reform Commission.
The “messiness” of the closures and the lack of democracy around these reforms
index what Greenhouse (2010) writes as the “problems of interpretation” that accompany
the marketization of publics. District officials responsible for closing schools and
authorizing charters, in spite of their fraught feelings over these actions underlying
paradoxes, did not feel a collective agency in altering the direction of reform. Charged
with “improving” the overall quality of the district while reconciling the disparate
demands of fiscal crisis, they allowed the School Reform Commission, or the state’s
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governing arm, to dictate the rules of engagement, losing administrators along the way to
budget cuts. While admitting that the state and district education policies promoting
privatization and context-independent metrics of “quality” worked in tandem with a long
history of disinvestment in Philadelphia’s district schools to produce schools’ “failure”,
they saw no other option but to rely on the same metrics to close schools. Moreover, in
the district’s internal policies, officials encouraged district schools to attract private
resources to boost their schools’ quality through partnerships with non-profit, corporate,
and philanthropic organizations.
Though I found officials troubled by the “paradoxes” of choice emergent in these
reforms, in the coming chapters I argue that market-driven policies like school closure,
charterization, privatization, and continued fiscal crisis created a blanket environment of
precarity for all neighborhood schools. Deprived of resources and exhorted to “act” like
charters by supplementing their budgets and services with the labor and resources of
private organizations, neighborhood schools faced the conditions and demands of an
increasingly entrenched education market. However, community members and educators
at district meetings with the SRC voiced the problems of looking to private organizations
to both attract private resources and demonstrate “quality” to parents selecting schools for
their students in an expanding education market. Many questioned the viability of
partnerships for all neighborhood schools when certain schools did not have the “ability”
to attract enough partnerships to meet their demands. Others questioned the stability of
partnerships with organizations that lay at the mercy of cyclical funding cycles. Many
underscored the undeserved shift in responsibility to the school to find resources that
should come from the state.
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Partnerships and school closure policies together index a dramatic seeping of
market logics into the relations between public schools. By encouraging public schools to
compete for private resources and then evaluating their closure-worthiness based on
decontextualized performance metrics, these policies pit public schools against one
another, limiting political mobilization and collective efficacy at the local level.
Therefore, not only do district officials feel powerlessness in steering the direction of
reform, but schools also understand their own survival as hinging on the failure of others.
Treated like businesses, school closure and market-driven policies like private
partnerships structure zero-sum relationships between schools competing for students,
grades, and the resources to defray their rising costs. School closures-as-policy in
particular, as both a consequences and extension of market logics, therefore raised the
stakes of failure through an explicit ultimatum: compete or close.
In this next chapter, I ethnographically explore one neighborhood high school’s
response to this ultimatum, examining the dilemmas that surface in educational practice,
philosophy, and governance when non-selective neighborhood schools must prioritize the
business of survival over the mission of educating. School closure, more than any
market-driven reform, fortifies the perils of failure, prompting neighborhood school to
compete for survival. I explore processes of social and organizational change that topdown, market-driven accountability mechanisms induce in public schools and they strive
to compete in an expanding urban education marketplace. More simply, I trace school
communities’ responses to the threat of closure and the market demands of demonstrating
“value” and managing risk to their performance. By linking school closure threats to the
in-school experiences of teachers, administrators, and students at a high school slated for
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closure in early 2011, I hope to show how local interpretations of “failure” and markets
come to restructure the educator-student relationships and experiences of equity and
belonging for youth in non-selective neighborhood schools. Further I will show how
market-driven logics alter the inclusive and democratic missions of traditional, nonselective neighborhood schools.
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CHAPTER 3 – “SAVING THE SCHOOL”: EFFORTS TO BRAND JOHNSON HIGH

“Doomsday”: September 9th, 2013
When I entered the building on September 9th, 2013, Johnson High was on the
cusp on its 100th birthday. Walking into the main office, I saw the principal and one
secretary enrolling dozens of students amidst a backdrop of empty desks and forlorn
desktop computers of former staff. The May 2013 budget cut had leveled 3,500
employees district-wide, and cut school supply budgets by 90 percent. The crisis also
accompanied the closure of two-dozen neighborhood schools throughout the city (Gabriel
2013). Johnson High had survived the “school closures list” for a third year in a row,
managing to secure itself another school year in spite of its leaking roof, soaring utility
costs, and low test scores. However, it did not escape the consequences of being a
neighborhood school in the midst of dramatic district-wide austerity and reform. The
school was sharing its counselor with 8 other schools, receiving his services 1 out of
every 9 days. The nurse came more often at one day per week.
After sitting for 30 minutes observing the chaos, I noticed that students enrolling
in the school were overwhelmingly of Asian descent. Mr. Keo, the school principal,
gestured to me to come into his office, a room covered in sprawling paper piles and
Khmer artifacts: a paperweight of Angkor Wat, a parchment painting of the Cambodian
countryside where he was born, a picture of his mother and her 11 children in her home a
few blocks from Johnson High. He himself was a former Khmer refugee, arriving at
Johnson High in the early 1980s after escaping the Pol Pot genocide and spending years
in a refugee camp in southeastern Thailand. “So how many days per week can you be
here this year?” he asked. I told him that I was planning on being in classrooms four
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days per week, that I would help out in whatever ways that were needed. “As you can
see, we are short-staffed, and some of our classrooms have over 45 students. I’ll take you
and whoever else I can get.”
From there he gave me a schedule of six classes, a mix of low-level EnglishLanguage-Learner (ELL) classes, “shelter” classes, or content classes like American
history and mathematics modified for ELL students, and finally a class designated for the
implementation of a college-access program, College Dreams, for college-aspiring
sophomores. As I walked the hallways, the imagery of Jonathan Kozol's (1991) work on
the state of public educational infrastructure came alive. Water stains marred peeling
walls and cockroach droppings gathered in dusty corners. Stepping over chunks of fallen
plaster, I sat in a squeaky seat in Mr. Wolf’s room. As the bell chimed, 43 students
rushed in to grab a seat in this “shelter” American civics class. With a limited number of
desks, several students took their seats on the radiator, a relic from the early 20th century
when the school was built. Students passed a set of 14 textbooks published circa 1989
around to their peers. Three and four students crowded around one book, taking turns
skimming the lines with their fingers and searching for information to answer Mr. Wolf’s
opening set of questions on the chalkboard. One student touched her shoulder with a
furrowed brow and raised her eyes to see water streaming from a hole in the ceiling. Mr.
Wolf looked at her, then to me, and smiled, “Yeah, we thought that sealing off the 4th
floor of the building would help, but at the end of the day we need a new roof and it’s
going to cost 5 million. You can guarantee that the district will close us down before that
happens. Just don’t sit too close to the door. That’s where most of the water is.”
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The rest the day was a whirlwind of desperate teachers trying to salvage lesson
plans with no paper, and students navigating overcrowded classrooms, hallways and
cafeterias. Whereas I thought that my presence would confuse teachers, make them wary
of a graduate student doing ethnographic “research” in their classrooms, many of them
seemed relieved to see me. Upon entering Mr. Raymond’s fifth period “shelter” biology
class, he asked, “What organization do you work for?” I responded, “I don’t work for
anyone. I’m a graduate student.” Squinting his eyes, he asked again, “So you don’t work
for a non-profit?” “No, I responded, “I’m not. Just a graduate student.” Mr. Raymond
narrowed his eyes, confused, but aware of the room filling with students, “You’re a warm
body and that’s all that matters” (Fieldnote, 9/9/13).
***************************
The experiences described above illustrate the milieu in which administration and
staff worked in September 2013, the direst month of my fieldwork, a moment when
neighborhood schools across the city struggled to manage over-enrollment, busting
classrooms, and no give in their budgets. In Chapter 2 I described the School District of
Philadelphia’s current state of affairs, particularly how issues of school choice,
privatization, charter expansion, and entrenched bi-partisan politics at the state-level
shaped the district’s urgency to execute mass closures of 30 non-selective neighborhood
schools over the course of two academic years (AY’11-12, ’12-13). In this chapter, I
explore the ways in which a particular neighborhood school responded to the concomitant
pressures of the threat of closure and unprecedented fiscal austerity in their strategies to
signify their educational value and save their school through a process of school
branding.
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I entered Johnson High in early 2011 as a tutor, two years prior to the budget
crisis. During that year a leaked report from the URS Corporation recommended the
school for closure (Herold and Mezzacappa 2011). While unique in its ethnic diversity,
Johnson experienced similar pressures to most neighborhood schools under closure
consideration: high student body poverty rates, low standardized test scores7, a decaying
building, and decreasingly available material and human resources. When the school
received word that the district was considering it for potential closure, administrators and
teachers read the policy as emblem of unprecedented precarity, raising the stakes of
“failure” through its explicit ultimatum: compete or close. Positioned as educationally
inferior to charter schools and magnet schools as a traditional neighborhood school, they
felt that the only way to rise from the fray of considered schools was to minimize risks to
their performance, improve the reputation of the school to attract higher enrollments, and
build political capital with connected individuals and networks to help insulate the school
from the threat. The practices that accompanied each of these strategies set into motion a
larger branding process that administrators and educators believed would sustain the
school as a viable institution within Philadelphia’s educational marketplace.
I therefore take on my second research question in this chapter that pertains to
how educators perceived the risk that school closures-as-policy posed to their fate and
how they translated those perceptions into organizational and praxis-oriented changes to
both mitigate risk to their performance and reputation as a school and circulate symbols
of educational quality to bolster enrollment of students deemed valuable to their imagined
7

Prior to the 2009-2010 school year, Johnson High scored below the district average on the PSSA (School
District of Philadelphia). Both AY 2009-2010 and AY 2010-2011, the school performed significantly
higher than the district average. It has subsequently dropped in the last several years to at or below the
district average (School District of Philadelphia, 2014).
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brand. As recent work demonstrates, underlying closure policy is the condition of
extraordinary competition between both charter and neighborhood schools alike. Schools
with declining enrollments are deemed “inefficient” and “failing” and therefore must
ultimately be consolidated under management rubric. Closure is thus the outcome of what
Jabbar (2015) identifies as “competition as process” where school leaders “must develop
their responses to competition after they scan the market for the strategic actions of other
schools” (3). She also argues that while many economists of education have assumed
competition as a natural “lift-all-boats” mechanism for school improvement, as a theory,
it remains speculative. While relatively unexamined in the literature, recent work has
pointed to the marketing of schools that competition motivates, rather than material and
curricular improvements as schools strive to attract enrollments (Davis 2013; Holme,
Carkhum, and Rangel 2013; Kasman and Loeb 2012). Other scholars have also discussed
issues of equity when “problem kids” are “counseled out” of schools during the
marketing of a school, raising questions about the equity (Jennings 2010; Lubienski
2007). I build on this work by considering how school branding, as a racialized process
that responds to the risk introduced through competition and resource scarcity,
encompasses more than merely marketing the school but transforming the institution into
a niche commodity that will succeed in the education market.
As I described in the previous chapter, branding requires the reinforcement of
symbolic associations between brands and consumers through the engendering of
affective attachments (Schroeder 2009; Bastos and Levy 2012). Brands, as cultural,
ideological objects, transcend Marxist-oriented conceptions of use and exchange-value.
For Marx, the process under capitalism produces a commodity or use value, that has an
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exchange value that is greater than the sum of the values of the commodities in its
production (Foster 2007). Luvaas (2013) argues that within advanced capitalist societies,
notions of use and exchange value have not disappeared but that value creation has come
to hinge more on the immaterial imaginaries that brands invoke through the play on
human affect. As Foster (2007) explains,
The product singles out the agents and binds them together and, reciprocally, it is
the agents that, by adjustment, iteration and transformation, define its
characteristics” (Callon et al. 2002:198). Hence, the product implies a dynamic
“economy of qualities,” an economy in which tradable goods in the market are
defined by the characteristics attributed to them in successive qualifications and
requalification, including those enacted by consumers (713).
Drawing on the “qualifications” that brands must consistently negotiate with consumers
to be successful, I show in this chapter how two successive principals and their
administrations sought to qualify the school by capitalizing on the educational desires and
aspirations of first-generation Asian immigrant students that they perceived would
enhance the school’s brand and thus attract and retain student-familial-consumers.
The chapter moves from a thick description and history of Johnson High as
context, and then to three major sections that detail the strategies that the school
employed to brand itself as worthy of remaining open. The first section details two
administrations’ efforts to alter the student body of Johnson High in order to attract larger
enrollments of particular kinds of students. The second captures the institutionalization of
policies that sought to manage “risk” in the student population in order to insulate the
envisioned school’s “brand” from sullying. The third and final section delineates the
ways in which successive principals went outside of the school to forge partnerships with
a large number of private organizations, mostly non-profits, in order to build political
103

capital with powerful individuals citywide and attract services that would attract
enrollments of particular populations. My analysis provides insight into how tandem
processes of risk management and branding that these strategies set into motion, indexed
racialized and classed educational practices that marked populations as “risky” to the
“quality” of the school. I show how these practices promoted particular student
populations as “desirable”, crowding scarce energies and resources in their service.
Conversely, I show how educators, in a context of austerity and heightened urgency,
attempted to annex and reduce the presence and visibility of populations that they
perceived would stain the school’s reputation and ultimately, imperil its survival.
Creating the Brand through ELL-ification
As the school closure threat gained strength from 2010 to 2013, Johnson High
came under the microscope by the Office of Strategic Analytics, the arm of the School
District of Philadelphia responsible for evaluating school “quality” through a series of
metrics including enrollment numbers, the condition of the building, academic
performance, and school climate data (School District of Philadelphia 2012a). Johnson
High, similar to many high schools considered for school closure, scored poorly across
most of the metrics. Consistently performing around or below the district average in math
and reading test scores, this 100 year-old school suffered from perpetual maintenance
problems and a dramatic drop in enrollment in the last decade. Administrators attributed
drops in enrollment and test scores to the “creaming” of better students by charter
schools, a trend that had reconfigured the educational landscape of the larger
neighborhood in recent years. With no hope for financial help to renovate the building
and with the likelihood of continuing to serve high percentages of high-need students, the
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two principals that governed Johnson High over the course of my three years there, Mr.
Brown (’11-’12) and Mr. Keo (’12-14) highlighted the importance of rising from the fray
of considered schools. Each saw improved performance in particular areas as more
achievable than others, namely enrollment and school climate. The School District of
Philadelphia uses a composite of indicators to measure school climate performance: 1)
percentage of students attending 95 percent or more of instructional days 2) within-year
retention rates or students that remained in the school for a full academic year year3)
across-year retention or students that remained in the school for successive academic
years 4) percent of students with zero in-school suspensions or suspension time served in
the in-school disciplinary quarters 5) percent of students with zero out-of-school
suspensions 6) teacher attendance rates 7) serious/violent incidents (School District of
Philadelphia, 2014). In both principals’ minds, bolstering “school climate” would
naturally increase enrollment. District auditors would also see changes in these indicators
as reflective of the school’s progress and therefore reconsider its initial recommendation
to close Johnson.
After a deluge of violence at another neighborhood high school in 2009 with
alleged attacks on Asian students by “African-American” students, contributed to an
exodus of “Asian” students, Johnson High’s former principal, Mr. Brown, saw an
opportunity become a “safe haven” for students fleeing what they perceived to be a
persistently “dangerous” school. Teachers and administrators referred to these students,
among other first-generation immigrant students, as English Language Learners, or
ELLs. While a number of different ethnic groups composed the ELL population at
Johnson, youth from East and Southeast Asian nations were the most populous. By
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promoting an image of a safety and opportunity for hard-working immigrant students,
Mr. Brown, Johnson High’s principal from 2008 to 2012, argued that he could “brand”
the school as an institution that would attract larger enrollments.
Mr. Brown: I use to work as a teacher in a bilingual school in North Philadelphia.
We had some ELL kids here [at Johnson High], some wonderful ELL teachers. I
was impressed with what was going on in those classrooms so of course I wanted
to highlight that. In a lot of ways you have to market your school – you have to
brand your school somehow. I think the school became more positive, safer when
we strengthened the ELL program. I think that kids were happier and therefore
kids came back. I mean I’m in charge of a five million dollar company [as a
principal]. I’m the CEO. I needed to build pride in the school as the resource
provider and the brander. I got the school painted, got the new weight room, put
in new cameras to improve school climate, so I said to the kids, “Look what I’m
doing for you.” To the staff and the press I said, “Look at what we’re doing for
each other and what we’re building!” I brought in the Student Union and they
went out and said, “Hey, look, ours is a good school and here’s why.” When you
have the kids selling the school, it’s tougher to close it. (Interview, 4/7/14)
Here, Mr. Brown tethers images of safety and school prosperity to the identity of a
particular kind of student: the diligent, well-behaved English Language Learner. When
Johnson High’s staff used this term, they referred to a particular type of student that
embodied the educational aspirations of Asian youth. While the term was slippery, used
to capture hard working, well-behaved Latino students, in this particular context, my
participants deployed “ELL” to index model minority behaviors. Mr. Brown further
describes the importance of reinforcing those images with material improvements and
curriculum changes. Under Mr. Brown, the school bolstered its English language
program, offering not only four levels of English language instruction (ELL) but parallel
content curriculum modified to serve the language needs of immigrant students. He also
points to the mechanisms through which he created an “aura” around Johnson as a “good
school”: the students themselves. By bringing in members of the Philadelphia Student
106

Union, or a city-wide student-led leadership organization, he incorporated students and
staff into the branding process by allowing them to circulate the message of the school’s
quality beyond its bounds.
As a result of this shift to an ELL-centric school, many new students came from
across catchment lines, particularly after the district closed other neighborhood schools
en masse from 2012 to 2013 and allowed students to apply to schools across catchment
lines in the spirit of “school choice.” Since the large majority of ELL students at Johnson
were of Asian descent, the school began to acquire a reputation as “The Asian High
School”, reinscribing the racialized logic that enrolling more ELL students would give
the school the “right kind” of reputation. As one teacher, Ms. Crowley, explained, “Yeah,
I mean you have students traveling from Northeast Philly just to come to this school.
There’s definitely a perception that this school is safe and welcoming for Asian students;
also that they represent the majority” (Interview, 1/10/14). Another teacher, Mr. Drew,
recounts the legacy of his Mr. Brown’s tenure.
When Brown was here the school was a lot different than it is now. He was
actually reforming the school to keep it from closing. So he was focusing a lot on
attendance and participation in class, detentions, that kind of thing. It was a very
different feel than it is now and that’s because of our immigrant students. When
he started, that population wasn’t as prominent as it is today. (Interview, 1/23/14)
Mr. Drew draws attention to a central assumption in Mr. Brown’s strategy to ELL-ify the
school: that enrollment numbers and climate statistics like “attendance” and “detentions”
would naturally improve with higher numbers of English Language Learners. By
improving those criteria, the school would not only bolster its “hard data” but also its
“soft data”, or staff and student narratives that could be traded upon in neighborhood and
city-wide discourse to strengthen the school’s reputation.
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Heightened Urgency to Brand: AY 2013-2014
Mr. Keo, who in served as Mr. Brown’s assistant principal from 2009-2012 and
succeeded him as principal, faced tremendous pressure in the AY 2013-2014 school year
to continue to brand the school as an ELL haven. With no resources and few support staff
as a result of the slashed budget and increasingly disproportionate enrollment of highneed students, Mr. Keo saw ELL-ification as the only way forward to save the school
from closure.
The district is focused strictly on one thing – numbers. It’s about saving money,
utilizing space, and not getting sued. They do not take into consideration the
uniqueness of each school unless it has something to do with those three things.
So you have to beat them at their own game. If they close the ELL high school
and those kids go to other schools and get beat up, that would hurt their numbers
AND get them sued and they know that. Even the principal of [sister neighborhood
high school] keeps saying to me, “Whatever you’re doing, don’t think you’re
offending me. You’re actually doing me a favor, because if you send those kids
over, there’s going to be turf war in my building all over again.” It’s not my
intention to make this into an Asian high school, but it would be great if it could
be. It’s a neighborhood school so I have to take everybody. However, it doesn’t
hurt to attract more Asian students because this district will never close down a
majority Asian school. (Interview, 5/1/14)
As he alluded to above, the enrollment of ELLs, namely Asian students, that would allow
the school to “beat [the district] at its own game” by exploiting the cultural politics of the
neighborhood and city to accomplish two goals. First, the principal assumes that by
enrolling first generation Asian students, he will raise the school’s “numbers” in terms of
enrollment and attendance, making it more difficult for the district to justify the school’s
closure. Second, Mr. Keo brandishes the political and fiscal risk the district would
assume through lawsuits by closing an Asian-dominated high school. The principal’s
secretary, Ms. Lai, a key adviser and information source to the principal and the only
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office staffer in 2013-2014, confirms an underlying assumption at work within the
administration.
I’ve been playing around with a lot of the open data in the district and so I was
looking at how attendance rates are correlated with the percentage of ELL
students, and I found really high correlations between ELLs and attendance rates.
(Interview, 2/11/14)
This explicit relationship between the enrollment of ELL students, improvements across
the board in behavior and attendance statistics, and enrollment numbers was a central
theme of conversations across both the administration and staff at JH. The discourse of
school survival ultimately hinged for staff on not only increases in enrollments, but
specifically enrollments of students that would not taint their climate numbers: ELLs.
Mr. Cassidy: The only reason we’re not closed is because we have our ELLs.
They come here all the way from Chinatown...What’s weird is that the Asian
scores are just as dismal across the board. The perception is that if you have Asian
kids, your math scores are going to go through the roof. It’s more of a reading
test than anything else, ya know, so it’s not about achievement. Let’s be honest,
when 15 ELL kids come in and are like “Oh, we want to go to your school,” Mr.
Keo is like, “Ok, sign em’ up!” It also helps because as we grow in numbers it’s
harder for them to close us down. This school used to house 1200 kids so I mean,
we need to be up to 700 or 800 to be safe. Two years ago we were pushing 500.
We’ve gotten 200 ELL kids from all over the city. It’s not like 200 show up in
August. They come all year. We got a student in June, ya know, it counts! He’ll
be here next year so sign em’ up! I mean, come on, you have zero issues with
those kids. You have issues but you wouldn’t have fights, weapons, or things like
that. You wouldn’t have those issues, ya know? And for a guy who’s been here 11
years, if that’s the way to keep it open, then I’m all for it. (Interview, 3/19/14)
Mr. Cassidy below summarizes the institutionalization of the ELL strategy and its key
technocratic advantages, alluded to in both the introductory vignette and the several staff
members’ testimonies. Attendance and behavioral statistics trumped achievement data
and therefore, instead of attempting to strengthen achievement in the midst of
increasingly severe resource and labor cuts, maintaining discipline became the key focus
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of Johnson’s administration. Teachers like Mr. Cassidy confirmed that the manageability
of ELLs made them an appealing student type for recruitment and admission. Together,
the value that Asian enrollment induced via quantification and the legal power they
carried to reverse district decision-making around closure, influenced teachers and
administrators ‘strategies to build their brand around this group.
Recruitment and Exploiting Enrollment Caveats
Understanding hard data and soft data as intrinsically connected, Mr. Keo,
spearheaded further efforts to ELL-ify the school to improve its numbers. Mobilizing a
number of staff, bilingual classroom aids, and students, he and this group visited
elementary schools to advertise and promote Johnson High as an alternative to charter
and special admission schools. Creating and relying on a “Student Advisory Council” of
four students, Mr. Keo encouraged this group of “model students” to go with him to
neighborhood elementary and middle schools to recruit students for the following school
year.
A lot of our students are wonderful, dedicated students. We have knuckleheads,
not that many, just like any other school. We know that this is a great school here,
but from the perception outside, every time we send out representation and they
introduce themselves as Johnson students, other children look at them like,
“Really? You’re from Johnson? You’re the ghetto one?” We need to break that
stereotypical perception. So I’ve asked Rhonda and a few of other students who
want to change that to come up with strategies to educate people outside of this
building that we are not fighters, that we aren’t the lowest form of human being
because we are from Johnson High. (Meeting Recording, 3/25/14)
Mr. Keo points to a key issue: the power of perception and reputation in terms of
attracting more students to enroll. By changing the perception of Johnson High’s as a
violent, low-performing “neighborhood” high school full of “knuckleheads” through the
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strategic employment of “model students” as recruiters, Mr. Keo attempted to counteract
his school’s reputation as serving “the lowest form of human being.”
However, Mr. Keo was not interested in all elementary schools equally. Targeting
elementary schools, some beyond the boundaries of the catchment area, he, the Student
Advisory Council, and a number of bilingual counselors, actively recruited ELL students.
Mr. Abram, a security guard whose wife served as the principal at neighborhood
elementary school where Mr. Keo sent students and counselors, recounts the selectivity
of the recruitment.
I know for a fact that all of the Bilingual Counselors went into the elementary
schools and were recruiting the ELL students to come here. I know that first hand.
Mainly Asians, which is understandable because the population down here is
largely Asian, but we’re also getting Asians from Center City! I think Johnson
High will be here for a while because of the climate and because of the type of
students Mr. Keo is accepting here. Well, it’s first and foremost a neighborhood
school, but there are students that can apply here outside the catchment that, in my
opinion, may end up turning it into a 100 percent ELL school. If that were the
case, I believe they would never close us. (Interview, 1/16/14).
As Mr. Abram points out, not only did active recruitment become a strategy to change
perceptions of the school, but also an indirect strategy to change the composition of the
student body.
The Risk Management of “Americans”
However, branding the school as one “worthy” of remaining open required
instituting policies that would also minimize the participation and visibility “risky”
students. These policies became of especial import as the district’s fiscal crisis deepened
throughout AY 2013-2014, intensifying the uncertainty of the direction of the district and
its implications for Johnson High’s future. As Nakassis (2013) argues, central to the
history of branding is the management of risk to the brand. Through differentiation from
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generic classifications, brands distance themselves from undesirable symbolic
associations. In the case of Johnson High, avoiding labels such as “dangerous” or
“chaotic” became of utmost importance in terms of retaining first-generation Asian
students, building their enrollment base, and avoiding poor climate data.
“Behavior” therefore reigned supreme as the defining expression of both student
quality and risk. While the generational and ethnic diversity of the school confounded
categorical race breakdowns, two homogenizing categories came to both classify and
segregate students spatially, academically, and socially: “English Language Learner” and
“American.” Staff and students also deployed these categories “ELL” and “American”
interchangeably with other synonymous terms that contributed to the crystallization of
the “ELL” versus “American” dichotomy. While staff and students used “ELL” in most
cases, they also substituted “immigrant”, “international student”, and “foreign” students
to invoke the same set of set of behaviors that characterized this student type. Even
though the ELL population also splintered in complicated ways across ethnic lines (see
Chapter 1), being “ELL” invoked “model minority” behaviors, or behaviors typically
associated with “Asian-ness” (Lee 2005; Fong 2008): hardworking, respectful,
submissive, and quiet. In contrast, staff and students alike framed “American”, or nativeborn students, as antithetical “ELL” – lazy, violent, disrespectful of authority, loud, and
abrasive – characteristics closely associated with what my participants understood as the
trope of urban Black masculinity. Ms. Betty, a teacher, describes the distinctions between
these two groups.
In the truest sense of the word, I mean it is sheltered ELL instruction, that’s the
model, but in reality, we’re sheltering them in the broader sense of the word from
the big, bad Americans. That’s the way I see it and I don’t discourage it. I know
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that it’s wrong because I don’t believe that’s going to help them in their life to be
afraid of Americans or not want to commune with them, but to be quite honest, I
would not want to commune with them either. Why would I approach someone in
the hallway who’s cursing up a storm and fighting in the hallway, whatever you
want to call THAT? The volume of their voices is offensive to my ELL students.
They cannot figure out why anyone would speak that loudly and that alone
prevents them from approaching them, regardless of what color they are.
(Interview, 12/18/13)
Ms. Betty points to two issues: first, she assigns a set of behaviors typically exhibited by
“big, bad Americans” that makes “ELL” students’ fraternization with them difficult to
facilitate. Second, she assigns fault in the communication barrier to the native-born
students. Claiming, “I would not want to commune with them either,” Ms. Betty
identifies more with the perceive plight of the ELL students.
This dichotomy did not just apply to behavioral characterizations of students.
According to both staff and students alike, ELLs “valued” their education and Americans
did not, a performance that had little to do with academic achievement, but instead, an
embodied hope that educational attainment would have some bearing on their futures.
Ms. Allard makes a comparison between her “ELL” and “American” students:
I do find that I see the American kids are not as appreciative of what they have.
You may not have much, but they’re like, “Oh, whatever, this is just school and I
don’t want to be here.” Where a lot of my ELL kids, they’re like, “I want to be in
school because education is important.” You even see that in class. When you
look at when they turn in work, almost all of the ELL kids turn in all of their
work, and the other kids turn it in whenever they want to turn it in. It’s the work
ethic that I don’t see in the American kids. (Interview, 2/18/14)
The dynamics described by Ms. Allard allude to spectrum of behaviors that inform
assignment of students to particular social categories: “work ethic” or “attitude” toward
their education. Scholars have thoroughly documented the enthusiasm and aspirations
that first immigrant youth harbor for educational achievement (Bok 2010; Kao and
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Tienda 2005; Louie 2012; McGinnis 2009; Ogbu and Simons 1998), highlighting that
fervency for achievement often diminishes as students become incorporated into the
American mainstream. Within this particular context, the subsuming categories of “ELL”
and “American” reflected that understanding, but went further to embed racialized
notions of value and risk. By building a brand around ELL students that demonstrated
care toward their education as well as contributed to a climate of order, the school
believed that it was elevate the value of the brand, selling the school’s environment as
one conducive to enthusiasm and respect for learning.
In fact, very few staff dwelled on disparate academic performance in their
classrooms but focused more the “effort” that students demonstrated in their work. The
obedient, hard-working minority, regardless of ethnicity or generation, was evaluated
based on his or her “care” for education – a trait they strongly associated strongly with
model Asian-ness. Teachers, administrators, and students designated students exhibiting
violence, deviance and apathy toward their academic performance, as more “American”,
or enacting “urban” behaviors typically identified with Black male students (Ferguson
2001; Rios 2011). While the “American” population, or native-born population, certainly
splintered in complicated ways across race and ethnicity, one’s labeling as “American”
translated into the degree to which their racialized behavior and educational aspiration
put the school’s imagined brand at risk.
Barring Enrollment of “Problem Kids”
In addition to a large number of ELL students of Asian descent enrolling at
Johnson, many of whom the staff referred to as “problem kids”, or native-born students
ejected from mostly charter schools and some parochial schools due to their poor
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performance, behavioral issues, or a combination of both, were arriving at Johnson High
simultaneously (Fieldnote, 2/19/14). These students were mostly African-American boys,
but there were several African-American girls and Caucasian boys. With cuts to support
staff and teachers, Mr. Keo and the teachers feared that “problem students” might have an
adverse impact on the school’s climate and overarching reputation. The school struggled
with its state mandate to “accept everyone”, specifically when branding itself required an
associative distancing from “problem students.”
Mr. Keo: I’ve even had people say to me, you know, I know you’re trying to
convert this school into an all Asian or ELL school. And I was like stop, that’s not
part of my agenda. If the ELL student comes to my school, I have to take him. If
the African-American student comes to my school and they live within the
catchment I have to take him. I run a neighborhood high school. I have no control
over who comes here. But it makes it hard because my school will be held
responsible for that African-American kid punching someone out in the stairwell.
We’re one violent incident away from being closed. (Interview, 12/9/13)
The dilemma of inclusion became particularly acute in AY 2013-2014 as Mr. Keo
struggled to operate the school with few support staff. In the opening vignette I alluded to
the lack of “bodies” in the school, a term that many teachers and Mr. Keo used often.
Students with behavioral issues posed a serious risk to the school climate without
“bodies” to regulate and govern areas where risk of an “incident” ran high – stairwells,
the cafeteria, and outside of school. As he notes, the behaviors he deems as most risky
reflect what he perceives as indicative of African-American boys, denoted by his use of
the term “him.”
As I began to spend more time in the main office observing enrollments, I spoke
often to the school secretary and principal’s intern. While the intern’s purpose was to
shadow the principal, she reported that with the budget cuts and the loss of five
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administrators, including the former assistant principal, she mostly helped the sole
secretary cope with the overwhelming workload of enrolling new students. The school
kept a record of transfer students as they streamed in, noting from where and for why
students were enrolling. Eating lunch one day with the principal intern, Ms. Nguyen,
commented on how Mr. Keo oftentimes worked around the “catchment” caveat.
I mean, every time a student comes in, Mr. Keo asks them a set of questions and
why they’re here, and they also look at the address. If the student lies beyond the
catchment and they have a lot of discipline issues at their old school – usually a
charter – then he doesn’t have to take them, and he won’t. But if they’re in the
catchment, he has to take them, so usually we’ll get like 2 or 3 kids in the two
days per week that I’m here that are like that. If the kid is a good kid, doesn’t have
issues, or doesn’t have a record because they’re just coming to the country, then
he takes them even if they’re not in the catchment. They are usually Asian kids.
(Fieldnote, 5/12/14)
By turning “problem kids” away and funneling them back to their neighborhood schools,
or students that exhibit the hazardous behaviors associated with African-American boys,
and enrolling “good kids” from across catchment lines to bolster the school’s numbers, or
students that reflect model minority behaviors, Ms. Nguyen underscores a central
mechanism created to drive the disproportionate enrollment of Asian ELL students.
Because the district gave principals autonomy to make decisions around admission of
students from outside the catchment, no mechanism existed to correct for racialized
readings of admissions candidates.
The Institution of the “Success Academy”
However, as Ms. Nguyen and Mr. Keo pointed out, as a non-selective
neighborhood school, the law mandated Mr. Keo to take “everyone” within the
catchment. In response to the enrollment of “problem kids”, Mr. Keo and teacher
leadership, or two teachers charged with administrative responsibilities in the absence of
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an assistant principal, adopted a strategy to corral these students, offer them an alternative
curriculum, and also truncate their time spent in the building. Through the founding of
the “Success Academy” in 2012, months after the announcement of Johnson High’s
inclusion on the potential school closures list, Mr. Brown and several teachers split 35
“problem students” between two classrooms in the school’s basement. When I asked one
of the two Success teachers what qualified students for this tracking, Mr. Marra informed
me, “It depends on a bunch of things. They’re here because of a combination of
behavior, attendance, and grades, in that order. Mostly behavior.” (Fieldnote 11/5/13).
Mr. Marra repeatedly discussed the prioritizing of weighting behavior and attendance
performance over achievement, a priority of the school as climate data became
increasingly critical to manage.
The students came from across grades and oftentimes had the same number of
credits regardless of their designated class year, largely due to failed classes and truancy.
One teacher in each classroom would cover a range of basic subjects like algebra, history,
and English, trying to forge a curricular middle ground among the range of levels.
Success Academy students arrived at 9am everyday instead of 8am with the rest of the
student body, and left by 1:30pm, not 3pm. These students did not enter through the
central doors, but came through an entrance on the side of the building that led directly
toward the assigned classrooms. Their classrooms were also directly adjacent to the
“Dean’s Room”, another space where students serving in-school suspensions gathered
under the supervision of a teacher-disciplinarian. Success students usually spent as much
time or more in the Dean’s Room as they did in the Success classrooms. They did not eat
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lunch with the rest of the student body and came and went from the school without much
interaction with the general population.
Teachers, administrators, and the student body, all constructed the Success
Academy in our conversations as a “necessary evil”, not only in light of the ever-present
school closure threat, but also due to the loss of staff in the May 2013 budget cut.
Without an assistant principal and counselor, as well as a teacher shortage, a vacuum
replaced former emotional supports for these students. When I asked the second Success
teacher, Mr. Cassidy, about the effects of the Success Academy on the climate of the
school, he explained, “Well, it certainly has improved things upstairs. You notice a
difference in the hallways - not as many fights because all of the instigators are corralled”
(Fieldnote, 11/5/13). The idea of “corralling” the problem was understood by the staff as
part of the larger strategy of minimizing the risk that “problem kids” could wreak on the
reputation and district-level data-driven decisions around keeping the school open.
Teachers and the principal himself oftentimes felt conflicted about the program, believing
that its absence would promise chaos in the classrooms of students that “wanted to learn.”
I will discuss the ethical dilemmas circulating around the Success Academy later in
Chapter 4.
Racialization of the Brand
As I spent more time observing in the Success classrooms, I came to realize that
its institution acutely distilled the spatial, relational, and racial dimensions of Johnson
High’s branding process. Over the course of the year, the number and composition
changed due to the influx of students from charter schools or the relegating of students
with behavioral and truancy issues in the regular population to the Success Academy.
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However, of the 35 students, of which only 28 on a given day attended, the majority of
the students were African-American males. Though the school was over 50 percent
Asian, 83 percent of the Success Academy was African-American.
Table 1.6 Breakdown of Success Academy8
Race
Black
Caucasian
Mixed9
Asian

Male
19
3
2
0

Female
9
0
1
1

Such a disparity in demographic representation in the Success Academy symbolized the
effects of a “colorblind” set of criteria, or behaviors deemed “unacceptable” regardless of
race, that the school and district used to contain threats to their climate data and
consequently their perceptions of quality schools (Bonilla-Silva 2009). Administrators
like Mr. Keo and teachers could justify the racial distribution in the Success Academy by
tethering behavioral problems to the risk they posed to the fate of Johnson High.
Justifying Colorblindness: Second Generation Cambodians
As the ELL population grew over the course of my three years there, questions
circulated among the students and staff as to whether Asian students were systemically
and socially receiving preferential treatment. To deflect this criticism, teachers and
administrators, namely the second principal, Mr. Keo, would cite the “other Asians”, or
second-generation Cambodian students as a contrary example (Ong 2003; Asian
Americans Advancing Justice 2013). This group legitimized the ELL-American

8

These numbers are subject to change. The Success Academy’s numbers and attendance fluctuated
dramatically over the course of its two years of existence. This was the racial breakdown during a visit on
November 5th, 2013.
9
Of the mixed students, one male was African-American and Caucasian, one male and one female were
Latino and Caucasian.
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categorical dichotomy, enabling the school community to deny accusations of racism
against Black and White native-born students. While the school had both second and first
generation Cambodian students, teachers and students pointed to the differences that
divided the groups. Teachers, administrators, and students described second-generation
Khmer youth as “more like the African-Americans” in their attitudes and behaviors,
predisposed to violence, bullying, and academic apathy. When I asked about the “Asians”
of the Success Academy, Mr. Marra commented,
Yeah, there’s a couple. There is one now and last year there was another one but
he doesn’t go to school with us anymore. It’s all Cambodians that are down there
– like the dark-skinned Cambodian girl, oh, she’s bad. The Cambodians aren’t
really Asian like the rest of our students are Asian. They’re all second generation
and completely Americanized (Fieldnote, 11/5/13).
Becoming “Americanized” in the school meant the display of behaviors traditionally
associated with the subcultural styles of urban Black youth urban, a product of exposure
to street life in Philadelphia and the shedding of more stereotypically “Asian” behaviors.
Whereas first generation Cambodian students in the school were typified as more
authentically “Asian” in their reverence for authority and educational aspirations, they
portrayed second-generation Cambodian students as “deviant” and “uncaring toward their
education”, therefore qualifying them for admission into the Success Academy and the
larger category of “American.” Mr. Keo, a former Cambodian refugee, reflected on what
he perceived as the second generation’s plight.
The children of my generation are lost and confused. They have no clue what to
do because most of the people my age dropped out of school and joined the gang,
the only place they felt they belonged. There’s no parent connection. Back in the
90s, we were trying to get the school district to understand that. They never look
at the sub-groups for test scores. When they look, they always see the “Asian”
population doing exceptionally well, and we told them to go a little deeper, to
break that sub-group down to find that the most challenging sub-groups are the
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Cambodians and Laotians. The Vietnamese and Chinese had more education and
structure. I still do feel that way. Also the parents—the ones who are growing
from my generation—they’ve gotten way too comfortable with the system in this
country. So there’s no motivation for our children, the ones who were born here,
to achieve higher. So the [first and second generation] are very separate and don’t
interact with each other. The newcomers, they tend to stick together and they
work harder. Whereas the ones—not all but most—who were born here, they tend
to hang out with the problem kids. (Interview, 12/4/13)
Mr. Keo in this analysis contrasts the second-generation Cambodian population to
“newcomers”, or Cambodian families arriving in the U.S. through family reunification
visas. Drawing on what are perceived to be more traditional “Asian” behaviors as a
metric, particularly the desire to “achieve higher” through educational achievement as
well as strong “connections” between parents and children, Mr. Keo explains this subgroup’s regression to patterns of urban deviance like joining “gangs” and relying on
“welfare.”
While he, as a member of this sub-group, understood the underlying history and
social forces shaping these youths’ educational outcomes, his position as the leader of a
threatened high school forced him to lump these students in with “problem students” and
quarantine their “deviance” for the “greater good” of the school. Using the treatment of
second-generation Cambodian students as evidence of colorblindness, the principal and
teachers repelled accusations that the branding of the school as ELL-friendly catalogued a
series of racist strategies that disproportionately targeted African-American males for
disciplinary action. Further, by shifting the blame to the “problem students” for
endangering the Johnson High’s already precarious status as closure-worthy school, the
administration and staff justified the highly racialized outcomes of their risk-management
strategies.
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The Political and Material Benefits of Partnerships
In addition to the enrollment of ELL students to protect against the threat of bad
climate data, the administration turned to another strategy to guard against the threat of
closure: building public-private partnerships with non-profit organizations at the city and
state levels. Though the school lacked an assistant principal and guidance counselor10 in
September 2013, the school had 14 “community partnerships” with organizations across
the city. These organizations provided anything from after-school music, athletic, and
academic programming to weekend service activities and resources for fieldtrips and
supplies, filling key service and resource gaps in the middle of the crisis. Not all
organizations were equal in terms of their resource commitments to the school, their
funding streams, or missions. Most of the organizations operated entirely on private
donations. The more stable organizations and those that had the strongest presence in the
school drew on a blend of public and private funding streams in the form of grants from
foundations, corporations, and the city, state, and federal governments.
Administrative Entrepreneurialism
Like the ELL enrollment strategy, building public-private partnerships with a
constellation of non-profit organizations was marshaled well before the mass school
closures and budget cuts. Teachers that worked under the reign of the former principal,
Mr. Brown, pointed to the turn to partnerships in 2011 after the school received news that
the district recommended its closure.
Mr. Cassidy: When I first got here, there weren’t that many community partners.
The only partner was Career Ready. And then when Brown came and the district
started having financial trouble in 2011, that’s when we started getting Guitars
10

The counselor returned full-time in December, 2013 when emergency funds were released by the Corbett
administration at the state-level.

122

and Hoops, Service for Salvation, and Refugee Youth Support, and all of those
groups started coming. Mr. Keo was Mr. Brown’s assistant principal and then
when he became he principal he just kept it going. The partners do all kinds of
stuff. Guitars and Hoops has sports, music, I mean, it’s out of control and Service
for Salvation with the treks to the different countries and stuff. (Interview
3/14/14)
As Mr. Cassidy points out, Mr. Brown left a legacy that his successor, Mr. Keo, relied on
heavily to cope with the “financial troubles” of the district. Other teachers celebrated Mr.
Brown’s “having juice”, or an entrepreneurial spirit that leveraged connections to both
attract as well as actively recruit outside programs to come to the building and provide
key resources. A 16-year veteran teacher at Johnson High reflected on his time under Mr.
Brown:
Mr. Darling: I would say that under his leadership these outside groups set up
base here and he knew a lot of people and carried a big stick. So he could make a
phone call and bring people in. He had a lot of star power. He has that gift of
communication, so he could swim in different social circles. He had juice.
(Interview, 1/13/14)
Interviews with teachers like Mr. Darling yielded the same opinions about Mr. Brown’s
reign: that without his “juice” to attract partnerships with key service providers, the
school may have closed at the end of the 2013 school year.
While Mr. Brown initially looked to partnerships to mitigate the loss of funds for
programming, the partnerships strategy also accomplished several other objectives. As
the school faced the looming threat of closure, partners allowed the school to market
itself as an attractive alternative for students to enroll in charter schools. With outside
groups like Service for Salvation offering trips to developing countries to build schools
and Refugee Youth Support providing full-time staff to tutor refugee youth after-school
and on weekends, the school hoped that it would strengthen its reputation among key
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groups of students. Partners oftentimes had political connections with district officials
and city, state, and national-level private funding streams like corporations and
foundations. By increasing the school’s connections with well-resourced as well as wellconnected organizations, Mr. Brown and Mr. Keo both saw partners as a way to assemble
a critical mass of allies in a menacing district climate. Mr. Wood, a teacher that worked
in conjunction with Career Ready to help implement their curriculum model, explained
the political and financial benefits of attracting partners to Johnson High in this climate.
[Partnerships] are part of this idea that you need to brand your school. You build
these connections through these external partners and you hope that they bring
you a network of money and people to draw on. Every year there’s this thing
called “Comcast Cares Day” where they pick sites around the city and they fix a
playground or do whatever. Career Ready, well, someone on its board knows
someone at Comcast and we became a Comcast Cares Day site. So Comcast
came in and we got resources, we were in the paper, and it was a cool thing for
our school. One day out of the year you get some positive press, and maybe
someone who knows someone will decide that you shouldn’t be shut down.
(Interview 3/5/14)
Mr. Wood’s description underscores the equal importance of two key benefits of
partners: resource provision as well as the potential for fortifying the school’s political
clout through mediums like media and association with persuasive individuals at the citylevel. In a conversation with the formal principal, Mr. Brown explained the “buzz” that
partners had the capacity to generate.
When good things start happening at a school with partners and it has a buzz, stuff
starts opening up. That’s kind of what happened. We were already partnered with
Career Ready and they were giving us support with their model but then we
brought in some other partners too. I would have the Career Ready’s board
meetings at Johnson High so people could see that our building’s a hundred years
old and we have antiquated equipment. But it opened their eyes to see the great
things and the great kids that were there. (Interview, 4/7/14)
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Career Ready, the partner Brown discusses, had multiple corporate partners funding their
model throughout Philadelphia, including hotels, electric and cable companies, and major
restaurant chains. By locating partners’ “board meetings” in the school, Mr. Brown saw
an opportunity to bring in leaders across the private sector to showcase the school and
create a “buzz” around its portfolio of partner activities, programs, and “great kids.” Less
visibly, having corporate connections as a threatened public institution was, similarly to
Mr. Wood’s insight, a key strategy to distinguish the school from other high schools.
Revisiting the idea of administrative “entrepreneurialism” or the ability to attract private
resources to fund services and programs outside of the scope of the district’s budget,
principals and teacher saw partners as an outlet to draw political and material resources
from to supplement their ailing budgets and reputation.
Supplemental to Core Service Provision
While the former principal used partnerships as a medium to promote the school’s
reputation in order to attract higher enrollments and build a network of politically
connected partners, the role of partners began to shift as the financial crisis in the district
spiraled throughout the AY 2012-2013 (Fieldnote 9/9/13). Mr. Keo formerly looked to
partners for the same reasons as Mr. Brown, to market the school to the district and larger
neighborhood by providing supplemental programming. However, the extent to which he
relied on their services and labor changed dramatically in September 2013. Partners
became core service providers as a staff hired to serve 500 students, accommodated over
seven hundred. Returning to the chapter’s opening vignette and the main office scene of
“chaos”, the school not only faced the enrollment of students coming from another closed
high school in the neighborhood, but students from closed high schools throughout the
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city. District policy, in the spirit of minimizing the “disruptive effects” of the closures,
allowed students to attend their schools of “choice” (Interview, 5/15/14). Without an
assistant principal, counselor, nurse, a sufficient number of staff, and nonexistent budget
to serve the unpredictable growth of the students, principals and teachers alike embraced
partners to fill key service gaps. The school coordinator for one partner, Service for
Salvation, reflected on an interaction with the principal in which she asked him how the
providers could be of service.
Ms. Shore: Yeah, at the beginning of this school year just talking to Mr. Keo, I
would say, “What do you want from the partners?” And he would just say, “I
need bodies.” I will stand in the hallway during transition time because there just
aren’t enough people. Some of the partners have really taken the initiative with
trying to support like, I mean, I’m supposed to be doing service programming but
I’m working with Keo on figuring out how we can work with problem kids on
discipline. (Interview, 2/18/14)
Ms. Shore’s depiction of Mr. Keo’s desperation for “bodies” and her role as a hall
monitor and disciplinarian points the ways in which resource and labor shortages forced
partner staff into positions where they deviated from their original missions and became
indispensable actors in school operations. Another teacher, Mr. Raymond, when asked
about their role in the school in AY 2013-2014, explained,
OH! WE NEED THEM! Hands down. They’re not like add-ons to the school
anymore. We’re building on top of them. They’re holding us up because they have
resources, manpower that they can bring into the school, and outside connections
they can bring in. They are the ones running most of the events. They’re
becoming the core of what we offer to our students. (Interview, 4/10/14)
Describing partner “resources”, “manpower”, and “outside connections” as “holding up”
the school, Mr. Ray confirms this shift in what he sees as once supplemental
programming becoming the “core” of the school’s services and resources. The partners
operated as a private labor force, heightening their presence after the budget cuts. The
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hemorrhaging of staff and resources particularly in May 2013 created a void of staff and
material functions to be filled by whomever the teachers and administration could draw
upon.
Mr. Keo: These relationships bring us bodies. Just knowing that every year I’m
threatened to lose my assistant principal again, having other people just standing
the hallway makes a difference in the school, even if they don’t have the authority
to do anything. The fact that they just stand out there, raise their voices a little bit.
The kids have a sense that not all is lost. (Interview, 12/9/13)
Mr. Keo not only depends on the “bodies” of partners in hallways to maintain control but
also to give the students the sense that they have not been completely abandoned. He
describes that an image of “safety” is as important as safety itself. Partners not only
attract students through their programming, but bring vitality to a building that otherwise
would feel like a hollowed shell. Therefore, partners improve the “image” of the school
internally and externally, sending signals to the students and community that “all is not
lost.
*************************************
I have delineated the multitude of strategies and sub-strategies that staff at
Johnson High employed to brand the school in order to “save” it from closure. First I
showed how administrators actively built curriculum around and recruited English
Language Learners in order to improve “school climate” and boost enrollment numbers,
two criteria considered strongly in the district’s closure evaluation methodology. Second
I showed how the administration and teachers managed the participation and
spatialization of risk in the school through the founding of the Success Academy and the
exploitation of the “catchment” caveat. Students that posed the gravest “danger” to the
school’s climate statistics were placed in isolated classrooms, given shortened school
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days, and redirected to private entranceways to minimize their contact with the rest of the
student body.
The labor shortage during AY 2013-2014 further justified school leadership’s
reasoning for these measures. I demonstrated how “colorblindness” discourse seeped
discursively into rationales for quarantining and villainizing “problem kids” as well as for
the creation of two dominant social categories: “ELLs” and “Americans.” The
interpellation of these categories rested on racialized readings of risk and value in relation
to the goal of building a competitive school brand. Finally, I explained the utility of
partnerships to Johnson High, particularly in the midst of the fiscal crisis. Drawn on for
material resources as well as political capital, both Mr. Brown and Mr. Keo saw
partnerships as key to branding the school and in turn, guarding against closure.
These strategies to resist closure stemmed from school actors’ readings of the threat
of school closure and how they might become a valuable neighborhood school as
measured by their meeting some of the district’s criteria for a “quality school”—though
interestingly not the criteria of improved student achievement and learning as measured
by test scores. Administrators and teachers believed that in order to compete with charter
schools, they would have to build a brand that would send messages of “value” in the
form of embodied educational aspirations, order, and safety. Relying on heavily
racialized notions of risk and value to their brand, Johnson High’s staff facilitated similar
processes of stratification and exclusion that many have argued characterize the
admissions and operations of charter schools (Leitner 2014; Buras 2014). Interpreting
behavioral issues as a “risk” to the school instead of a symptom of needs gone unfilled,
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these educators felt forced to eschew their public oath to serve all students, treating
students as mini-threats to be managed or expelled versus children to be educated.
My goal was not to indict these teachers for maliciously and intentionally
perpetuating racial inequality but to couch their strategies within an educational
marketplace that pressured them to compete or lose their livelihoods and school
community. Mr. Keo, Mr. Brown, and all of the teachers and support staff worked in
deplorable conditions, endured pay freezes for close to half of a decade, and dedicated
their own resources to buy supplies and fund extracurricular activities and events. Mr.
Keo himself attended the school as a former Cambodian refugee and held the school and
its value to the neighborhood in profound esteem. He opened the school almost every
Saturday during AY 2013-2014 to allow non-profits partners to provide additional
programming, striving to bring opportunities to Johnson High’s students, albeit
selectively. Many teachers had served at the school for 30+ years and saw Johnson High
as a distillation of their life’s work. Their deep commitment and care for their students
and the school was evident in their sacrifices, digging into their pockets to make events
like the prom and other school traditions possible. Further, the participation in some of
branding practices plagued their consciences as they saw these measures as necessary but
immoral in light of the dire circumstances of the district and the direction of school
reform toward charterization.
In the following chapters I will further show how these actors reconciled their
fraught consciences with their overarching goal to “save the school”, bringing into relief
how branding processes, induced by closure threats, are stimulated by small moral
economies of educator work that debate and contest what it means to be a “good school”
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under the current paradigm of marketized educational governance. Teachers’ and
administrators’ troubled narratives will illuminate the lived experience of marketization,
the moral dilemmas that surface in their craft, and their implications for the racialized
care of the vulnerable youth that attend neighborhood schools.
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CHAPTER 4 – THE MORAL ECONOMY OF EDUCATOR WORK IN CRISIS
“Screw the Kids”
In the middle of second period, Mr. Keo walked into a 10th grade math class,
lethargically dropping into a seat next to me at the back of the room.
People expect me to come in, be energetic and light-hearted, but I’m not. I’m
completely burnt out like everyone else and I don’t know how I’m going to keep
this up for another five years, if we even have a district by then. We have become
holding ponds for the kids nobody wants. The idea that I need to get 700 kids in
order to get an assistant principal, and be subjected to the same standards of the
magnet and charter schools that get to select their kids is absolutely ridiculous.
We’re not going to get the same scores - we’re just not. We get the kids with the
behavior problems and because of that, we don’t deserve an assistant principal?
They create the conditions for us to fail and then punish us when it happens. You
devalue the work we do with the toughest kids, the ones that are hardest to get to,
the ones that nobody is looking out for. I don’t see society getting behind us. I
don’t see the public getting upset about what’s happening. Maybe it’s because I’m
in my little bubble taking orders, but from my seat, it feels like we’re being
abandoned. What’s happening is we’re dismantling public education piece by
piece. We’ve made it into a commodity and the irony of it all is that the kids at the
bottom don’t have any choice, even though we’re supposedly all about “choice.”
Screw the people that are committed to running good schools for them. These
people at the top have no plan for how this is going to go. They’re all about the
money. The people making the decisions know nothing about this neighborhood,
this community, and this city. They have no history here the way that I do, yet
they makes decisions that wreck havoc on our lives. They threaten to close me
instead of just giving me teachers and money for supplies. It doesn’t matter to
them that there won’t be the resources next year. That’s how it works at the top there’s no vision – just don’t get sued, don’t go broke, and screw the kids.
(Fieldnote, 1/28/14)
********************************************
Embedded within this conversation with Mr. Keo, Johnson High’s principal, in
the throes of the winter of AY 2013-2014, is the central theme of this chapter: the moral
and ethical dilemmas of teachers and administrators that arose from setting the school’s
survival strategies into motion. Questions over the accrued benefits of these strategies
and the marginalization of particular groups of students as a result of enrolling
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disproportionate numbers of ELLs surfaced in teachers’ discourse around the crisis,
praxis, and relationships with staff and students. While the previous chapter demonstrated
how the crisis at the district level trickled down to permeate the school climate as well as
inform the strategies teachers and administrators adopted to cope with the budget crisis
and bolster perceptions of Johnson High as an institution, this chapter ethnographically
engages the fraught nature of the collective response. As these educators attempted to
“save the school” through these advocacy for students in their politics and praxis and
donating unpaid labor as the budget cuts ebbed at their salaries and healthcare, the
question of “for whom?” the school could be saved brought tension to their work to resist
closure.
I draw on work in moral anthropology to illuminate moral economy of staff labor
to explain how the staff developed and justified problematic branding strategies to keep
to elevate what they perceived reflected a worthy school. Fassin (2009) defines a moral
economy as the “production, circulation, and appropriation of norms and values,
sensibilities, and emotions in contemporary societies” (10). Central to a moral economy
are the contradictions that emerge in the dialectic between politics and compassion, as
different moral judgments and sentiments clash over social problems. Within this view,
moral codes and ethical dilemmas cannot be isolated from political, religious, economic,
or social issues, but apprehended through acts and discourses that people claim are
“moral or good or right or generous” (Lambek 2010: 6). I argue in this chapter that the
ways in which teachers and administrators narrated the troubled “rationality” behind
these strategies illuminates the tension between their call to offer equitable educational
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opportunities “all” children at Johnson High and the demands of competition within an
expanding educational marketplace.
Downey's (2007) notion of the “moral economy” of teacher-work, or the process
of “sense-making” in which educators “develop, maintain, and justify their own logics
through the telling of stories” (p.6), brings focus to teachers narratives around their action
as a place to explore this tension over what constituted the moral course of action for the
school. He posits that often the “job” of teaching is often conflated with the “work” of
teaching, arguing that when public educators are not teaching or preparing to teach, their
“work” disappears off the radar of researchers, limiting the kinds of questions that can be
asked about their labor process. Instead of understanding teachers as merely executors of
curriculum or disciplinarians, one must question the ways in which the moral dilemmas
teachers face in their care work and activism spills beyond the bounds of the classroom
and into their politics and personal lives. This “narrative work” through the telling of
stories, offers a window into the coping mechanisms that teachers develop to cultivate
hope and direction in a desperate educational milieu that they otherwise understand to be
unjust and immoral. Their narratives around school closures and their consequent
responses further offer insights into the moral and ethical dilemmas produced through
their reading and enacting of resistance to closure.
I detail these ethical dilemmas as they arose throughout the year in two major
sections, the first which follows up on the strategy of manipulating the racial composition
of the school’s student body and the “corralling of poison” in the Success Academy. The
second provides a window in the crises of school representation and teacher advocacy as
relational rifts in the student body worsened over the course of the school year. Together,
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these sections craft an account of how the first strategy came to influence the construction
of student and deservingness of the right to a public education, and subsequently, the
school’s right to remain its provider.
Hopelessness and Burnout: The Rising Premium on “Affective” Rewards
As the budget cuts deepened throughout the year, a discourse of hopelessness and
burnout began to circulate more intensely in classrooms, hallways, and teacher
professional development meetings. On the ground, overcrowded classrooms, particularly
before the “leveling” in late November11 (McCorry 2013), broken copy-machines, burnt
out Smartboard bulbs, and gaping holes in ceilings streaming rain water, contributed to a
palpable stress which embedded itself in the tirades of teachers (Fieldnote 10/10/13). If a
classroom did have textbooks, albeit dated, three and four students often crowded around
one. Without a budget to repair a caving-in roof, Johnson High, a building celebrating its
100th anniversary at the end of 2013, sealed off its asbestos ridden 4th floor. Many
students and teachers complained of tight-chests to me as I sat in corners observing their
classes. While I was allegedly there to observe, I acted as a sounding board to teachers
trying to salvage lesson plans without paper and facing impending cuts to their healthcare
and salaries. In the middle of the particularly harsh winter of AY 2013-2014, news
surfaced that the district would be asking the teachers to take a 13 percent cut to their
salaries and pensions as well as extending their school days and paying into their

11

Pennsylvania state law caps class sizes at 35 students and mandates “leveling” by October 1st where
disproportionate enrollments are corrected for by the reshuffling of students and teachers across schools.
Due to a confluence of factors including but not limited to the holding of state funds in the PA Department
of Education and the closure of 24 neighborhood schools city-wide that caused unpredictable enrollments,
Johnson High and many other neighborhood schools had classes with 35+ students. After the release of
“emergency funds” in late November, the district finally “leveled” classes, allocating 4 extra teachers to
Johnson High to cope with the over-enrollment of students.
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healthcare costs (Graham 2014). These requests compounded a 5-year pay freeze for
teachers in the district that, on average, make less on average than their suburban
counterparts.
The day following the release of the request from the district was also a
particularly heavy day for Ms. Allard, a 30 year old, 5-year veteran teacher, whose
student told her that she had been raped and was pregnant. Ms. Allard left the class
suddenly and asked me to take over. Once the bell rang, I went to the bathroom where I
found her leaning against the wall and crying.
If I thought my time was going to make one bit of difference, I would gladly
donate it, but I’m just feeding a bad system. I have to play mommy, daddy, social
worker, doctor, and teacher and not only am I not compensated for it, but I’m
punished for it. I burn myself out and for what? They’re just going to charterize
this whole district anyway and pay a bunch of Teach for America types half of
what I make to work 13-hour days and weekends. I love these kids but life will go
on if I’m not their teacher. There will be another warm body in here when I’m
gone. I’m barely making it and they want to cut our salaries 13% next year? You
can’t take 13% of nothing. If this job were just about teaching, instruction, and
the kids’ learning, the salary would be ok. But to do everything else, plus the
stress of taking on the problems of these students, I can’t wear all of these extra
hats and see my salary get cut. Nobody expects anything from these kids or they
would have backed it up with resources. They don’t care about them or me and
they’ve shown me that over and over again.” (Fieldnote, 2/25/14)
Ms. Allard’s despair touches on the affective dimensions of working at Johnson High
with the mounting pressures of the budget crisis for staff across the school. Called to
sacrifice her limited income for a district in decline, many of the teachers articulated
despondency as they experienced the devaluing of not only their paid labor as instructors,
but also the growing emotional labor they performed as “ momm[ies], dadd[ies], social
workers, [and] doctors.” In subsequent conversations with Ms. Allard, she indicated that
while teaching in a high need urban school like Johnson High had always required her to
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go “above and beyond” the call of duty in terms of unrecognized forms of care for
students (Fieldnote, 10/12/13), mass cuts to support staffing like counselors, school
psychologists, and classroom aids only exacerbated the emotional tax exacted by
“wearing all of these extra hats.”
Teachers certainly bemoaned the salary and healthcare benefits concessions as a
product of a conspiracy to break their union and make room for the total domination of
charter school networks. Yet teachers pointed more their unrecognized emotional work as
they attended to the basic needs of their students while managing the stresses of
deplorable conditions of the school as the budget cuts deepened in 2013-2014. This
emotional work, performed within and beyond the bounds of the classroom, through the
management of students’ personal issues and the scramble for the basic resources to do
their jobs, increased the premium for what I term the “affective rewards” of educating. I
define affective rewards as the interactions and experiences that inform educators’
feelings of value and efficacy. Following Downey’s (2007) theory of “teacher work” as a
meaning-making process that spills beyond the confines of classroom praxis, a
“simultaneous battle to make meaning of their jobs and to make their jobs meaningful”
(25), I suggest that the implications of the budget cut and stress of impending closure for
teachers and administration, increased the premium educators placed on the affective
rewards of their work. Affective rewards became one of the coping mechanisms teachers
developed to salvage meaning from work they felt was being devalued by the marketized
direction of the district.
In other words, facing threats to their incomes and the further deterioration of
their working conditions, feeling effective and valued by their students became of greater
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importance to teachers, and figured more significantly into their plans for “saving”
Johnson High. Conceptualizing affective rewards as one of the mechanisms driving
teachers’ to continue their work in the face of what they perceived as the decline of their
craft and public education more generally, locates the spaces and interactions with
students that teachers came to value in an increasingly hopeless environment. Further, it
allows one to understand a branding process as not merely grounded in sending symbols
to the larger marketplace of educational care and value, but a source of emotional
sustenance and hope for desperate staff and students as they fought to survive as a school.
The Affective Rewards of Teaching ELLs
In my third chapter, I described the terminology deployed to depict the bifurcated
social relations of Johnson High’s diverse student body. While the school boasted
students from a myriad of countries and linguistic backgrounds, teachers, administrators,
and students alike divided the student population into two distilled groups: “ELLs” and
“Americans.” These categories had pseudonyms, but for the most part, participants
across the board used these terms to invoke a particular set of behaviors and
identifications that students belonging to each group exhibited. Staff and students alike
framed ELLs, while overwhelmingly of Asian descent, as well behaved, easy to manage,
and “caring” for their teachers and overall educational trajectories. Americans,
conversely, were seen as deviant, violent, irreverent to authority, and “not valuing” their
education. These students broke down across a range of racial categories, but mostly
included African-American students and second-generation Cambodian students.
However, of the native-born students, two thirds were African-American, therefore
indexing a strong association between the negative behaviors of the “Americans” and
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those of African-American males in particular. Teachers also, for the most part, taught
either solely ELL students in the SHELTER program, or non-ELLs, “Americans” or
“urban students”, in the general program. Hence, this distinction not only signified the
school’s two prevalent social categories, but also mapped neatly onto staff-student and
student-student relationships and the curricular organization of the school.
While these categories carried weight at Johnson High throughout my preliminary
fieldwork (September 2010- August 2013), and ostensibly much earlier, the increasing
numbers of ELL students leading up to AY 2013-2014, as well as the budget cuts in May
2013, had implications for the ways in which these educators perceived their
responsibilities and obligations to students as well as relationships with other teachers.
With larger class sizes and scant assistance, having “well-behaved” students made all the
difference in weathering the effects of the budget cuts. When I asked teachers who taught
primarily ELL students, how the budget cuts have affected their practice, they often cited
how their experience wasn’t representative of the general experience of teachers at
Johnson High and also the district at-large. Mr. Raymond explained,
I feel like I’m in paradise because I, for some reason, was very lucky to get
assigned to all of the ELL and international students. They’re very well mannered
and I don’t really have discipline problems. If I do, a slap on the wrist is more
than enough to set them straight. So I’m very fortunate and I don’t think my
interpretation of what’s happening in this school under the budget cuts is accurate
because I don’t have all of the students. I don’t have many of the urban students.
(Interview, 4/10/14)
Another teacher, Mr. Darling, a history teacher in the SHELTER program, when I asked
him about the teachers’ reactions to over-enrollments in their classes prior to the leveling
of students in November, he explained the differences in having “ELLs” versus a general
class post-budget cut.
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Most people won’t say anything if the kids are like these kids [pointing to a his
classroom full of ELL students]. Mr. Raymond, even with 38 kids in his class,
isn’t going to say anything about the illegality of this because those kids behave.
No issues. He’s not a crybaby. But if it’s a bad class of American kids, well, that’s
a different story. People start squawking if it’s bad (Fieldnote, 11/26/13)
In both quotes, Darling and Raymond point to differential affective impacts of teaching
an ELL class versus a class of “urban” or “American” youth. Understanding “American”
students as requiring the expenditure of more energy to manage, each frames the teaching
an “American” class as a recipe for burnout. Conversely, a class of “38 of these [ELL]
kids”, even with scarce resources, demands far less emotional energy. As teachers felt the
creep of more responsibilities with less compensation, or the wearing of “extra hats” that
Ms. Allard described with an impending salary and benefits cut, they couched their
emotional energy in a language of scarcity as well. Mr. Raymond and Mr. Darling’s
testimonies underscore the valuable emotional energy saved by teachers that had
SHELTER and ELL classes, and the increasing value of that energy as the labor crunch at
the school level came to bear on their time.
In addition to facilitating the conservation of emotional energy for teachers, ELLs
offered greater affective rewards, or increased feelings of value and efficacy in their work
to students.
Mr. Darling: Now the ELL kids are a little bit different than the Americans.
They are forced to learn more because they must acquire the language to succeed
in the work force and at home to help their parents. I see a group of people that
come to America and must learn the language, and as a result, their behavior is
going to be better and they’re more willing to learn. Whereas the American kids,
it seems like high school is passing time. When I say American kids, I mean the
ones in this school. That’s a stereotype, and maybe I’m feeding into it, but that’s
what I see. I’ll give every kid my best, but the ELL kids just seem to have places
in teachers’ hearts because they come, they respect you, they’re kind. They make
you feel like all of this crap in the district is worth it, that your job is worth it
(Interview, 1/8/14).
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The fact that ELL kids “come”, “respect” their teachers, and are “kind” points to an
affective preference for teaching ELLs, particularly in a climate where teachers like Ms.
Allard feel increasingly undervalued and deprofessionalized by the district and state’s
treatment. By making him feel that his “job is worth it”, Mr. Darling could tolerate the
“crap” at the district-level. Ms. Betty, conversely, felt just the opposite about her
“American students.”
The ELL kids don’t tell you to go fuck yourself. The other day I had a girl who I
didn’t even know that was on her phone in the hallway. I told her to get off of her
phone. She started cursing at me and yelling at me and I said, you still have to put
your phone away. I didn’t really react but she crossed the hallway to get in my
face and threaten me. Then she told me to go home, get my daughter, bring her
here, and she’ll rumble with my daughter. I wrote this all up on a pink slip, to
which to the dean, in front of the child sitting there, cause I went down to check
on it, but with no staff in the office and Mr. Keo freaking out with no help,
nothing got done about it. So yeah, it pays to have ELL kids when you’re getting
no support from anywhere else. Even if they wanted to support you, they can’t.
(Interview, 12/17/13)
In a sense, the feeling of value induced by work with ELL students, compensated Mr.
Darling and Ms. Betty for their mounting frustration with the implications of the district’s
budget crisis. Mr. Darling highlighted the feelings of efficacy and respect from ELL
students, and Ms. Betty, conversely, discussed the emotional costs of teaching students
that bring negative energy to class. Ms. Betty especially points to the lack of
administrative capacity to support her in these moments, therefore compounding the costs
of managing difficult students. In other words the affective rewards of ELLs became of
greater import, as the struggle to make meaning of his work in a beleaguered district
simultaneously grew more difficult.
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Educating Everyone?
In Mr. Darling’s excerpt, he does not assign blame to the native-born students for
their behavior and even acknowledges that he might be “feeding into” a “stereotype”
them. However, he admits that the stereotype accurately fits his experience in his “this
school.” In saying this, Mr. Darling draws the distinction between Americans students at
Johnson High, a neighborhood high school, and American students across a progressively
stratified district. With larger numbers of charter schools and the steady presence of
selective magnet schools, teachers and administrators harbored a growing sentiment,
alluded to also in Chapter 2, that they were receiving the district’s students with the
greatest needs. Resenting having to take the students that charters and magnet schools
either would not accept, or would eject for a series of transgressions, educators would
argue that it was namely students with behavioral issues and low academic aspirations
unfairly earning neighborhood schools their poor reputations.
Many teachers like Mr. Darling, however, struggled to reconcile their mission as a
neighborhood school to “educate everyone” with the understanding that accepting
everyone would have implications for the fate of their school as well as their day-to-day
struggle to implement curriculum without resources. In the former section I described
how teachers perceived the affective rewards of teaching ELLs as far greater than
American students. I also argued that in a school with insufficient resources, emotional
energy and affective rewards like demonstrations of respect and gratitude became
increasingly valuable forms of exchange with students. In turn, the enrollment of ELLs
and the value of their behavior as both a statistic as well as an affective commodity in the
classroom dramatically impacted the relationships between students and teachers. The
141

enrollment of ELLs especially prompted questions about the ethics of ELL-ification and
its implications for educating “all” of Johnson High’s students.
Mr. Cassidy: In this school, I see the American kids losing out a lot. Between me
and you, I really think that they want to keep this school open and do the right
thing, but the only way to do that is to make it an ELL school. I do believe that
because the kids actually feel that. The American kids say that…Oh, yeah! They
ask, “Are they making this an ELL school?” And I always tell them that they
can’t because it’s an neighborhood high school but ya know, what they can do is
just keep making the student numbers bigger and bigger and a lot of these kids are
finally going to say, “You know what, I’m going to go somewhere else.” They’re
driving them out. Ya know? (Interview, 3/19/14)
Teachers like Mr. Cassidy faced a moral dilemma in terms of the “right” course of action
to keep the school open. Mr. Cassidy understands that the fate of the school hinges on
whether they can enroll students that will improve both their numbers and climate
statistics, but he also sees how a shift in the school’s identity might alienate American
students that already attend the school. This could also hurt their numbers as a school
catering to ELLs risks “driving [the Americans] out.” In a conversation with another
teacher, he lamented, “We have to remember sometimes that there are a significant
number of non-ELL students here that we still have to educate. We can’t leave them
behind either” (Fieldnote 3/4/14). By branding the school as a “good school” to the
district, one deserving of keeping open, the teachers saw risk in compromising the
mission of the “neighborhood school”, to provide a public good to all children. However,
with scarce resources and the threat of closure ever-present in the decision-making of the
teachers and administrators, building a school culture around addressing the needs of
“American” kids seemed implausible.
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Questioning the Success Academy
Mr. Keo: The idea of the Success Academy was you take all of the students who
are overage, under credits, behavior, that don’t go to class, who hang out in the
gym. You round them up instead of sending them from class to class, you keep
them there and you send the teachers in there. As incentive for them, they get to
come here a little later and they get to leave a little earlier. And we would buy a
program—computer-based program—A+ program that they can actually work at
their own pace. They earn credits with the support of the teachers there. I think
the idea—instead of having these kids walk around, grow older, and drop out,
they would have the opportunity to bond amongst themselves and among the
same teachers. They know that they’re not superstars, but at least someone cares
for them. It was successful in the first year, but with the budget cuts that wiped
out my whole special education department, no common planning time, no plan to
meet, the whole program became very gray.” (Interview, 5/5/14)
The moral dilemma of “educating everyone” manifested itself nowhere else more
strongly than in the institutionalization and maintenance of the Success Academy. The
initial intent behind starting the Success Academy in AY 2012-2013 was to offer a more
personalized space for students with “behavioral management problems” to receive a
modified curriculum and truncated school day. The teachers would ideally have special
education backgrounds, trained to implement individual education plans (IEPs) and
manage ‘problematic’ behavior in a circumscribed area of the building. Students would
feel “cared for” by teachers that were dedicated to bringing them up to speed, as Mr. Keo
explained in the opening quotation, given the opportunity to atone for their missing
credits and poor academic performance in a supportive environment.
However, with the budget cuts, the implementation of the program suffered,
raising questions of legality and equity, but also the necessity of continuing the program
with limited staff. Mr. Keo underscored the loss of teachers in the special education
department as a key consequence of the budget cuts.
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Mr. Glyn: The Success Academy really backfired. It really did. Last year when
we had a couple of other teachers, it was a real program to nurture these kids.
With no faculty this year, it’s a holding cell. It’s to keep them out of the general
population because if they were in classes with 40 kids, it would be chaos. Chaos!
This is a budgetary issue too because people say you can’t throw money at a
problem, but money would have helped to fix this! We would have had different
people down there and we could have had actual programs instead of A+. I mean,
what is that? You don’t want to deal with a kid in any capacity so you just stick
them in front of a computer. That’s what I’m bugged about. There’s no educating
them socially and emotionally. That’s a perfect example of how the budget cuts
are having an impact on our ability to educate the kids who need us most.
(Interview, 4/9/14)
Mr. Glyn describes the Success Academy as “holding cell” post-budget cut, a place to
keep students out of the “general population” as to stave off ensuing chaos. With so few
staff, the necessity for the Success Academy persisted, however at the expense of its
students’ educational quality. To preserve order and learning climate for the “general
population”, a population increasingly comprised of ELL students, “problem kids” would
have to go without. Another teacher, Mr. Raymond, lamented the message sent to the
students of the Success Academy, and the rest of the student body by allowing the
program to continue.
It’s a necessary evil, I guess. Ethically, it feels kind of wrong, because what
you’re doing is saying hey, these kids are failures, so we’re going to isolate them
and keep them from poisoning the rest of the groups. It makes sense and it’s very
pragmatic. It’s hard to say that these students will become nothing and that we
just need to keep them away from the rest of the kids so that somebody can learn.
And we’ll pass and graduate them but they’re not at any kind of level that they’re
going to be functioning well. It does not seem completely ethical and I’m sure
there are legal ramifications for it. Our climate numbers look great, but our school
is failing to educate everyone. So it’s that kind of shortsightedness that’s hurting
us too. (Interview, 4/10/14)
Mr. Raymond interpreted the tracking of students through the Success Academy as a
threat to the overall charge of the school to “educate everyone.” By isolating the
“problem kids”, the school was able to control the damage done by the school’s forced
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enrollment of “American” students, mitigating the risk of behavior problems and violent
incidents. However, in doing this, teachers and administration felt that they shirked their
duty to provide equitable educational opportunities to the entire study body. Mr.
Raymond’s excerpt distills a deep, underlying concern among the staff that the
“shortsightedness” of strategies focused purely on improving climate numbers would
implicate their moral responsibility to treat all of their students as pupils to be educated
instead of risks to be managed.
The American vs. ELL Faculty Rifts
Many staff throughout the year voiced grievances in teacher professional
development meetings and in their interviews, drawing attention to the necessity of
meeting differential student needs but also the climate and school identity issues resulting
from the growing chasm between these students. They cited the budget cuts as damaging
for opportunities for contact between ELL students. Aside from the loss of funds for
extracurricular activities and elective classes like music where “American”, or non-ELL,
and “ELL” students could mingle, one teacher, Mr. Cassidy, discussed the consequence
of expanding class sizes and loss of teacher labor for mediating cross-generational
relationships.
Yeah, because the class sizes are bigger, you’re just running around trying to get
things together. A lot of teachers now are trying to teach as many kids as they can
in that 40 or 50 minute frame and putting so much, like 40 kids sometimes, it’s
hard to do the fun things. If you have a really integrated class, it’s hard to say,
“Oh, today we’re not going to do equations. We’re going to do 1v1s and rotate.”
Teachers can’t afford to do that anymore. We need smaller class sizes and less
testing to do that.
Mr. Cassidy points to a few issues that staff across both the SHELTER and general
programs highlighted. The lack of “fun” things to do, those not pertaining to test
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preparation, made it difficult to cultivate a cohesive school culture where students could
build on a common identity. Many teachers especially felt that without fieldtrips, classes
like music and art, and school-wide events, the chasm between the “American” and
“ELL” populations widened considerably.
With the growing number of ELL students, the number of teachers dedicated
solely to the instruction of ELL students also experienced a dramatic increase. Similar to
the students, the bifurcated student identity structure of ELL v. American mapped neatly
onto the teaching staff as well with more than half of the teachers working with primarily
ELL students and the other half with the native-born population. As the budget crisis of
AY ’13-14 escalated stress levels with swelling class sizes and workloads, tensions arose
between teachers of primarily ELL students and teachers of the native-born. Perceptions
circulated among teachers of “American” students that ELL teachers “had it easy” and
did not inherit the same disciplinary issues in overcrowded classrooms. Mr. Cassidy, a
Success Academy teacher, describes the staff rift.
Well, there’s some tension I think because sometimes when the ELL teachers get
on their soapbox and say, like, when we’re talking about discipline or kids
running around in the hallways or terrorizing these congested classes, some of the
ELL teachers will say, “Oh, well I’m out in the hallway and I tell these kids to
move on and they don’t listen to me but MY KIDS, they come right into class and
they sit and do their work.” So, they kind of separate them without separatin’ em,
ya see? “My kids” ya know, or “our kids”, so it’s kind of like “our kids” and their
kids. (Interview, 3/19/14)
ELL teachers, conversely, oftentimes villainized the native-born students and accused
their teachers of ignoring incidents of native-born students bullying ELL students. After
an incident one day where an African-American student shoved a Bhutanese student into
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a locker in front of an African-American teacher, Ms. Betty, a white ELL teacher,
complained to me in the privacy of her classroom.
I just don’t understand how you can’t see the humanity in your students. They
work with these tough American kids and they lose their empathy for my kids.
They just don’t understand them or what their backgrounds are. They’re Philly
teachers, the kinds of people that have a pull-yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps type
of approach. And Mr. Keo, well, he was a refugee, but now is too so afraid that
people will think he’s favoring “the Asians.” That’s a very real thing here,
especially now with so many ELLs coming in. The American teachers think we
baby the Asian kids and that they get everything and the Black kids get nothing.
(Fieldnote, 10/14/13)
Embedded in Ms. Betty’s grievance is a racialized critique of alliances between students
and faculty. She frames teachers that taught mostly native-born students American as
callous, not empathetic to the needs of her students, and hardened by years of working
with “these tough American kids.” American, in this case, is synonymous with nativeborn students exhibiting the behaviors associated with African-American boys, and ELL,
with first-generation Asian students. She alludes to Mr. Keo, in spite of his background
as a Khmer refugee, as paralyzed in his management of the race politics of these tensions.
He explains the predicament he confronts as he mediates heightened racial tensions
among students and staff.
I sometimes try and convince myself it’s only in my head that I’m seeing it, but
it’s happened too many times. I had one of my supervisors ask me in a meeting,
“Are you trying to convert this into an all-Asian school?” I said, excuse me? I run
a neighborhood high school. I don’t have control over that. And the teacher
tensions, I mean, that’s the elephant in the room I’m trying to tackle. I want
people to understand this is not about who you’re teaching; it’s about what you’re
teaching. It does not help knowing that we have no common planning time for
them to meet to plan accordingly and build relationships. The ELL teachers all
specialize in working with the ELL students and the American teachers, you
know, teach the American students. We try to get everybody into the same pod,
but it’s just like they’re in here, and they’re in there. No they’re not mixing, and I
see that. I want to resolve that tension but I don’t know how. (Interview, 5/5/14)
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Already fielding accusations by community members and district-management that he is
trying to “convert [Johnson High] into an all-Asian school”, Mr. Keo pointed to the
underbelly of attracting ELL students in order to boost student numbers: strained staff
relations. His identity as a former Asian ELL student, and now an Asian principal of a
school with growing numbers of Asian students, complicates his leadership role as
advocate for two disparate interest groups. Plagued by anxiety around the school closure
threat, he internalizes the imperative to build the school’s reputation around its ELL
program, with the aim of improving climate statistics to protect the Johnson High from
district-level scrutiny.
Yet, at the same time, as teachers’ working conditions worsen under the budget
cuts, perceptions over how the administration and staff were distributing scarce resources
and privileges between ELL and American staff emerged. These resources did not just
amount to materials and supplies, but the energies that affective rewards of that staff
perceived stemmed differentially from working with ELL versus native-born students.
Mr. Keo acknowledged that this is the “elephant in the room”, but without resources and
time to support teachers dealing with the bulk of the behavior problems, he is at a loss,
admitting, “I want to resolve that tension but I don’t know how.”
Teacher Professional Development: Exposing the Fault Lines
The fault lines between ELLs and American teachers became more glaring in
fraught conversations at teacher professional development meetings (PDs). Of the four
held throughout the year, the administration dedicated large chunks of each to discuss the
implications of increased enrollment of “problem kids” from charter schools and other
district schools, as well as their implications for school climate. At a PD in February
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2014, many of teachers that worked mostly with the native-born population voiced
criticism that they felt unsupported by the administration in their classrooms when then
disciplined their students. The conversation involved four teachers of solely native-born
students (Ms. Alexis, Ms. Ralley, Ms. Abruzzi and Mr. Cassidy) and the principal, Mr.
Keo.
Ms. Alexis: If there are rules, then they need to be enforced. If a student threatens
me or someone else, we can’t just have them get a 30-minute detention. That’s not
appropriate. I’m saying that the school climate is slipping.
Ms. Ralley: I mean, these kids are disrupting every other kid in that classroom.
We’ve discussed this, and you said come up with an alternative plan. Guess what,
I don’t have one. What do you do with the kid who’s suspended and nobody
comes to pick them up, who just comes back to the classroom and disrupts all of
the other kids that can barely keep it together themselves? I don’t know what the
answer is, but this year it’s getting worse, and only some of us have to deal with it.
Mr. Keo: We are dealing with more kids that have problems that are transferring
into our school from other places. We’ve been working on it and trying to find
other options, but we can only do so much. We have to keep these kids here
because everyone dumps them on us. We don’t have the resources to have inhouse suspensions anymore and the state limits the number of out-of-school
suspensions that we can have. I thought I would have more autonomy, but with no
resources, it’s hard.
Ms. Abruzzi: But it jeopardizes the education of everyone else in that classroom,
especially the general population.
Mr. Cassidy: We’re just in a bad spot. We’re getting these kids that are coming
out of these charter schools and then we can’t move them no matter what they do
because there’s nowhere to move them to. By law we have to take them.
Mr. Keo: I think the other issue is that these charter schools have lots of mental
health services, but we don’t have that and there’s nobody here to work with these
really tough kids. (Recording, Teacher PD, 2/5/14)
The issue of inheriting “problem kids” from other schools (i.e. magnet, charter, parochial)
throughout the year introduced further complexity to the divide between ELL teachers,
American teachers, and the administration. Ms. Ralley stresses, “This year it’s getting
worse and only some of us have to really deal with it.” As resources to support
disciplinary mechanisms like in-school suspensions waned under the budget cuts,
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teachers of the native-born students felt that they were unfairly called to handle the issues
associated with “problem kids” while ELL teachers classrooms’ remained relatively
unscathed. Mr. Keo laments the lack of resources like mental health services for the
“really tough kids” and the bureaucratic red tape around remedies like in-school and outof-school suspensions. He admits that “with no resources” it’s difficult to find effective
solutions to Ms. Ralley’s grievance. He also draws attention to the absurdity of charter
schools with resources “dumping” students onto neighborhood schools that lack statefunded supports.
“Problem Kids” and In-school Suspensions
The previous section exposes the widening rift between staff teaching native-born
students and those teaching ELL students. With the budget cuts and a lack of support
staff, teachers saw the emotional costs of teaching native-born students, particular those
with behavioral issues, as higher and disproportionately falling on some teachers’
shoulders and not others. To return to the related issues of school climate data and the
threat of closure, teachers of American students also felt discriminated against in their
handling of what they perceived to be an unfair workload. In another PD in late April, an
assistant superintendent and Mr. Keo jointly approached the staff with a document that
ranked the top five high schools across the city in terms of annual in-school suspensions.
Johnson High ranked at the top of the list. In-school suspensions were the preferred
method of disciplining students to preserve attendance numbers. Instead of sending
students home, “in-house” removed “problem students” from the classroom and held
them in a discipline room, not ironically, in the basement next to the Success Academy.
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Without an assistant principal or classroom aides, and overcrowded classes, teachers of
American students felt that in-school suspensions were their only tool to maintain order.
Mr. Keo: We made it to the point where we are the highest school with in-school
suspensions in the city of Philadelphia. So in-house suspensions, if you look at
this, we made it to the top where [The Superintendent] actually asked him what
the hell just happened at Johnson High.
Mr. Cassidy: I think that we need to take into account that a lot of these numbers
are inflated. If you look at the in-houses, I would say that 90 percent of those are
the same kids.
Mr. Keo: At Dr. Hite’s level, he sees the number and it goes to the associate
superintendent and then it comes to me. They don’t look further than the number
and that’s a problem based on where we stand on a closures list.
Ms. Betty: It always feels like you get penalized when you do the right thing12.
Doesn’t it feel like that every time? You can’t say that these problems aren’t
happening in the other schools! They’re just not doing anything about it.
Mr. Rudolph: This could be one possible read though. Maybe we’re being more
vigilant in enforcing the disciplinary standards so perhaps our numbers look
higher because of that. Is that one reason that our numbers look higher?
Mr. Keo: We can’t speculate because it doesn’t matter. They see the numbers, so
we need to give them numbers. (Recording, 4/5/14)
Frustration mounted in the voices of the teachers as they felt “penalized” for doing the
“right thing.” The idea of not being able to “win” permeated the remainder of the
conversations at the PD, many of them complaining that their only option to cope with
the spike in behavioral problems without additional resources was to send students to “inhouse.” By sending students home through an out-of-school suspension, the teachers
damaged their attendance numbers, another key statistic considered in the school closure
survey. Backed into a corner, teachers like Mr. Rudolph beckoned Mr. Keo to “read” the
statistics differently, to consider that maybe the teachers were actually doing their jobs by
enforcing “disciplinary standards.”

12

Ms. Betty is referring to the disciplining of students by enforcing rules with in and out of school
suspensions.
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However, Mr. Keo could only entertain the teachers’ protests, not act on them.
Citing “numbers” as the bottom-line criteria for the death or survival of the school, Mr.
Keo dejectedly meets the teachers’ protests with an inevitable conclusion: “They see
numbers, so we need to give them numbers.” The administration elided issues of school
stratification, resource scarcity, and support for the schools’ neediest students, issues
which the teachers voice as central to foregone production of in-school suspension
numbers, and instead placed the onus back on teachers to improve those numbers without
subsequent support. Pressure from the district to keep those numbers down without
considering the multitude of factors influencing their production, reinforced Mr. Keo’s
fears that, at the end of day, the decision to keep Johnson High open will hinge on the
same blind, “evidence-based” process. Regardless of whether he wanted to support his
staff or not, Mr. Keo felt that he no choice but to accept the ultimatum handed to him by
the superintendent to improve the school’s climate numbers.
Following the PD that day, I sat by the fence in the schoolyard with Mr. Keo
where he admitted that he felt not only burnt out, but also morally compromised.
This numbers game is just too much sometimes. I’ve gotten our attendance
numbers up, which is a good thing because it keeps us open, but it’s a bad thing
because these knuckleheads come from other schools and [District office] doesn’t
support us with the staff. Do you know that [charter school in the same
neighborhood] has a school culture administrator and four assistant principals and
they still don’t have a good school environment? They send all of their problem
kids to us and we still outperform them with a quarter of the staff. I want to serve
everyone, even the problem kids, but I can’t! Not when we’re evaluated by these
standards with no support. I haven’t heard anything about us closing recently but
there’s always the rumor that we are on the list. I don’t know what’s going to
happen in May - probably something similar to last year until they bleed us dry by
2017 and 90 percent of the city schools are charters except for the [magnet
schools]. There will be nobody left to fight. Even my union - we’ve accepted a
freeze these last two years and this year we’re taking a salary cut. I’m just tired.
I’m not sleeping. (Fieldnote, 4/5/14)
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The exhaustion in Mr. Keo’s voice was apparent as he described the moral dilemma that
the “numbers” game imposed on his leadership. By improving statistics in one area,
enrollment and attendance, Mr. Keo struggled with keeping climate statistics in shape.
This quote is rife with a critique of school stratification, what he perceives as the root of
this issue. Calling attention to well-staffed charter schools that eject “problem kids”
which ultimately land on Johnson High’s doorstep, he felt that his hands were tied in
terms of serving them without support staff like assistant principals and counselors. He
also felt guilt in placing the responsibility on teachers of native-born students to manage
students with behavior problems without the proper supports. The energies that educating
these students required, compounded by pay and benefits cuts, compounded feelings of
burnout among teachers. Returning to the strategy of rejecting students with problematic
behavior from outside the catchment and confining ‘problem kids’ he was forced to
accept from the school’s catchment in the Success Academy (see Chapter 3, pg. 18), Mr.
Keo mourns the fact that he feels he has no other option but to treat these students as risks
instead of as children in need of support. These risks took the form of not only poor
climate data, but also the risks to the affective rewards required to sustain staff as they
endured deplorable working conditions and hostile politics at the state and district levels
for public schools and their teachers.
The Multicultural Day Debacle
By May 28th of AY 2013-2014, the principals’ union had already accepted pay
and benefits cuts, and the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers (PFT), the teacher’s union,
was in the midst of a battle to stave off a 13 percent salary reduction and cuts to their
153

healthcare coverage. This prospect compounded a 5-year pay freeze. Morale among staff
was at an all-time low as teachers questioned their future in a district that they sensed was
trying to “drive [them] out” (Fieldnote, 5/28/14). Attempting to “salvage” what was left
of an “ungodly year” for the students, teachers dug into their own pockets through
donations and fundraising to support “Multicultural Week”, an annual school celebration
(Fieldnote, 4/30/14). Multicultural Week consisted of two half-days, one of which was
dedicated to watching musical, dance, and cultural performances in the auditorium,
prepared by overwhelmingly ELL students, and another half-day of food sampling where
teachers provided students with small stipends to cook tasting menus of foods from their
countries. The following passage comes from an extended fieldnote from the cultural
performances day.
The day of cultural performances turned out to be more controversial than
I anticipated. Sitting in on a class of mostly 9th grade ‘American’ students in the
morning before the performances, Ms. London fielded grumbles from students
that felt that the performances did not reflect their culture (Fieldnote, 5/28/14).
Walking into the auditorium where the performances were taking place was a
clear divide. The front two thirds of the room consisted of mostly ELL students,
while classes composed of mostly of American students to sat in the back. As I sat
by the wall, chips of paint and plaster fell onto my shoulders from the decaying
auditorium ceiling. A tearful ELL teacher, Ms. Dowd, grabbed my shoulder with
tears in her eyes as the stream of students carrying their countries’ flag streamed
down the aisles. Bollywood music, Vietnamese, Indonesian bamboo instrument
songs, Spanish rap, AA breakdancing, Chinese pop, and Burmese ethnic songs
and dances induced resounding applause from the crowd. There were break
dances, Mexican and Karen-Burmese rapping, and a poetry reading in Chinese by
an African-American senior female. A Pakistani senior girl sang a song in Urdu
and the Nepali boys erupted with shouts of encouragement, recognizing the words
from a language so similar to their own.
The two culminating performances included a Bollywood tandem dance
by a Nepali junior male and an Indian sophomore girl and 15-person Nepali crew
with one Karen freshman female putting on a hip hop dance. The sole Karen girl
admitted to me after that her Karen friends’ performances were too “calm” for her
and that she preferred the hip-hop “feeling.” The audience throughout was mostly
quiet, captivated by the performances, but cheering raucously at their conclusions.
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Ms. Lavery, another ELL teacher, looked over at me and asked, “Why can’t we
have more of this and less testing?” Another teacher circled the room, snapping
photos to post on the website and hall by the main office. Mr. Keo and other
teachers sitting on the sides beamed with pride. Exiting the auditorium, I said to
Ms. London, “My heart was full today. I have to remember days like today,
because they were so rare this year. If only there were more opportunities to
celebrate these students.” She remained silent, turned, and walked away
(Fieldnote, 5/28/14)
The cultural day, while a point of pride for the school, and a bright spot in a year devoid
of extracurricular activities, also exposed the effects of the shifting school identity as a
result of the ELL-ification of the school. Admittedly, my own involvement as a
participant observer in mostly ELL and shelter classes throughout the year positioned me
to admire the resilience of the staff and students to put on such a performance. I was also
more familiar with the performers as most of them were ELL students that I had worked
with in classrooms. My interaction with Ms. London in the latter half of the fieldnote did
not go without recourse. Ms. London, a teacher of both SHELTER and general
population history classes, later that evening, emailed me with critique of the event.
At some point, I'd like to give you another perspective. Your feelings about
yesterday may be tempered if you sat in my seat. I was in the back - by the section
where mostly African-American students sat. I also heard a lot of "I'm not going
to that" in my 2nd period class. It is two schools - the ELLs (note who performed
- not reflective of the entire school) and the US born. There is no effort by
administration to address it - it is taboo to bring it up. There is a lot of frustration
by the non-ELL teachers. Anyway, while yesterday was nice for the students who
participated, from the "back of the room" (or of the bus...) it was very different.
(Email Correspondence, 5/29/14)
After receiving this email, I found myself experiencing the same kind of tension
permeating the staff. I had made an inadvertent comment in a moment of pride for the
students I had come to know and love during my three years at Johnson High, but had
simultaneously angered a teacher that saw the performances as “not reflective of the
entire school”, and actively marginalizing the native-born and largely Black population.
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In her email, she draws an explicit connection between the “back of the room” and the
“back of the bus”, tethering the spatial dimensions of the assembly to a larger critique of
the racism that textured the treatment of Black youth in the school as the ELL population
grew. In an interview with another teacher briefly following the event, Mr. Glyn echoed
Ms. London’s concerns about the growing chasm between the native-born (American)
and ELL students, as the ELL population became the majority of the student body.
It could have been a great opportunity for the whole school to get involved in
something like that and bring the whole school together a little bit, but instead
there’s this sense that culturally there are some other aspects of the school that are
a little bit bleached out. Like we have this richness and multiculturalism in the
school, it’s unbelievable! But are we being truly inclusive? Some people are seen
as having legitimate culture versus an American kind of whateverness. We want
people to see our “culture” so that they won’t close us down but it’s a specific
kind of culture they want them to see, ya know? (Interview, 6/3/14)
Mr. Glyn introduces the idea of “legitimate culture” versus “American culture”, a notion
that Ms. London understood as divisive in terms of representation in the multicultural
performance day as well as the strategy of marketing the school as a haven for ELL
students. Though many of the teachers voiced that turning the school into one which
attracted high numbers of ELL students to both bolster numbers and improve climate
statistics was a strategy of necessity, a public educators, they felt conflicted by the
ultimate consequences of the school’s identity shift. In being “multicultural”, first
generation immigrant youth became the face of Johnson High, oftentimes at the expense
of the native-born students, two thirds of which were Black. Mr. Glyn refers to
perceptions around American youth as “bleached out” culturally, or a kind of cultural
“whateverness” that was dismissed in favor of celebrating students from other countries.
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Through the marketing of the school’s mission as a supportive environment for
ELL students, the administration and teachers exploited cultural politics to as a resource
to fuel positive perceptions of the school as “diverse.” However, as teachers like Mr.
Glyn and Ms. London point out, this drawing on culture as a resource legitimated
particular student types over others. This problem manifested itself through the fraught
spatial dynamics of the multicultural performance assembly, the relations between staff
teaching ELLs and those teaching the general population, as well as relationships
between American and ELL peers.
**********************************
Mr. Keo: Are the students affected by the cuts? Absolutely. Some are more than
others of course because the cuts take the special education support, making them
the most vulnerable. We’re losing the resources. I think the ELL population is
doing pretty well here in this school. We didn’t lose any students. In fact, the ELL
population gained more in this school because I’ve allocated I guess—I’m more
biased toward the ELLs because I was one myself. They’ve gained more support
because we also have more dynamic ELL teachers who help bring in resources
from the outside. The regular ed students too, are also being affected because
we’re limited on supplies and classroom assistance. (Interview, 5/5/14)
Teachers and administrators across the school, even those that taught primarily ELLs,
often said that they felt that the impact of the budget cuts and school closures had
disproportionately adverse impact on the native born students of the school, primarily
African-American students that made up the majority of the native-born at Johnson High.
In Chapter 3 I argued that the strategies to improve quality hinged on two overlapping
processes of value creation and risk management through the ELL-ification of the school
and the exclusionary enrollment and tracking practices of students with behavioral issues.
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Throughout this chapter I have sought to answer my third research question by
illustrating the dilemmas in educators’ ethics, purpose, and praxis that surface when
neighborhood schools seek to brand their schools around selective student populations.
Given that school closures implicate districts like Philadelphia’s suffering from
fiscal crises that compound the trauma of school closures, I drew on Downey’s (2007)
theory of teacher work to explore branding as not only a process that seeks to create value
in neighborhood school deemed substandard in urban districts stratified by charter and
magnet schools, but also as means to convince down-trodden educators that their work is
meaningful. Many teachers articulated a profound sense of burnout and hopelessness,
citing pay and benefits cuts amidst a background of intensifying standards without
resources, demands on their time, and imminent threat to their livelihoods (via closure) as
responsible for their demoralization. Struggling to make sense of their predicament and
fighting to salvage import from their labor and care, administrators and principals placed
higher premiums on their students’ demonstrations of gratitude, respect, and effort. In
other words, the “affective rewards” stemming from positive, energizing interactions with
students became the lynchpin of sustaining their work in the face of what many perceived
as attacks to the integrity of their profession.
The “meaning-making” process is not unique to the craft of teaching, as it
pervades many forms of care work. What I argue in this chapter is that branding the
school around ELL students accomplished more than merely giving the school a
marketable reputation. The unstable and desperate state of affairs induced by the district’s
fiscal crisis and impending plans to consolidate schools, precipitated a staff-wide trauma
for which the affective rewards of working with ELL students served as the antidote.
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Though many teachers pointed to the implicit racism is favoring ELLs in their
preferences for and treatment of their students, surviving the grueling days required
minimizing the expense of negative energy and maximizing feelings of efficacy. They
admitted that under different circumstances – a district climate and school environment
with adequate resources, compensation, and staff morale – that they might have more
patience and care to offer students with greater needs. Yet with growing responsibilities
in their personal lives and classrooms, compounded by existential fears of the future
unemployment, persisting required distancing themselves from sources of stress.
In turn, the branding process created a moral economy that traded on the affect
produced by positive educator-student interactions with ELL students. If one likened the
school to a company that not only branded itself to broaden its consumer base but to also
expand employee satisfaction, ELL-ification and risk management accomplished both
goals. A school with a hopeful trajectory, bolstered by an atmosphere of customers’
praise and appreciation for their work, enabled teachers to tolerate what they perceived as
the “district’s bullshit” and allowing the branding process to continue (Field note,
11/5/13).
However, the consumer-producer relationship did not laminate as neatly onto
traditional notions of student-public educator relations at Johnson. First, if one employs
the market metaphor, companies the produce commodities tend to have control over their
inputs and materials. Many teachers voiced that an illusion of control existed at the
district-level as officials expected the school to deliver a quality “product”, evaluated visà-vis quantification, without the kinds of resources, supports, and autonomy afforded to
privately managed schools like charters. Second, if markets are predicated on choice,
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both consumers through purchasing and producers through branding effectively “choose”
one another. Many students and teachers noted that the core mission of the neighborhood
school was free and unfettered access to public education for all students. Even in their
efforts to behave like a business, the district still required the school to admit all students
within their catchment, ultimately mitigating the “choice” both students and teachers felt
around their school and students. Teachers of native-born students highlighted these
discrepancies in their frustration of ELL teachers’ “easier jobs” and Mr. Keo in the
opening vignette where he condemned the district:
You devalue the work we do with the toughest kids, the ones that are hardest to
get to, the ones that nobody is looking out for….What’s happening is we’re
dismantling public education piece by piece. We’ve made it into a commodity and
the irony of it all is that the kids at the bottom don’t have any choice, even though
we’re supposedly all about “choice” (Fieldnote, 1/28/14).
These educators’ narratives and actions, or the process of sense making that informed the
school’s branding strategies, reveals that when administrators and teachers’ work shifts in
scope and scale from pedagogic and democratic to managerial and entrepreneurial, their
praxis damages the compassion and care available for the students’ with the greatest
emotional needs. By understanding teachers’ labor as part of a care economy that trades
in affect, one can see the moral dilemmas that surface when marketization forces schools
and educators to frame their students in absolute terms of risk and value. Backed into a
corner by the threat of closure, these educators reluctantly and remorsefully employed
these strategies in an effort to “save” the school for the students they believed would
sustain their numbers and their declining energies.
In the following chapter I delve deeper into a different economy of service
provision that the school created to signify school value and consequently attract higher
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enrollments: partnerships with non-profit organizations. As the fiscal crisis worsened in
the district from 2011 to 2013, these private partners came to play an increasingly central
role in filling gaps in resources and labor. However, these organizations also had tapered
missions and targeted student populations based on their or the funders’ theory of the
schools’ problems. This next chapter therefore examines both another branding
mechanism and the quandaries it generated for equitable governance and opportunity at
Johnson High.
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CHAPTER 5: FRAUGHT COLLABORATION: PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
AND NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS IN CRISIS
“The Vultures Come Heavy”
In spite of Johnson High’s missing guidance counselor, nurse, and adequate
staffing, the school boasted 16 “community partnerships” with a host of philanthropic,
non-profit, and for-profit organizations. Mr. Drew, a part-time coordinator of a non-profit
organization, Guitars and Hoops, highlights the strange bedfellow relationship that his
organization and other partners developed with Johnson High as fiscal conditions
worsened in the district.
We’re not really hustling for that because we have so many kids. We’re actually
getting 9 more slots next month to meet the demand. Our program is growing like
crazy because our utilization is through the roof. We can’t even get students to not
come when it’s snowing. We’re like, no, you can’t come, there’s no school! I
teach guitar, piano, coach soccer, and also do urban farming. I mean, yeah, like
any decaying object, the vultures come heavy. Just being a vulture myself, you
know, it’s kind of like a carcass. The school system is already dead so we’re all
just scrambling to feed on what’s left of it. (Interview, 1/30/14)
Mr. Drew discussed at length in his interview how austerity policies like school closures
and budget cuts across the district, policies that framed neighborhood schools as
disposable, created a dual-imperative for schools to both fill chronic resource gaps in
labor and supplies as well as to market the school through programming to potential
students as well as the district. Comparing the partners to “vultures…feeding on what’s
left” of a dying public school system, partners also wielded the crisis as an opportunity to
demonstrate “impact” and justify the significance of their continued presence. Moreover,
the imperative to “save the school” through partnerships factored heavily into the
administration’s school branding plan. Each principal saw partnering service-providers as
promoting a culture of opportunity for students as well as building political capital with
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well-connected individuals that had influence at the city and district levels. The district’s
own efforts to facilitate the partnering of non-profit organizations in its resurrection of
the Office of Strategic Partnerships further reinforced administrators’ understanding of
partners as a means to demonstrate “quality” to district-level auditors looking to close
schools.
While Johnson High did work with a major partner to offer career-oriented
curriculum throughout the last fifteen years, until 2011, it was the only consistent partner
working in the building. The district also facilitated this partnership, linking Career
Ready, this particular partner, to the school in order to build an integrated curriculum
through federal funding that targeted monies toward career readiness. However, the
number of independently established partners increased dramatically after Johnson’s
placement on the school closures list in May of 2011, attracting upwards of 13 additional
partners (Interview, 2/28/14). Many organizations also deepened their resource and labor
commitments following the budget cuts in May 2013 (Interview, 3/11/14). The dire
circumstances stemming from the budget crisis therefore mobilized and justified the
presence of private entities in the school. These 16 “public-private partnerships” (PPPs)
were therefore forged in response to different dimensions of crisis, driven by school’s
need for labor, resources, and political allies that many of the leadership of these nonprofits organizations maintained, as well as the non-profits’ own needs to frame their
services as critical to their funding stakeholders. Under these unprecedented conditions,
partners at Johnson High had an almost unfettered freedom to pursue their organizations’
mission, allocate resources, and dramatically influence the cultural politics of the
school’s branding process.
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Public-Private Partnerships in Education
Scholars have termed public-private partnerships in education as “the new mode
of educational governance” (Robertson et al. 2012), a medium which ranges from
corporate support for school reform (Bhanji 2012), for-profit and non-profit school
management contracting (Bartlett et al. 2002; Cucchiara, Gold, and Simon 2011;
Cucchiara 2013; Koyama 2010), philanthropic interventions in schools (Brown 2012;
Reckhow and Snyder 2014; van Fleet 2012), and “community schools” where
organizations tied to health and adult literacy, offer family-centered programming
(Jacobson and Blank 2011). Extant scholarship has however largely focused on the
relative value or danger of relying on PPPs in furthering educational improvement
without adequately depicting how politico-economic shifts in funding and policy agendas
are currently shaping PPPs’ role in educational provision nor the internal politics of
public schools (Smith and Wohlstetter 2006). Further, little is known about the ways in
which increases in private organizations’ coordination with schools in crisis are affecting
the school governance and distribution of educational resources.
This chapter explores PPPs as a resource garnering and marketing strategy for
“failing” urban schools. I examine Johnson High’s reliance on 16 non-profit partnerships
throughout three years of continual cutbacks and closure threats as part of the larger
project in urban public education to brand schools within expanding educational
marketplaces as well as an index of the increasing privatization of public services within
public institutions (Katz 2010). I targeted five partners with deep resource commitments
to the school to study the paradox that emerged when partners became embedded in
school’s survival strategy. For, on one hand, Johnson High as a public school was
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constitutionally mandated to provide “a thorough and efficient education for all” and was
held to strict standards of accountability for achieving this mandate (Education Law
Center, 2014). Yet, at the same time, school leadership desperate for support, relied on
PPPs that, by their very design, served students selectively and lacked accountability to
school leadership. This dilemma implies two central questions at the heart of this chapter
that relate to my second and third research questions (Chapter 1, 37): 1) How have
austerity and school competition shifted the role of PPPs in neighborhood schools? 2)
What are the implications of relying on PPPs as both marketing mechanisms as well as
core public education service providers for ensuring equitable educational access and
opportunities for vulnerable student populations?
I conceptualize how the schools’ need for private partnerships has become part of
a broader strategy to bolster the traditional neighborhood and charter schools’ appeal and
reputation through external programming in order to attract larger enrollments. However,
the forging of partnerships is also a product of a fiscal and existential crisis in public
education that creates a necessity for partners’ to fill resource voids, shifting their role
from traditionally supplemental service provision to becoming central providers. In order
to analyze this change in school governance in relation to equity of educational access
and opportunity, I turn to theoretical frameworks developed in anthropological studies of
poverty and the privatization of government social services (Roy 2012; Soss, Fording,
and Schram 2011). Vincanne Adams (2013), in her ethnographic analysis of the
privatization of disaster relief in the reconstruction of post-Katrina New Orleans,
highlights the role of affect in the work of private sector organizations, which in the case
of Katrina involved a constellation of grass-roots, community, faith-based, and for-profit
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organizations. Adams defines affect as a type of purposive ethics, informed by a sense of
emotional urgency that then prompts social action (Roy 2012: 107). She employs the
concept of an “affect economy” to explain how with privatization, affect concerning the
plight of the poor incites calls for “emotional responsiveness” and induces action, having
the ability to “generate new business investments and free labor for a struggling
economy” (2012: 209). Her analysis illuminates how replacing government responsibility
for vulnerable populations with privatized or market-mechanized forms of care results in
an unregulated, uneven distribution of services that puts critical state-led safety-net
infrastructures and the people they protect at risk. Resources, in turn, are allocated
selectively in relation to how poor citizens are positioned along a spectrum of
“deservingness” of care.
Important insights can be gained from using the concept of an affect economy in
analyzing how the shift from state-provided educational resources to private ones through
PPPs are both affecting the distribution of services in schools like Johnson High as well
as the brand messaging that school leaders imagine as valuable and therefore competitive
in the marketplace. Financial crisis-induced suffering has triggered a kind of moral
imperative, similar to Adam’s depiction of the humanitarian imperative in post-Katrina
New Orleans, affectively mobilizing a network of PPPs to rescue imperiled schools. The
constellation of private organizations that have responded to these needs are largely
unregulated and unevenly distributed (Interview, 3/21/14). The PPPs providing
educational services are also called to action in relation to differing “moral panics,” or
understandings of educational issues and problems that inform how they target and
prioritize resource allocation. This sets in motion a cultural politics of recognition within
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the schools where particular social categories of students are affectively identified as
“deserving” of educational care (Ticktin 2011). I argue in this chapter that PPPs’ cultural
politics of recognition, where certain student categories are valued over others, are
closely related to the ways that administrators and staff strategize around developing
school brands around particular students. By attracting and retaining partners that serve
valued student populations through selectively-serving PPPs, schools can reinforce other
branding strategies that target these same students. Attention to the role of affect as a
generative force underlying PPP’s allocation of resources and care, then, provides a
powerful window on the processes and resulting cultural politics of PPPs educational
resource allocation as well as the implications for ensuring educational equity for all.
I argue in this chapter that the conditions precipitating from this district-wide
crisis forced a kind of fraught collaboration between private providers and the school as
the administration felt they had no choice but to rely on these non-profits to provide core
educational services, labor, and political leverage in an increasingly ominous district
climate. I show that the demands of marketing the school of the school as “ deserving” of
remaining open through partners introduced questions of equity in resource distribution
as well as coordination among competing partners. The desperation engendered by the
retrenchment of state-funded supports in district schools inevitably intensified the need
for PPPs as not only branding mechanisms, but also to keep the school solvent in the
middle of the “doomsday” budget crisis of AY 2013-2014.
Targeted Tracking
In order to more fully understand how partners influenced both the social
dynamics of the school as well as the distribution of resources across the student body, I
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selected five of the organizations with the deepest resource and staff commitments to
track. These five organizations all contributed full and part-time staff, provided supply
budgets to the school, and influenced curricular planning.
1. Career Ready13
Mission: To expand life and economic options for Philadelphia public school students
through career-focused programming that prepares young people for employment and
post-secondary education using the career academy model.
Targeted Population: General student body
Impact Measures: Graduation rates, postsecondary enrollment, income
2. Service for Salvation
Mission: With your support we are breaking the cycle of poverty, illiteracy and low
expectations through youth service programs in many of America’s most under-resourced
high schools and by building schools in some of the world’s poorest villages
Targeted Population: General student body
Impact Measures: hours of engagement, numbers of students engaged, graduation rates,
college enrollment rates
3. Guitars and Hoops
Mission: The primary goal of this program is to provide learning opportunities through
innovative activities through Project Based Learning instruction. Youth work together in
groups on creative projects for a minimum of two hours daily for two days per week
during the school year. These projects sessions are hands-on experiences where students
learn and solve problems reflected in everyday life and develop 21st Century Skills.

13

All organizations and names of staff are pseudonyms.
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Youth cleverly tackle difficult subjects that impact their lives. Youth address a
community need through various projects ending with culminating events, presentations,
and/or shows through the uniqueness of program offerings such as digital media, music,
fitness, dance, photography, and poetry.
Targeted Population: 40 slots available – first come, first serve enrollment
Impact Measures: enrollment, graduation rates, participation rates
4. Refugee Aid
Mission: Refugee Education is a federally funded program that supplements educational
support services for migratory children. The program assists school districts and charters
in coordinating the continuity of educational services for children who have had their
schooling interrupted.
Targeted Population: K-12 students whose parents work with raw food products
Impact Measures: reading and math standardized test scores, enrollment, graduation
rates, college enrollment
4. College Dreams
Mission: Through grants to high poverty schools, to prepare students to enter and succeed
in postsecondary education
Targeted Population: members of senior class
Impact Measures: 4-year college admission rates, matriculation rates,
I hypothesized that these organizations would have the greatest influence on the
school’s culture and also speak to broader trends across the partners, namely which
students were being targeted for services, how these partners’ framed the needs of the
students and school, and how these services shaped perceptions of equity and school
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quality among students. More closely tracking the activities of these organizations
allowed me to “go deep” with these organizations, conducting interviews with 15 of their
upper-level management in addition to observing their activities closely in in-school,
after-school and weekend programming. It was my initial work with Refugee Aid as a
teacher and volunteer that first directed me to Johnson High as a site to explore the
experiences of ELL students. In turn, I had closer relationships with several of the
partners, namely Refugee Aid, by the time I began Phase II of the study (see Chapter 1,
section under “Methodology”).
The Work of Crisis: Creating a “Need” for Partnerships
Mr. Wood: The more partnerships you have, the better your resume right? If
every school is on an equal playing field, I mean, if you look at the school from a
data perspective then they all have a justification to close it right because of
NCLB standards14. The next question is, what’s the point? It costs money to keep
this school that was built in 1913 open because you’ll have to rebuild it. When
you have the numbers against you and the facilities against you, the things you
can put in your pros column to balance out your cons column is your community
partnerships and the positive things you can point to that are in your school.
Partners are a huge part of promoting your school. You hope that people pass
through your doors and get you exposure to networking, resources, and more
partners. (Interview, 3/5/14)
Mr. Wood’s acutely captures a set of interrelated pressures that engendered a
“need” for community partnerships as a marketing mechanism, beginning in AY 20112012 when the School District of Philadelphia released its first school closures list. In a
destitute district, particularly in the context of the AY 2013-2014 budget crisis, Johnson
High administrators and teachers knew that the district releasing funds to renovate their
building was unlikely. Additionally, with high numbers of ELL students and charter
school refugees entering their doors and decreasing resources like staff and supplies,

14

No Child Left Behind.
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improving test scores also felt increasingly like a pipe dream. Therefore, as Mr. Wood so
eloquently explains, the school saw partnerships as an opportunity balance out their
overwhelming “cons” column to draw positive attention to the school.
As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, the number of partnerships increased at
Johnson High during the tenure of the previous principal, Mr. Brown. Many teachers that
worked under his reign cited the “juice,” or entrepreneurial spirit, that he brought to the
building. Many attributed the growing number of partners to Mr. Brown’s efforts to
market the school and entice students through partners’ offered opportunities to enroll.
However, in the wake of the budget crisis, partners took on a new role: filling major
service gaps. Many teachers indicated that during their tenure, they had seen large
increases in the number of partners coming to the aid of the school.
Mr. Wood: Well, originally Career Ready was the only game in town. They were
the only external organization that we partnered with. Service for Salvation, just
as recently as two years ago, was just an after-school club that met on
Wednesdays. They decided this year to implement a full roll out of being here
everyday with two full-time staff. And how do you say no to someone when they
say that, especially now with no resources? Of course, no problem, it’s good just
to have the extra person to help you coordinate and do things. I mean, Guitars and
Hoops, they’re more after-school and they’re picking up where we no longer have
extracurricular money to pay teachers do these things. We used to have choir, we
used to have the Gamer’s Club. I was paid to run that club three days per week.
But as that money dried up, we’ve had partners like Guitars and Hoops come in
and say, “Oh, well we’ll run after-school programs in your school and you don’t
have to pay for them anymore.” So it’s really the quest for private money to pay
what used to be covered by the district. (Interview, 3/5/14)
Another teacher, Mr. Darling, a 16-year veteran teacher, corroborated Mr. Wood’s claim
that the partners have increasingly come to fill critical service gaps, even in classrooms.
Yeah, [the partners] definitely have made an imprint in the school and have
showed up at teacher meetings and filled in the gaps that were needed because of
time and resources. Some teachers could not step up to the place as they have in
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the past and Service for Salvation and other organizations have filled those
footprints. (Interview, 1/7/14)
With overcrowded classrooms, no supplies, and a chronic lack of support staff like a
school counselor, nurse, classroom and lunchroom aids, secretaries, and janitors, Mr.
Wood and Mr. Darling again highlight the lack of choice that Mr. Keo felt in terms of
allowing partners to enter the building, shifting partners’ role from supplemental to core
service providers. Whereas the school only had one partner providing in-school staffing
and resources prior to AY 2011-2012, by AY 2013-2014 it had five.
This shift became apparent in “community partners meetings”, a gathering of the
16 partners on the first Tuesday of every month where one of the partners, Guitars and
Hoops, provided a “partnerships coordinator” to orchestrate and synthesize services and
programming (Fieldnote 10/4/13). I attended nine of these meetings throughout the
school year, intrigued by the paradox emerging from the budget cut: though the school
supported a student population of high-need students (e.g. refugees, special-education
students) without a guidance counselor, reading specialist, and school psychologist, it had
a force of privately sponsored labor that amounted to almost half of its remaining
teaching staff after the budget cuts. Mr. Keo oftentimes attended these meetings, voicing
the emergent needs of the school and drawing on partners to fill in the gaps. The full-time
coordinator for College Dreams and part-time staff from Refugee Aid, and Career Ready
offered fieldtrips, financial aid workshops, and application help for select students
enrolled in their programs. The Service for Salvation and Guitar and Hoops coordinators,
two full-time staff with an office in the building, provided budgets for fieldtrips to service
projects, and school-wide assemblies. After receiving word in a professional development
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meeting from the superintendent that the former year’s School Improvement Grant (SIG),
a release of funds from the state for schools that demonstrate the greatest need, had been
changed from delayed status to rescinded, Mr. Keo admitted,
Well that’s how it goes, it happens every year. I just have to find someone
private who will get me what I need. That’s why I have all of these non-profit
people in here. I care about the kids. As the principal of a school I feel like I am
the CEO of my building, pretty much running it with the staff I have, with no
support from anywhere else. There’s nothing in the school so you have to look
elsewhere and make deals with these people. They provide something for the
school and then they get their data and they can keep applying for grants.
(Recorded Conversation at PD, 11/6/13)
Mr. Keo here employs a kind of “market-speak”, comparing himself to a CEO of a
building instead of a principal. Instead of merely managing state-provided resources, he
felt responsible for recruiting and employing private organizations to provide
programming formerly funded by district budgets. In exchange for providing the nonprofits with the “data” they needed to apply for grants and therefore perpetuate their own
missions, Mr. Keo received programming for his students that he could not provide with
a retrenched budget commitment and little promise of improvement in the future. Other
teachers employed a similar “market-speak” as the principal, questioning whether nonprofit organizations could accomplish the same goals as teacher-run extracurricular and
in-school programming with greater “efficiency.”
Mr. Glyn: We don’t have a choice. I mean, that’s kind of presupposing that
educators are the best people to deliver those services. Maybe the people with
unique experiences like the Service for Salvation and Guitars and Hoops
coordinators bring a different scope? They’re not exactly building programs that
are driven by an educator’s point of view. I don’t know. There’s resourcefulness
to it because we’re getting these groups in and we’re kind of discovering how
much more efficiently we can work. I mean, the budget cuts have just totally
decimated us. (Interview, 4/9/14)
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Many teachers and students that I interviewed even lauded administrators like Mr. Brown
and Mr. Keo for looking to outside organizations to give the students opportunities.
Commenting one day on the role of College Dreams’ coordinator to an independent
evaluator of the program, Mr. Wood lamented,
These kids are woefully underserved with no one to help them navigate the
application system. I’ve tried to do it, but I have so many other responsibilities.
There’s no counselor. These kids are getting from College Dreams what the
School District and the state don’t provide. We need five of your coordinators, not
just one. (Fieldnote, 10/30/13)
Mr. Wood and Mr. Glyn point to a resourcefulness in drawing on partner services
in light of the budget cuts. Mr. Wood’s comment of needing “five” of College Dreams’
coordinator underscores the critical services several of the organizations provided in the
absence of support staff in AY 2013-2014. Hence, the affective dimensions of the crisis
on two fronts, impending closure and resource shortages, shaped productive relationships
between school staff and partner staff. Teachers and administrators, desperate for
“bodies” in hallways and packed classrooms, felt lucky that these organizations were
there at all.
Accountability Ironies
On the surface, the employment of partnerships accomplished an increasing
number of goals as conditions worsened. Teachers and administrators drew on partner
staff in a multitude of school-wide initiatives, administrative processes, and in-class
projects. However, as partners became progressively more embedded as core service
providers, questions around the ethics of their work and their implications for the
schools’ trajectory began to circulate among both staff and the providers themselves. In
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an interview with the former principal of the school, Mr. Brown, he described the
importance of selectivity in terms of allowing partners into the building.
I think you really have to be selective of whom you bring into your building and
why you’re bringing them in. I don’t think you say yes to everybody, and that’s a
tough thing. You have to have the smarts to know your school community and
what is going to support your kids, because people want to get into your building
for multiple reasons and they’re not always up front with them. (Interview 4/7/14)
Mr. Brown, the principal before the budget cut AY 2013-2014 budget cut, corroborates
Bryk's (2010) notion of program coherence and making sure that programming,
regardless of where it comes from, a private or public entity, blends in such a way that it
aligns with the vision of the school and the needs of the students. He also points to the
tensions that can arise from an administrator’s interpretation of the needs of the students
and the “multiple reasons” that a partnering organization might want to enter the school.
While Mr. Brown had more latitude in his selectivity of partners to market
Johnson High, the AY 2013-2014 budget cuts severely compromised Mr. Keo’s ability to
deny partners entrance to the building. Returning to the vignette from Chapter 3, with so
few staff in the main office, he oftentimes did not know who was in the building or had
time to observe their programming. Mr. Keo felt that he did not have much choice in
terms of the kinds of programming he allowed in. Citing the need for “bodies” and
“things for the kids,” he repeatedly argued in interviews and after-school conversations
that the pressure to admit external programmers in order to bring some relief to an
overworked staff made it difficult to implement a coherent vision for the school.
However, Mr. Keo was critical of the position that the budget crisis and district overhaul
of its neighborhood schools placed him in.
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I don’t have a reading specialist or basic staffing. I’m accountable for what
happens to our test scores regardless of what kinds of resources I have, which
ultimately means that the school could close. What pisses me off though is these
organizations are not staffed by educators. They’re non-profits. They have no
certified teachers, yet they get money from the state and foundations, whereas,
we, the school, cannot apply for that. The only reason I need them is because
nobody will give me money to run my fucking school. I know it’s a game that
we’re playing. We make each other look good, but the reality is, they are not
educators. They’re just passing through. (Recorded Conversation, 12/4/13)
Mr. Keo’s appraisal of the partners here was wrought with resentment. He needed them
because “regardless of what kinds of resources” at his disposal, the district held him
accountable for the performance of the school and continued failure foreshadowed
closure. As he pointed out though, the partners were eligible to apply for private funding
and in the end were not liable for the school’s overall outcomes (as evaluated by the
district). They also are not “certified educators” and, as Mr. Keo understands, do not
harbor a long-term commitment to the public education system like he and the school’s
teachers. In “the game” that Mr. Keo and the partners play, they partners offer resources
to the school and in turn, make the school more alluring. In return, the school bolsters
partners’ engagement data and promotional narratives of helping a school in the midst of
a budget crisis.
As Mr. Keo indicates, he is forced to engage these non-profits because “nobody
will give [him] money to run [his] fucking school.” He and many teachers drew attention
to this irony, that in an era of high-stakes accountability where the absolute consequence
for poor performance was school closure, they, as public educators, were held
accountable for the school’s fate as an institution. Even though they had no control over
the district and state’s decision-making around the parameters and conditions that
produced school failure, they ultimately shouldered the bulk of the responsibility. Yet,
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Mr. Keo and the teachers also relied on non-profit organizations to accomplish this
mission that were accountable to neither them nor the district. “Just passing through”,
most of the organizations had informal agreements with the school and no written
contracts for the kinds of resources that would be exchanged. Not in a position to bargain,
Johnson High remained subject to the whim of the partners’ fluctuating material and
labor commitments. Ms. Betty, an ELL teacher, levels of an extrapolated critique of how
the employment of partners has diminished pressure on the state to properly fund schools.
I’m glad they’re here because we need stuff and Guitars and Hoops and Service
for Salvation have given me supplies, support, and money for fieldtrips. But just
from a purely critical standpoint, that means that the district doesn’t have to do it.
I’m sure that they love all of these people coming in and supporting our schools.
It takes the pressure off of them and they use it as a marketing tool for schools
and for the quality of what’s going on and I resent that. I feel like the state
doesn’t fund us appropriately but they still get the benefit. But it enables them to
cut and cut and I do resent that. It’s a double-edge sword because they hold us to
the same standards whether we have the resources or not. It affects us as a
school if we fail. Are we failing by the standards that I care about? I don’t care if
we fail by PSSA or Keystone standards, but I care if we fail because kids are
getting hurt and they are. (Interview 12/23/13)
Comparing partners to a “double-edge sword”, Ms. Betty captures both the
benefit of their presence as they allow the school to acquire resources to accomplish their
goals, yet simultaneously, “enables [the state] to cut and cut.” She postulates that perhaps
in the absence of the partners, political pressure would mount on the state to properly
fund the district for its activities. In her critique, Ms. Betty refers to partners as a
“marketing tool” and a metric to measure the “quality” of what’s going on, begrudging
the ways in which partners sanitize the politics behind precipitous drops in school
funding that make their presence possible and necessary. Like Mr. Keo, she ties the roots
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of the school’s predicament to a larger district reform strategy to compensate for budget
shortfalls through contracting.
Cucchiara, Gold, and Simon (2011), in their work on marketization in the School
District of Philadelphia thoroughly document the contracting of school management and
curricula to private for-profit and non-profit organizations. They also mention briefly that
district since the mid-2000s began to increasingly look for private sector “partners” to
assist in reform efforts. These partners included local non-profits, universities, and
community organizations. Cucchiara and her colleagues however focused specifically on
the formalization of partners’ work in schools through contracts with the district instead
of informal agreements, and the implications for partners’ to “act independently, voice
criticism, and hold the district accountable” when potentially criticizing the district could
imperil partners’ collaboration with schools (2480). My work at Johnson High and
conversations with administrators at the district level in this political moment suggest a
shift in accountability from the district and the partners that work with schools, to the
schools themselves. Mass budget shortfalls at the district level severely truncated the
oversight of partnerships at the district-level and also compounded school-level pressure
to operate and market one’s school through the resources that partners provided.
Drawing on Adams (2013) work on the moral affect economy of post-Katrina
New Orleans, this void in oversight of partners due to diminished capacity at the districtlevel, opened up a space for the proliferation of private partners to do the work of the
state. I will show in this next section that given these conditions, PPPs enjoyed almost
complete autonomy to define the needs of the school based on their missions as well as
distribute critical resources based on these missions. Such resource distribution initiated a
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cultural politics of recognition for certain student groups, introducing questions around
equity, the invisibility of particular groups of students’ needs, and overall efficacy when
each of the organizations acted in the name of their organization and its constructed
mission, and not necessarily administrators’, teachers’, and students’ voiced needs.
Defining the Problem and Missing the Mark: The College Dreams Case
Though I conducted participant observation in six classrooms, I draw on my more
consistent experiences in one class to explore these tensions. It was part of my agreement
when I came to the school as a hybridized “researcher/tutor” to spend 6th period of every
day helping with this group of students. This class, a group of 18 sophomores, was hand
selected by two teachers who were trained by an appendage program of College Dreams.
The program was supposed to be purchased through a School Improvement Grant (SIG)
and rolled out in middle school for students to prepare them through a specialized
curriculum for postsecondary education. However, in a neighborhood high school like
Johnson High, the implementation of such a program, like many of the programs
provided through the partners, faced many challenges. First, the state did not release the
SIG grant at the beginning of the year due to cuts in staff at the district level stemming
from the budget crisis. The program required the purchase of a $5,000 library and paid
training for a team of teachers that would work closely with these students. Again, due to
mass layoffs and uncertainty hovering in hiring throughout the fall of 2013, selecting a
team of teachers to structure the program became impossible for Mr. Keo.
So while the stability of the school certainly hindered the efficacy of the program,
the real pitfalls of the College Dreams program laid in the one-size-fits all approach to a
narrowly defined problem, an approach that many of the non-profits shared. College
179

Dreams, a program designed to improve postsecondary education matriculation and
persistence rates, framed college access issues among low-income youth as a matter of
skill-based deficiencies and a lack of long-term vision. By targeting those deficiencies
through a curriculum which stressed the acquisition of higher-level “critical thinking”
skills as well as surrounding promising students with other college-bound youth and
trained teachers in every subject, the students could overcome these obstacles and
persevere in their quest for postsecondary education, namely enrollment in 4-year
colleges. The program also incorporated “volunteer” college students as tutors, recruiting
from universities in the area to offer role models to aspiring college goers.
Unfortunately, this program did not align with the nuanced context of the school.
With so few staff and an ongoing budget crisis, the time and resources to recruit a team of
teachers to implement the program were nonexistent. To complicate matters, the students
started the program several years late. Johnson High’s student body was composed of an
amalgam of students coming from a mix of neighborhood, charter, and parochial schools
across the city, most of which did not have the program. Thus, regardless of the district’s
stability, any neighborhood high school administrator would struggle to maintain the
cohort continuity from middle school to high school. Finally, Johnson High’s ethnic and
linguistic diversity made the curriculum of the program almost impossible to implement.
The curriculum was predicated on a high degree of English fluency as well as literacy.
The two teachers, Ms. Allard and Ms. London, designated to recruit students and oversee
the program, admitted that did not receive enough applications to field a class, and, from
the applications they did receive, very few students in the school were adequately
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prepared to handle the curriculum (Fieldnote, 11/16/13). In addition, the school’s lack of
proximity to a major university made the recruitment and maintenance of tutors difficult.
These issues converged particularly around “the tutorial”, or the break out of
small groups of four students to go over their assignments and present confusing material
to be solved by the group. Since the program administrators were unable to arrange for
consistent tutors, the teacher and myself struggled to go between groups to facilitate the
tutorial. Below is an extended fieldnote describing a typical tutorial class in late
February.
From there I sat with one of the groups of all ELL students to complete the
tutorial. Most of the kids couldn’t understand one another and were straining to
decipher through the accent. They couldn’t take notes because they couldn’t make
out the words. Most of the tutorials either were incomplete. Even I couldn’t
answer their questions about the layout of the tutorial worksheet. Ms. Allard
confided in me at the end of the class, “Even I don’t understand this stuff, so I
don’t know how they’re supposed to. The head of the program at the district told
me that this has been a mess in the city schools because nobody can afford to pay
for it or be trained to teach it. This also wasn’t designed for a school that is
majority ELL.” We finally found out today that the tutors will not be coming at all
this year because their class schedules changed and the commute was too difficult
to swing. (Fieldnote, 2/20/14)
In the fieldnote I highlight a range of issues with partner programming which I will
address more in depth in the coming sections. However, College Dreams’ incompatibility
with the school-level context drove its implementation troubles. Most of the students in
the class struggled with basic literacy and English, therefore regardless of how much the
teacher modified the curriculum, most could not access the program’s sophisticated
academic language. Ms. Betty, confided:
Most of these partners’ programming is bullshit. Everybody is drinking the KoolAid trying to get kids into college, but there’s no reading specialist to figure out
why my kid can’t spell dog. They aren’t looking at the cold hard reality: our kids
can’t read. They expect that a non-profit intervention will get these kids from
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point A to point Z. Most of these kids can’t write a coherent sentence and nobody
wants to have those hard conversations about why. This is about illiteracy but
nobody wants to fund that. (Fieldnote, 10/14/13)
Ms. Betty points to a glaring discrepancy between the design and intent of partners’
programming, particularly those pushing college, and the unique needs of the student
body. With so many first-generation immigrant students, many of whom had interrupted
educational backgrounds (e.g. refugee and undocumented youth), the program did not
address their actual needs. This discrepancy also points to how organizations’ oftentimes
operate on a blanket definition of a social problem from which they generalize and scale
their efforts without taking context into account.
Moral Dilemmas of Partner Work
The coordinators of College Dreams, one who offered full-time counseling in the
school, Mr. Lytle, and the other who coordinated tutors part-time district-wide, Ms.
Collie, both admitted that oftentimes they felt a severe disjuncture between the mission of
their organizations and the needs of the school. With so many ELL students and students
labeled as having learning disabilities and behavior issues in the school, they felt their
top-down organizational mandates did not map well onto the students’ needs as well as
the school’s ability to support their program with matching resources.
College Dreams does function predominantly in neighborhood public schools.
They haven’t had much success in Philly, but I think it would do well in our more
selective schools that have more advanced kids. I mean, they still need support,
but the program is better suited for those kinds of students, and there’s a little bit
less crisis in those schools. If you have crisis, then you need more funding, which
this school doesn’t have. (Interview, 3/6/14)
Her testimony highlights not only the mismatch between the program’s curriculum and
the needs of the students, but also the debilitating effects that the school’s overcrowded,
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understaffed condition have on the full implementation of their programming. Without
time and resources, the principal could not afford to train the team of teachers it would
require to carry out this program with fidelity.
Because of these mismatches between top-down mandates and the school’s
nuanced needs, partner staff often experienced moral dilemmas over the purpose and
efficacy of their work. Sitting in one day at the end of AY 2013-2014 with Mr. Lytle in
his office, I observed him as helped one of the school’s best students, a first-generation
Mexican senior, Juan, navigate a financial aid portal for a Pennsylvania State branch
campus. Living with an aunt while his parents remained in Mexico, Juan saw a $20,000
differential in the cost of the school and the financial aid he received. Mr. Lytle explained
the difference between the subsidized and unsubsidized loans, already part of the
package. Juan replied, “I don’t think I can afford this even with the scholarships that I
applied for. Most of them are only $300 for one year.” Mr. Lytle responded, “You, my
friend, are learning what so many students who want to go to Penn State are learning: it
just ain’t cheap” (Fieldnote, 4/2/14). Of all of the Latino students, Juan was one of few
that had his citizenship, had scored high on several AP exams, and was extremely
motivated to apply for scholarships in order to pursue his dream of becoming an electrical
engineer. However, at the end of the day, Mr. Lytle could not guarantee that funds would
come through to support his postsecondary education.
Between cutbacks and the state and federal levels for Pell grants that created
situations like Juan’s, and the myriad of other financial, logistical, psycho-emotional
issues that arose throughout AY 2013-2014 for immigrant and native-born students alike,
Mr. Lytle admitted that within the senior class, the cohort selected by College Dreams to
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receive his services, most of the students would not be going to 4 year colleges. Having
been responsible for following this group of students for three years of high school, he
lamented on the unforeseen difficulties.
I expected much higher rates of kids going to 4-year colleges. It felt like there
were so many challenges with this school that I was just figuring out as I went
along. When they chose this school, they were looking at schools with primarily
low graduation rates and low college attendance. That was it. But they didn’t
really understand the reasons perhaps why this was happening that were outside
of the school’s control. The immigration status and FAFSA forms were two of the
biggest issues. We have kids who are undocumented here who don’t get any
financial aid. There is a glass ceiling for them. I bring these issues to the
spokesperson for College Dreams and he’s like, “Hmm, that’s tough. I guess there
just aren’t a lot of options for them, or here are what the limited ones are.” What
was really eye-opening was going through their forms and seeing some of the
parents’ incomes. You know that people are low-income but you’re not exactly
sure what that means. Some of these kids have one parent making something in
the low teens. There’s also special ed. and the Success Academy that I haven’t
really touched at all. I just didn’t have time and also, even if I did, didn’t know
how if they could barely graduate. I was spread so thin. There was just so much
that we had no idea about. (Fieldnote, 5/12/14)
Acting on behalf of his organization’s mission, to increase college admission rates
through heavy investments in information, college trips, workshops, and counseling, Mr.
Lytle committed three years of his life to a group of 160 students. With only 34
matriculating to four-year schools at the end of his tenure with College Dreams, he
doubted the overall efficacy of a program that failed to consider factors beyond the scope
of both the school and program’s control: immigration status, access to financial aid,
poverty, and a severe lack of preparation. While the Latino population only comprised 12
percent of the student body, lacking social security numbers barred many of the higherachieving Latino seniors from the financial aid application. Also, with so many “special
ed” and Success Academy students missing necessary credits in the senior class, Mr.
Lytle admitted that they weren’t “really touched at all” as meeting the needs of students
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that might actually qualify already “spread [him] so thin”. Exhausted and melancholy by
May, this jaded idealist wrestled with his conscience, trying to make sense of his
relationships with these students and the impact his work had on their lives.
The Quest for “Meaning” amidst Instability
Like many of the partner staff working the school, Mr. Lytle questioned the
underlying assumptions of his organization: assumptions that narrowly constructed the
problem and therefore their interventions in ways that did not heed the major issues that
prevented children from accessing postsecondary education: poverty, language, and
preparation. These moral dilemmas arose frequently among these partner staff as many
were underpaid and overworked, accepting contingent contracts without full-time
benefits. They felt that “making a difference” in the lives of these students could
compensate for the insecurity of their labor. Mr. Drew, the 31 year old, white, male
coordinator of Guitars and Hoops, explained his arrangements with his organization.
My job description says that I’m supposed to come and show up as a group leader
at 2 and leave by 6. However, I come in from like 12 to 6, sometimes earlier. I
design all of my programs and 100 percent of the recruiting. I work with
administrative staff here, do payroll, lesson plans, sit in partner meetings,
community events, um, whatever is pretty much asked of me. I mean, they’ve
been talking about it for three years to bring me on for full time and benefits but it
hasn’t really worked out. I do work 40+ hours a week a lot, even though I’m only
part-time. Thank god I’m healthy because I don’t get health insurance.
Sometimes the grants fall through and the full-time thing doesn’t work out, but I
actually enjoy my job because I get to work with kids and make a difference in
their lives. As long as you make the best of it and there’s some money, then you’ll
always do successfully in this business. (Interview, 1/30/14)
While Mr. Drew’s organization was one of the more stable partners with the school, his
testimony captures a theme running through these positions: high degrees of
unrecognized labor and insecurity. Comparable to the teachers’ discussing the escalated
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significance of affective rewards in their work (Chapter 4), the professional insecurity
that partner staff endured was offset by their perceptions of “impact” on the students they
worked with. To reiterate, “making a difference” atoned for the mounting responsibilities
amidst inadequate compensation and few pathways to promotion.
However, for many staff, this insecurity wore on them as they began making
commitments in their personal lives. Almost all of the partner staff worked for
organizations that operated from a mix of public and philanthropic-corporate grants,
though usually more of the latter. The impending threat of a layoff at the end of a grant
cycle scared many struggling to support families, mortgages, and crushing student loan
debt. With a master’s degree in educational policy, Ms. Shore, the coordinator of the
partner meetings and an employee of Guitars and Hoops, faced a heavy predicament as
the grant supporting her approached its end. Not knowing whether it would be renewed
or that she would be out of a position, she described her difficulty in remaining
committed to her chosen work.
I’m nervous because I’m going to need a job in June possibly. I’m not
complaining, but the personal piece of this is that it’s a non-profit and it’s not like
I’m making a ton of money anyway. I mean, I have a master’s from an Ivy
League school and an undergrad degree in mathematics and now I have to figure
out how to market what I do to funders so that either someone will fund me now
or possibly hire me down the line. Part of me is constantly looking to see what
other opportunities are there, but then I’m with these kids and part of this great
school, and I’m like, wow, I want to continue to do this. For me, personally, that
internal battle is always there. (Interview, 5/28/14)
As the AY 2013-2014 wound down, Ms. Shore’s struggle to balance what she
perceived as meaningful work with the perpetual uncertainty of her position mirrored
became a prominent topic in my unstructured interviews with partner staff. Yet these
conversations differed slightly from those with teachers and administrators in that this
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group of partner staff, though clearly worried about the future, understood job instability
as par for the course, a permanent feature of grant-funded non-profit work. Ms. Shore
claims that she’s “not complaining” but that questions whether her credentials that might
serve her better in another industry, one which potentially would not induce as much
anxiety about her career’s direction. Ms. Shore fought her reconcile her urge to be treated
as young professional with promising career but also to pursue her ideals through her
organization. The precarity that Ms. Shore experienced also suggests a lack of investment
that these organizations encourage as their staff must continuously hedge their bets on
other opportunities that might be more stable. This lack of investment raises questions
about the sustainability of PPPs as core service providers, as their instability creates a
contingent, insecure workforce that cannot afford to remain committed to their
organizations’ work.
Equity in Service Provision?
The moral dilemmas of partner work lay in the production of meaning within a
zone of professional precarity. Negotiating tensions between mandates of their
organization, their commitments to the youth they served, and pressures in their personal
lives, these partners worked tirelessly to provide opportunities for students in the face of
the budget-cut imposed tumult of the AY 2013-2014 school year. They collaborated with
teachers on planning field-trips, offered after-school programming that would not have
been there otherwise, and went beyond their job descriptions to act as security guards and
lunch monitors to stymie the chaos in the hallways and cafeteria. In other words, they
were an undeniable factor in keeping Johnson High afloat, and, in spite of criticisms, the
teachers and administration were largely grateful for their presence.
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Yet the crisis-induced “need” for partners to fill resource and labor gaps
introduced a set of paradoxes that the principal felt was both troubling and unavoidable.
First, though the partners were operating as core service providers, the partners’ ultimate
allegiances were to their organizations, their funders, and not Johnson High. Second, as
the school relied on these organizations to provide essential services for a school
designed to serve all students, the partners, by their very design, targeted selected, limited
groups of students. Therefore, questions of equity in partner resource distribution
surfaced as the partners rallied around particular categories of students to target for
services and largely neglected others.15
“Refugee Porn” and The Marketable Immigrant
Of the five organizations I followed, Service for Salvation, Guitars and Hoops,
and Career Ready all had “open access” or allowed any student in the school to sign up.
College Dreams and Refugee Aid worked with students that met particular criteria. In the
case of College Dreams, the coordinator only offered services to the senior class while
Refugee Aid solely targeted first-generation immigrant students whose parents worked
with raw food products. Of the five organizations, all, with the exception of Service for
Salvation, had limited slots available. Many of them operated on a first come, first serve
basis, interested in both raw participation numbers as well as recruiting particular kinds
of students that they felt would be demonstrate the “impact” of their program. Thus, the
composition of a partner’s served population hinged equally on these criteria, leaving
partner staff some leeway to recruit students and target them for services.

15

Mr. Lytle testimony in the previous section somewhat alludes to this problem, as he admitted that large
proportions of the senior class, an already restricted group, went untouched by his services.
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The skewed provision of resources to first generation Asian students, namely
refugee students, arose as a point of contention throughout the year. As I mentioned in
the Chapter 2, Johnson High was home to a large number of recently resettled refugee
students, specifically ethnic minorities from Bhutan and Burma. It was actually through
my preliminary fieldwork these students in their communities through Refugee Aid that I
found myself at Johnson High.16 I initially assumed when I followed these youth into the
school that they would not be recognized as refugees and that other categories of racial
and linguistic difference would replace the category (i.e. Asian, ELL, immigrant).
Though these latter categories did matter, particularly in terms of how teachers
processed and acted upon them, it surprised me that refugee youth received the most
support in the school in terms of non-profit services. Bhutanese and Burmese students
constituted ninety-eight percept of Refugee Aid’s caseload in AY 2013-2014, therefore
qualifying these students for access to five part-time staff that interfaced with teachers
and administrators over their issues, after-school homework help, home visits, and a
Saturday program that provided supplemental English classes to themselves and their
parents. While the disproportionate enrollment of these students wasn’t problematic in
isolation, the fact that the school did not have a counselor to serve the entire study body
in September of 2013, complicated the question of equity as the school continued to rely
on partners like Refugee Aid to selectively fill in service and resource gaps.
Its qualifying criteria and funders, a mix of federal and philanthropic grants
legally bound Refugee Aid to only serve students whose parents worked with raw food
products. For refugees coming to Philadelphia to work in meatpacking and produce
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packaging factories, this meant that their children were able to participate and benefit
from the program. The coordinators at Refugee Aid always voiced that the stipulations of
their federal grants limited their work to students that fit this criteria. Further, they also
felt the need to market themselves to private funders as public funds for the programming
became increasingly unavailable. When discussing how the refugee category affected the
ways in which their organization marketed itself to funders and collaborating
organizations, Ms. Kraft, the assistant program director, explained the power of the
category.
Well I think the problem is that everyone wants to help a refugee. Ya know, who
doesn’t want to help a refugee? You know what I mean? So a lot of funders and
volunteers come to us because it’s like shooting fish in a barrel. I mean, you see it
on TV all the time and there are all of those commercials that have like kids with
the flies on their faces and if people say, “Oh, I help refugees,” then people
always think they’re so great. Honestly, it helps us to have refugees in our
program (Interview, 1/14/14)
To describe the affective cache of the category in attracting funders and volunteers, Ms.
Kraft deploys the metaphor “like shooting fish in a barrel.” Analogous to the
phenomenon in medical “voluntourism” where companies sell the affective experience of
being the “white savior” (McLennan 2014; Cole 2012), Ms. Kraft believes that having
refugees in the program offers the same experience to funders and volunteers that
contribute money and labor in exchange for “think[ing] they’re so great.” In other words,
Refugee Aid capitalized on affect generated by the global circulation of refugee suffering
and white humanitarianism rampant in media portrayals of the Global South, mobilizing
energy and resources to support their organization’s mission.
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Another program coordinator at Refugee Aid struggled not only with his
organization, the multitude of other organizations at the city and neighborhood levels that
used refugees as a way to garner support.
Mr. Michaels: People see the word “refugee” and they want to help and donate.
Nonprofits are really good at selling that for grants and it’s definitely a dichotomy
that I struggle with. I hate selling people this picture of helping “poor refugees.”
They’re good people and they need help just like a lot of other groups who need
help, but I think with non-profits needing funding, they need to like sell the sobstory and be like, “Look at these persecuted refugees that we’re helping.” I don’t
know if I ever told you this before, but some of the staff at [my old organization],
well, they would tell these like extreme refugee stories to get money. We would
call it “refugee porn” like where these non-profits are one-upping each other with
one more fucked up story after another. We’re all drawn to those extreme stories
but I think that’s one of the biggest problems is that people care about the
“refugee” but there’s less compassion for an undocumented person. I think that
[our organization] doesn’t do that good of a job at bringing all of those people in
because we’re just so busy with our different programs out looking for donations
and funding. People aren’t as drawn in when you say you’re helping immigrants
in Philly, but if paint this story like, “Oh, they’re brand new! And they’re from
Bhutan! And they wear these colorful clothes! And they’re refugees!” People like
eat that up. They love that. People get recognized for extreme stories but not just
for the mundane, regular, difficult needs in their lives. (Interview, 1/23/14)
Mr. Michaels points to a critical issue of the marketization of particular categories of
students to perpetuate the organization and the moral dilemmas that arise from that. If
Refugee Aid worked in a well-funded school and provided supplemental services to
refugee youth specifically, the issue of equitable resource distribution would be less
convoluted because the underlying assumption is that school-provided supports (i.e.
counselors, reading specialists, classroom aids) for all students exist. But as organizations
like Refugee Aid bring resources selectively into a school without those supports, Mr.
Michaels highlights there are dangers to relying on partners that must market themselves
in specific ways to survive. Serving refugee youth was not only part of their mandate, but
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also advantageous as it enabled them to entice exploit the affective power of the refugee
category in the philanthropic world to garner more funding.
Invisible Immigrants
The issue of selective service provision that Mr. Michaels discussed in his
interview played out throughout the year, raising red flags among teachers and staff that
felt both critical of partners but also grateful for their support. In an after-school meeting
one day among several teachers and the Service for Salvation coordinator, Ms. Crowley,
these tensions peppered the conversation. Ms. Crowley wanted to elicit feedback, ideas,
and commitments from teachers to help her put on a school-wide service day where she
could reach her “engagement goals” for the year and spend the money allocated for larger
events. Distributing sheets around the room with pie charts and bar graphs of the number
of students and hours of service logged, Ms. Crowley told the teachers that she was
mandated to “touch” at least 150 students through this event (Fieldnote, 3/19/14). As she
described her vision for the day, a combination of speakers coming into the auditorium
and excursions into the neighborhood to do park cleanups, the teachers scrunched their
faces in concern, voicing worries over overcrowding in the auditorium, having the right
number of chaperones, being responsible for collecting permission slips, and what to do
with the kids that would inevitably not turn theirs in. Proposing alternative ideas, like
smaller service projects for specific grades, Ms. Crowley interrupted them one by one,
citing the need to reach her “engagement goals” through a school-wide service day. “I
have to hit 150 students. I have no choice. That’s how I have to spend this money.”
Uncomfortable with silence in the room, Ms. Crowley ended the meeting by thanking the
teachers for their input. Following the meeting, Ms. Betty and Ms. London hung behind.
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Ms. Betty: I don’t know about these programs sometimes. Only the kids who can
actually do stuff after-school and on weekends can participate in these. All of the
kids from Central America have to work. Maybe she should ask why her
“engagement” data doesn’t always look so good.
Ms. London: Yes, I know, the refugee category is so political. These kids from
Honduras are refugees and aren’t recognized as such and it makes all the
difference in the world in terms of what kind of an education they get with all of
these partners here. The Burmese and Bhutanese have support services from
Refugee Aid and all of these organizations because they fit that category.”
(Fieldnote, 3/19/14)
The strain of the meeting over the issue of the service day and the exchange between Ms.
Betty and Ms. London highlight the obfuscating effects of partners’ data pressures as well
as the invisibility of particular kinds of student needs within this economy of partner
programming. Again, with mandates to meet specific benchmarks of “impact” like Ms.
Crowley’s “engagement goals”, coordinators oftentimes did not pay attention to the input
of teachers and staff. As the 8 teachers attempted to give Ms. Crowley input, she
eschewed their ideas by citing her lack of “choice” in manipulating the top-down
directives of the event. This issue arose often in collaborations between partner staff,
teachers, and administrators, as partners would be broached to use resources beyond the
‘scope’ of their organization’s mission.
Ms. Betty and Ms. London also point to how a singular focus on these top-down
directives conflict with questions of accessibility and need. Ms. Betty underscores the
lack of support for Latino students, specifically those from parts of Central America that
fled violence and poverty, and entered the U.S. without supports, oftentimes as
undocumented, unaccompanied minors. The school experienced, like many districts
across the U.S. in AY 2013-2014, a spike in students from Central American countries.
Many of the students were living in homes with cousins or siblings and oftentimes had no
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running water, or electricity. Though this trend culminated in a national state of
emergency in April of 2014 (Children on the Run 2014), teachers in the building
experienced a heightened consciousness of this issue as students would broach them with
their personal issues and ask for help.
Overwhelmed by the need and with nobody to turn to, the teachers voiced
criticisms of partner programming that did not take into account perhaps why only
specific kinds of students were attending their programming, or were legitimizing certain
forms of suffering and immigrant categories over others (i.e. refugees). Complaining one
day about a mural arts project introduced by one of the partners to the students in her
class, Ms. Betty boiled over.
[yelling] There are all of these issues in the Latino community like pregnancy,
immigration status, extreme poverty, and this woman is painting murals. She has
a degree in Fine Arts and that’s awesome that she painted murals in Ecuador, but
is that really what the community needs? I see this all over the place and it drives
me nuts. They wanted these kids to stay after school to paint murals, but if they
knew anything about undocumented kids, they would realize that they have
restaurant jobs to run to after-school. How can you be that out of touch? They
want everyone to go to college without realizing that there is a glass ceiling for
the undocumented kids. The refugees and documented Asian immigrants get
everything, all of the volunteers and non-profits in the world, but there’s nothing
to be done for the undocumented kids. They’re invisible. (Fieldnote, 4/24/14)
As more and more mental health issues arose amongst the Central American and
undocumented Mexican students in the school, oftentimes resulting from trauma crossing
the border or spiraling home finance situations, teachers like Ms. Betty searched for
partners that might be able to help address these problems. At these junctures the line
between researcher, advocate, and social worker blurred for me as much as the teachers.
As I sought out other organizations doing mental health work under the advisory of
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several of Refugee Aid’s caseworkers, their staff advised me to attend a neighborhoodlevel school partners meeting where I might make some connections.
At a meeting in June 2014, I met a social worker that had established a storefront
mental clinic in the neighborhood. When I asked her which populations she worked with,
she responded, “I work mainly with Burmese and Bhutanese refugees. We are actually
expanding our program at Johnson High next year. I’ve just met with the principal to
discuss possibilities of doing pull-out therapy with those kids.” I asked her whether she
would have flexibility to work with undocumented Central American and Mexican
students. The social worker politely declined, “I know, I would like to, but nobody will
give me money to do that.” (Fieldnote, 6/2/14).
These two instances point to a central issue among all partners – that their funding
streams, mission, and structure induced a top-down approach to managing the socioemotional and academic issues. Instead of performing needs’ assessments or doing due
diligence and research on the needs to the school, PPPs staff and leadership of PPPs
consistently looked to fit the square-pegs of their work into oftentimes the round holes of
the school’s and student body’s wants. This uneven mapping of missions onto the needs’
geography resulted in a mismatch, rendering essential needs and opportunities of many
students invisible.
Unmarketable Minorities: The Marginalization of the Native-Born
Like the strategy to enroll Asian students, the strategy to employ partners to save
the school mobilized staff and students around particular categories of racial, ethnic, and
political difference to both statistically and affectively brand the school as one deserving
of staying open. However, also like the first strategy, the second marginalized native195

born students as partners also funneled resources toward students that they felt would
demonstrate the most “impact” and market themselves to future funders. I described the
affective dimensions of the refugee category in the distribution of partner resources in the
previous section, a within-group analysis resource distribution among ELL students.
However, teachers also noticed large rifts between attention paid by partners to ELL or
“immigrant” and “American” or “urban” students.
Mr. Cassidy: We used to have more stuff for everyone, but we don’t anymore. I
mean, there are some American kids that benefit, but I do think the ELL kids
dominate these non-profits. The American kids don’t want to participate because
they might be treated differently ‘cause technically, the ELL kids are nicer right?
They do target the more Asian nationalities and it takes away from the American
students. I get the sense that they feel that. We preach diversity but we’re not
diverse. The partners too, they’re like, the ELL kids are nice kids so why am I
going to take a chance on an African-American kid who’s questionable? I’m
going to have to deal with his attitude or something when I could just have this
nice Bhutanese kid that I can just teach guitar to. See? (Interview, 3/28/14)
Mr. Cassidy underlines not only the affective dimension of partner resource provision, or
partner preferences for servicing ELL students because they believed they were “nicer,”
but also the ways in which the snowball effect of partners focusing on ELL students
created feelings of exclusion among native-born students. Teachers and partners alike
said that even when they noticed skewed enrollments of first-generation immigrant
students, most of Asian descent, they did not always know how to address the disparity or
have time to address it given the many demands on their time.
When I asked Mr. Keo in an interview whether he noticed partners’
disproportional enrollment of Asian ELL students in their programming, he admitted that
it was a problem, but not one that he was in the position to fix because he needed the
partners so desperately.
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Race still matters a lot here. Guitars and Hoops has mostly Asian kids with no
black kids. I’m aware of it but having them is better than having nothing. There’s
definitely some friction between the Black and Asian kids but I don’t know it’s
about race or whether it’s just kids being kids, you now, the boys trying to act up
to defend their manhood. For the most part, we speak 24 different languages here
but all manage get along which is one of the highlights n this school and
something I take pride in. It’s a neighborhood high school, but the race issue with
the partners is something that I can’t seem to touch on, but I’ve seen it for years. I
don’t know whether the Black kids don’t feel comfortable joining in or that they
see no value in these extra programs. The Asian kids, they value their education
and take advantage of it. (Interview, 5/14)
Teachers that saw the skewed enrollment of Asian students in partner programming as
indicative of greater “care” for their education, felt similarly to Mr. Keo that they could
not disentangle native-born students’ feelings of discomfort from those of academic
complacency. Even if they could, they did not feel much control in terms of changing the
social dynamics of partners’ programming. At the end of the day, “having [the partners
was] better than having nothing,” as Mr. Keo claimed.
Partner self-criticism textured my conversations with partners concerned that they
were potentially exacerbating social rifts between ELL and native-born, mostly Black
students. Service for Salvation tried to atone for these rifts by facilitating a tutoring
exchange between College Dreams’ students and a rudimentary level ELL class.
However, many admitted that the draw of working in a school like Johnson High was the
“immigrant hope” that fueled participation in their programs. A high-level administrator
overseeing the implementation of the College Dreams program described the advantage
of partnering with schools with lower percentages of “American” students.
Ms. Tolentine: The most refreshing part about working in this school with more
immigrants is that there’s a level of hope and focus that’s different than other
schools with multi-generational poverty in that those kids don’t see that education
is going to make a difference. They don’t see that there’s something—if I work
hard, something will shift. So like at a school with lots of native-born students,
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like it’s a harder sell in some ways because the immigrant kids are like, “Oh
we’re going to college.” (Interview, 3/21/14)
Engaging in the same “market-speak” that many of the partners often used in community
meetings, Ms. Tolentine explains that part of working as a partner is “selling” the idea of
social mobility through education to children. In order for one’s program to have the kind
of “impact”, measured usually through attendance, hours of participation, and ultimately
graduation and college admission rates, each program had to attain a level of “buy-in.”
While Louie (2012) referred to this phenomenon as the “immigrant bargain” or
first-generation immigrant youths’ attempt to recompense their parents’ sacrifices by
making it to college, I see this “immigrant hope” as being somewhat different. Many of
the first-generation students that attended Johnson High did not have the language,
foundational skills, or means to pursue higher education. However, this was often not of
interest to the partners who oftentimes cared about attracting hard numbers and the
marketing of individual success stories to funders. It was this buy-in to their program that
they desired more than longer-term outcomes in terms of college admission rates. In this
case, the partners traded on “immigrant hope,” a kind of currency in a funding climate
where programs lived and died by the sword of evidence-based “impact.” Such a trade
exacted a value from first generation immigrant students, namely refugee youth, which
increased their value as organizations in the grant-funding marketplace. However,
partners framed native-born students that lacked the “buy-in” discussed by Ms. Tolentine,
as disinterested and not worth the investment of their time, energy, and organization’s
funding.
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A Sustainable Strategy?
By the end of the 2014, three of the five major partners in the school pulled their
programs. College Dreams’ largest grant elapsed and Career Ready decided to implement
a new model where they would be consolidating their resources and crowding them in
just a few high schools (Fieldnote, 3/12/14). Service for Salvation’s national office
announced that they could not develop an enduring, self-sufficient funding plan in
Philadelphia and therefore had to pull out (Recording, 12/13/14). With their pullout, the
school lost four full-time staff, one of which served as a counselor for the entire senior
class, funds for college trips, financial aid workshops, internship opportunities, and
political capital in a district that had declared “partnerships” as a key reform strategy in
its Action Plan 2.0, a document outlining the direction of district policies. Career Ready’s
instability was not unprecedented, as they had promised funds for a new biomedical
program and donated lab renovation years before and had lost their grant (Interview,
3/19/14). The principal and collaborating teacher of Career Ready both were disappointed
but not surprised by the retracted commitment to the school.
Mr. Cassidy: I mean, when we first started, we had three different career track
programs and it was really positive. The staffers designated for each program
were here all of the time, we had tons of trips. But ya know, that was the high
time and of course you have the low times with the budget crisis and all of that.
They lose money too because they’re a non-profit and businesses aren’t putting as
much money in so the first three years were great and then funding started
stopping around 2010. I mean, yah, I was in hog heaven. Anything I asked for I
got from them, which was great. It’s not that way anymore, and now they’re gone
for good just like that. (Interview, 3/19/14)
With the pullout of the Career Ready and College Dreams, many of the teachers worried
about their students and what kinds of resources they would need to attract to fill the void
left. At community partner meetings in the last two months of school, Mr. Keo would
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approach the partners, desperately asking whether they could pick up slack. While some
partners obliged his entreaties, oftentimes an awkward silence permeated the room, many
partners reluctant to commit more resources to objectives outside the scope of their
mission. The coordinator of Service for Salvation, Ms. Crowley, one day in May,
frustrated with having had to play a “security guard” throughout the year and play a role
on disciplinary committees, finally broke down. “I’m sorry, Mr. Keo, but I can’t use my
organization’s money and time to do all of these things that you ask of us.” At the
meetings conclusion, I conducted an interview with a coordinator of Guitars and Hoops
that had take it upon herself to run these meetings. Exasperated and despondent, she
vented to me.
Ms. Shore: I think that’s where I get to that point where I’m like, jeez, how is this
helpful? It’s such a difficult thing because when you market a program, you want
something quick and concise and simple, but those are just Band-Aids. It doesn’t
really get to the real issues. It’s not systemic. We can’t always do the things he
asks of us and even if we could, is that really our responsibility? (Interview,
5/28/14)
Ms. Shore’s questions about employing partners as a strategy to combat resource scarcity
in the school highlights another problem, the moral dilemmas that arise from perpetual
“mission slip” as new and old partners come and go. Calling the partners “Band-Aids”,
she is uncertain of the sustainability of leaning heavily on partners that are inherently
unstable and subject to fluctuations in grant cycles and the whims of the market. Partners
made no bones about their missions and the objectives of their programming. They were
accountable to their funders and evaluation measures before the needs of the school.
However, as the crisis deepened and Mr. Keo became more desperate, their role as core
service providers raised questions about the limits of their work and whether they could,
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in good conscience, eschew their organization’s priorities in favor of attending to the
immediate needs of the school.
A Slippery Slope: Internal Privatization and Paranoia
In the second half of the year, partners’ relationships with students, families and
other institutions, particularly charter schools, posed further questions about whether the
“agendas” of the partners actually aligned with the school’s interests. Earlier in the
chapter, Mr. Brown, the former principal, discussed the importance of selectivity in
allowing partners into the building, explaining that partners may have ulterior motives.
With the expansion of charter schools in the district in the previous years and the mass
closure of district schools in May 2013, many teachers voiced a criticism that private
partners, while necessary in the context of the budget crisis and harsh school performance
evaluation system, introduced a dangerous encroachment of the private sector on a public
institution.
Mr. Wood: I think people are fine with marketing ourselves to private funding
sources as long as it’s happening the way is now. If more community partners
came and wanted to help out, of course we would say yes. What you fear the most
is someone going to come in and say, “We’re going to make this the Beautiful
Sunshine Academy and turn it into a charter school because we have this other
model that we think works better.” Now you’re out. Especially when you look at
the growing number of seats that have been turned over to charter schools, and the
shrinking numbers of seats in public schools, the bottom line is with the charter
schools, there’s private money flowing through there, and private money serves
itself, not the students. Partners also serve themselves before they serve us
(Interview 3/5/14)
Many teachers, like Mr. Wood, drew parallels between the private nature of partners and
the private nature of charter schools, fearful of the slippery slope of forfeiting too much
control and power to private entities. Mr. Wood warns that “private money serves itself”
and that partners also “serve themselves before they serve [the school]. Concerned about
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the overall survival of Johnson High, his anecdote highlights the contradiction between
resisting the ultimate consequence of neoliberal education policies, closure, through
partners, while also engaging private entities, the perceived root of the closure threat.
Pigeon-holed and feeling a lack of choice, Mr. Keo proceeded throughout the near
to nurture relationships with the partners and integrate them into the school community.
However, a series of events beginning in January heightened paranoia that the partners
might actually be subverting the school’s survival strategies, rather than bolstering them.
In several Facebook posts of Burmese refugee students, I came to learn that many had
applied to a large charter high school in the same neighborhood and had been accepted
(Field note 1/6/14). These students had received application assistance from Refugee Aid
and their staff, specifically a prominent Burmese staff member that had cultivated a
strong relationship with an ELL teacher there. As a long-time tutor and volunteer with
Refugee Aid, I consulted another staff member about these students, questioning whether
they, as an organization, supported charter school applications. Ms. Kraft, the co-director,
explained the predicament.
I mean, it doesn’t matter if it’s a charter school or a public school. Whoever has
our students, we’ll work with them. I mean, the charter schools are pulling our
good kids and the parents think the schools are safer and have better staff to
student ratios. If our students want to go to charter schools, we support them. A
lot of the Burmese and Bhutanese have applied. Actually, most of them, because
the word on the street is that [Mastery] Charter School is the best. One of our
Burmese-speaking staff is a huge proponent and now everyone is drinking the
Kool-Aid. I mean, not many of the high school kids will get in because they want
the little ones that will move through their programs. But if someone drops,
they’re might be free spaces. (Interview, 1/14/14)
As Ms. Kraft highlights, their allegiance is to the students they serve and not to Johnson
High.
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As the semester wore on, several teachers and Mr. Keo got wind that staff at
Refugee Aid were deliberately enrolling their high-achieving refugee students at a local
charter school. A confrontation ensued where Mr. Keo called a co-director at Refugee
Aid and accused the organization of undermining the standing of the school and
imperiling its numbers. He also accused the staff of “brainwashing” vulnerable refugee
parents into thinking that a charter school would serve them better. Indignant and
offended, a series of heated emailed exchanges ensued, Mr. Keo drawing support from a
vocal ELL teacher, Ms. Betty, and the part-time bilingual counselor responsible for
corresponding and translating for Burmese families, and the staff of Refugee Aid. In a
conference between his staff and those of Refugee Aid, Mr. Keo’s anger boiled over.
I have little control over what you people do and how your missions contribute to
what’s happening here academically. I have no choice but to let you come in here,
and so I opt to trust you because what’s the alternative? Having nobody? I
assume you are the lesser of two evils, but then you go and do something like this,
help these people poach my students. What am I supposed to think? (Fieldnote,
4/29/13)
Refugee Aid staff, fearful that they would lose their standing in the school, insisted that
they respected Johnson High’s ELL program and encouraged their students to come
enroll there. They assured Mr. Keo and Ms. Betty that the scale of the impact was small
and that the majority of the students probably would not be accepted anyway. Mr.
Michaels, a case manager, assured him,
As you know, we are always encouraging our students to go to Johnson, largely
because of the support and dedication they received from you and other excellent
teachers and staff. We just want our advanced students to have more
opportunities. We don’t want to deny them those opportunities if a charter school
and not a neighborhood school is able to provide them. As an organization, we
have to support what’s best for the students” (Email Correspondence, 4/28/14).
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However, independent consultations with each camp following the confrontation
revealed a deep level of mistrust and uneasiness. My conversation with Ms. Betty and
Mr. Keo after the Refugee Aid staff left the main office was fraught with anger and moral
dilemma.
Mr. Keo: We have charters poaching our good kids here already. There are noneducational institutions popping up left and right. With everybody trying to
compete for that money and students, the ethical piece is thrown out of the
window. For us, it’s more difficult because we are a neighborhood high school,
and as a neighborhood high school we have to take students from all over who the
charter schools don’t want. Having an organization like that who’s willing to
enroll kids in charters under our nose challenges the integrity of our school. We
need our numbers because if we don’t have that number, we close. The good kids
get into the charters, but what happens to the rest of them?
Ms. Betty: [Refugee Aid] is so shady. I don’t think they get it. They keep telling
me that if there are opportunities, then we shouldn’t prevent our good kids from
going, that we can just take the low-level ELL crowd. Well, I take that personally.
Just because we’re a neighborhood school doesn’t mean we’re a bad school. I
told them that these schools aren’t going to take the [names of three low Englishlevel Burmese students], that they want the quiet, high achieving [names of three
high-level Burmese students]. So what happens to them when our school closes?
Where do they go? Do they get warehoused somewhere where they won’t be part
of a community or acknowledged for who they are? I’m an invested teacher and I
think it’s fucked up when you use our school for your program and then you
undermine my livelihood and hope by taking my kids away from me. We have so
little hope already so this feels like an assault [crying]…like we’re being used and
dumped because we’re not good enough. The partners don’t see our fate wrapped
up in this seemingly innocent act, that when they close schools like us, charters
open in our place. I don’t think they see it that way because they’re advocating for
a very select group of kids, but what about the rest of the kids that those schools
don’t want? I believe that equitable, nurturing public education is what’s best for
all of our kids, and it’s a serious philosophical difference that we have. (Recorded
Conversation, 4/29/14)
Listening to this conversation was one of my more difficult moments throughout my
fieldwork. I felt caught at the center of an ideological battle where the question over what
was “best for the kids” straddled two camps where I held dear friends. My two years of
prior fieldwork with Refugee Aid, an organization responsible for my entry into the
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neighborhood’s newer refugee communities and ultimately Johnson High, was a result of
working and teaching in their program. Caught in the middle, I was asked to “choose” a
side, between a teacher and principal that I had grown to respect and ache for in their
struggle to keep the school alive, and a partner that did thorough, well-intentioned work
with, what Ms. Betty correctly describes, as a “very select group of kids.”
**************************************
Throughout this chapter I have detailed the pressures that created need for
partnerships – the confluence of an extraordinary budget crisis that intensified the
material needs of the school as well as the expanding education market in Philadelphia
that placed the onus on neighborhood schools to compete with charter schools for
enrollments. In spite of their reservations about partner accountability and their
potentially ulterior motives for being there, both principals and teachers felt they had no
choice but to allow partners to enter the building in order to either replace lost services or
make them a more palatable option for students and families. Returning to my second and
third research questions – aimed at understanding how partners worked in conjunction
with the schools’ other strategies to brand Johnson High as a quality high school –
Johnson High’s administrators, teachers, and staff developed strange bedfellow
relationships with non-profits not just due to austerity but also because of market
pressures to compete with charter schools. Understood as a mechanism to bolster the
school’s reputation in the larger neighborhood and city, Mr. Brown and Mr. Keo forged
partnerships with non-profits that would extend their ability to not only attract great
enrollments but influence people of persuasion by forming relationships with wellconnected individuals at the city-level. If powerful individuals and their organizations by
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extension were making investments in the school, administrators hoped that the district
would be less likely to subject the school to closure.
As the fiscal crisis in the district worsened in the last years of Mr. Brown’s tenure
and the first two years of Mr. Keo’s appointment to principal, partners served a more
practical purpose: plugging their resources into service and material voids left by budget
cuts. Becoming core service providers in the absence of district-funded school supports,
Mr. Keo especially saw partners as the only way to keep Johnson High afloat on an
everyday basis. Partner staff became disciplinarians, hall monitors, chaperones, and
funders of school events and fieldtrips. Further, by bringing in partners that specialized in
serving ELL students, Mr. Keo recognized partners as a means to attract the kinds of
students that would not only strengthen enrollment but also fortify his climate data.
However, this strategy to build the schools’ service capacity through partners was
rife with moral as well as practical dilemmas. College Dreams, a particularly committed
partner, served as a ideal case to examine the chasms between the top-down mission of an
organization and the ways in which mission elided the more nuanced needs of the school
through program’s implementation. Partner staff struggled to reconcile their
organization’s mission and accountability to funding sources with the student’s and larger
school community’s unique needs and personal dilemmas.
Partners, similarly to the administrators and teachers working to build an ELLcentric brand, confronted equity in service provision as their design targeted select group
of students for their programs. Specific categories of student, namely first-generation
refugee youth, triggered an affect that both attracted partnering organizations and allowed
them to frame their work as “impactful” to their funders. As many partners articulated,
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the humanitarian appeal of a refugee cause allowed them to market their missions as
more worthy of philanthropic funding sources, cashing in on the global circulation of
“white saviorism” that they incited humanitarian care for these students. However, these
narrowly constructed targets rendered the needs of other high need populations, namely
the undocumented students and the native-born, invisible. As one partner explains,
undocumented students narratives do not trade as well in the non-profit marketplace as
“refugee porn”, or the horrific atrocities that made refugee youth more attractive to save.
Questions over the sustainability and utility of partnering organizations also arose
often as partner grants elapsed and partners shifted their foci, leaving the school without
resources it so desperately needed. Vignettes fraught with teachers’ and administrators’
doubt around partners ‘ trustworthiness and intentions also indicated an unease and
borderline paranoia over partners’ as possible agents of privatization and the charter
school movement. In the case of Refugee Aid actively helping some of their cases to
apply to charter schools, administrators like Mr. Keo had to ultimately reconsider
whether the motives of the partners and their missions were compatible with the
overarching goal of the branding process: to save the school from closure. Moreover, as
partners began to exert more influence on the student body and school, teachers also
wondered if the short-term relief that they brought with them, mitigated the political
pressure that continued resource scarcity would place on the district and state to properly
fund their schools.
The employment of partners to brand the school, however, contributed to an
existential questioning not only among the teachers, administrators, and students, but the
partner staff themselves. As the school felt an amplified sense of accountability to the
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district and state for their “performance” across a range of aforementioned criteria,
partners lacked accountability to the school and state. Partner loyalties conversely lied in
demonstrating “impact” to their funders; impact defined by their missions and prescribed
interventions. As the school came to increasingly rely on partners’ services after the
budget cuts, teachers especially questioned the ethics of building “on top of” partners that
selectively served particular student populations.
Looking to Vincanne Adams' (2013) observations in post-Katrina New Orleans,
this non-profit network at Johnson justified its presence through the crisis and also
operated without oversight or coordination. Several actually used the crisis in their
promotional materials and “impact” evaluations to demonstrate the utility of their
services and market themselves to philanthropic funders. Yet it was this strategy that also
rendered them unstable, as grants and subsequently staffing, came and went.
This strategy therefore demonstrates what happens when state and district
manufactured crisis removes supports for neighborhood schools, forcing them to look
beyond their walls for resources to continue to provide basic educational services and
compete in the education market. Highly volatile non-profits prioritizing their
perpetuation as organizations serving select populations over the inclusive and
democratic mission of the neighborhood school played a role in the uneven distribution
of school resources. While partnerships functioned as a stopgap measure to stymie the
exodus of state-funded supports, they also became another mechanism through which the
school funneled resources to students deemed valuable to the school’s brand. In many
ways, the non-profits drew on the same affective power of first-generation Asian students
as the school’s leadership, namely refugee youth, to promote and market the mission and
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impact of their organization. In other words, they became valuable commodities that nonprofits could “sell” to raise money and please stakeholders. Aggregated with the
administration’s internal strategies to enroll ELL students and minimize the visibility and
numbers of native-born, largely African-American, students, partnerships exacerbated
feelings of marginalization and segregation among the latter group. This next chapter will
detail students’ responses to the emergence of what Ms. London termed as “two schools”
(Chapter 4) and its implications for their educational trajectories.
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CHAPTER 6 – “YOU PLAY THE HAND YOU’RE DEALT”: STUDENT VOICES
AT JOHNSON HIGH
“A Lost Opportunity”
Everyone is afraid of the school closing, so people want to make notes of the bad
things. I’m pretty sure more good things happen than bad things. If they closed us,
it would be bad for the neighborhood because the school plays an important role
in the how people relate to one another. If I see you in school and in the
neighborhood, and I have to work with you in a group here, then I know that
you’re not a possible threat. It would be a lost opportunity to know your
neighbors. The school is the meeting ground, the connection place. It would be
that missing (pause) like if everybody goes to charters, nobody cares about the
place that they’re from. That’s why I go here. I can say, hey, that’s MY school in
[Johnson High’s neighborhood]. But if I go up to North Philly, it’s just another
place. I pay more attention to what’s going on in my neighborhood and my school
if I feel like they’re mine. The school enlightens people. In this city, not many
people leave their neighborhoods. The school presents the opportunity to know
different kinds of people and see through their eyes. You need knowledge to fight
ignorance. Kids know OF each other, and that’s a good thing, even if they don’t
hang out. (Interview with Eric, 2/20/14)
*******************************
Eric is an 18-year old African-American senior at Johnson High, a student that in
his four years has experienced the full gamut of the strategies used to try to save Johnson
High. His four years also coincided with unprecedented tumult at the district level across
two superintendents. When I asked him to imagine the feelings he would have should
Johnson High close, he insightfully addressed the implications that a closure would have
for not only his own sense of belonging, but also the macro-level relations of the larger
neighborhood. Describing the school as “the meeting ground, the connection place,” Eric
invokes notions of a community and place building through an educational space. A
school, according to Eric, establishes bonds between diverse neighborhood constituencies
through children. Embedded within his quote is a critique of the ways in which the
expansion of charter schools erodes feelings and understandings of neighborhoods as
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places of belonging and family history. “That’s why I go here,” he explains, “I can say,
hey, that’s MY school…but if I go up to North Philly, it’s just another place.”
Eric opens this chapter because his insights encapsulate the critiques, fears, and
hopes of the Johnson High’s student body as they bore witness to the devastating effects
of the austerity policies at the district level in their classrooms, hallways, and
neighborhood. I dedicate this chapter to their voices because their narratives ultimately
reveal the youth-centered impacts that this constellation of market fundamentalist policies
exact on their lives and trajectories as emerging adults and citizens-in-the-making. I focus
particularly on their perceptions of their educational quality as well as how the schoollevel strategies to save Johnson High from closure influenced their peer-to-peer
relationships. Their responses to the micro-level influence of these policies, I argue,
expose much about the limits of these reforms.
Further, their responses they illuminate the ways in which neighborhood schools
responding to these reforms structure youth inclusion and exclusion. By focusing on
students’ reactions toward the triangulating influences of the school-level strategies, I
also show how these policies (i.e. which frame particular student types as threatening and
others as worthy) fracture possibilities to facilitate successful, sustained relations across
diverse student bodies. No study within the school closures literature has focused on how
attending schools slated for potential closure influence students’ perceptions of school
value or the ways that they relate to their communities. Their perspectives matter to the
degree that they reflect feelings of respect and belonging as well as their willingness to
enroll and invest their time and energy in the school’s health and future.
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The chapter moves from students’ perceptions of neighborhood schools within the
schema of “school choice” in Philadelphia. I discuss how the stratification of schools
within the expanding range of options affect students’ understandings and attitude toward
the traditional neighborhood school. I then move into students’ critiques of the
community partners, noting their instability and selectivity in service provision. I finally
discuss students’ understandings of their peers as particular strategies racialized students
along the ELL-American spectrum. Together these sections craft an account of the
instability of the school’s brand as many students lost faith in the school to serve the
needs of the entire population as well as survive as a divided institution.
Perceptions of Neighborhood Schools
The “Hierarchy” of Schools
Of the six classes that I observed regularly at Johnson High, I spent almost every
day in the College Dreams sponsored class of 25 sophomores. The group was a mix of
higher-level ELL students and native-born students, and the ratios fluctuated throughout
the year pending the attrition and transfer rates. Of the 25 students, there was one 15 year
old, White student, James. James was an anomaly in a school that at the time of the
research, was less than 10 percent White, and of the White students, many have been
ejected from parochial schools and charter schools for behavior problems. James was
quiet and generally kept to himself, completing work so that he could retreat behind a
textbook to sleep without the teacher noticing him. Playing the class tutor meant that I
spent many classes sitting with him, keeping him “focused” as per the teacher’s request,
and asking him about his life.
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James was born and raised two blocks from the school to an Irish mother and
Italian father, streets of the neighborhood that are interestingly still home to those white
ethnic populations. His older brother graduated several years prior from the other
neighborhood high school and then lived on marine on base in California. His mother
also attended another neighborhood high school where she became pregnant at 17 with
his brother and subsequently dropped out. She worked as a temporary receptionist for
dentists around the area, but often did not have regular or consistent hours. His stepfather,
a construction worker, also only worked when he was “called in” for a job. On a day in
late September, as Johnson High roiled in the chaos imposed by the budget cuts, James
described to me his predicament as a student attending a “neighborhood school.”
I mean, I really wanted to go to Catholic school but they’ve gotten a lot more
expensive, like $5,000 a year. I mean, I don’t mind it here that much. Like you
have the magnet schools and Catholic schools up here [gestures with hands high],
and charters are here [lowers hands down] and then there’s the neighborhood
school here at the bottom of the barrel [lowers hands further]. I mean, Johnson
High isn’t as bad as [other neighborhood high school], not as dangerous, but it’s
still down here because it’s a neighborhood school. And then with all of the
budget cuts, it sucks even more, ya know? (Fieldnote, 9/26/13)
Delineating the rungs of school “quality” in Philadelphia, James places his Johnson High
at “the bottom of the barrel” echoing similar sentiments as Mr. Keo in Chapter 3 toward
the overarching perception that neighborhood schools are “bad” because “bad kids” go to
them. James distances himself from the school’s reputation by pointing that he himself
“wanted to go to a Catholic school but they’ve gotten more expensive, like $5,000 a
year,” citing his lack of choice in attending Johnson. In a system where charter schools
have further injected “choice” into the marketplace of urban school options, James points
out that those at “the bottom” do not enjoy that same choice for prohibitive tuitions at
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Catholic schools or losing in a charter school lottery ultimately relegates them to nonselective high schools. Further exacerbating his plight, he feels, are the budget cuts that
have disparately affected district-run neighborhood schools that rely solely on state and
city-level tax revenues. When I asked James whether he had plans to apply to college, he
told me that he probably would not. In spite of his placement in the College Dreams’
cohort, he explained, “I mean, I go to Johnson High right? Didn’t I just explain that to
you? Like, I’m not that smart. I’m tryin’ to just find a job now down at Modell’s so that I
can pay for my shoes and stuff. With mom not working, I gotta pay for my own stuff”
(Field note, 9/26/13)
Many students in addition to James felt compelled to transfer to “better schools”
like charters and magnet schools, particularly when stressful situations arose regarding
the building’s infrastructure and the lack of cleaning staff. A bed bug problem descended
on several classrooms mid-year, but with no funds to hire a fumigator, the students and
teachers had no choice but to bring personal repellent cans (Fieldnote 2/5/14). With a
leaking roof, asbestos-ridden 4th floor, disintegrating dry wall, and only two part-time
cleaning staff to cover a building large enough to accommodate 2000 students, the air
quality suffered enormously. Ms. Allard, the teacher of the College Dreams class, was
hospitalized on three separate occasions for in-school asthma attacks (Field note, 5/4/14).
During one of her absences, I sat with two native-born Asian and Latino male students,
discussing the possibility of transferring. Brian, the son of Vietnamese refugees, Tony,
the son of two Lao refugees, and Leo and Joseph, the sons of first-generation Mexican
parents.
Leo: I applied to charters in the 8th grade but I didn’t get accepted.
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Joseph: I wanted to, but my parents didn’t know what to do. They don’t speak
much English.
Tony: I really want to transfer though. This school is so gross with all of the shit
on the floor and stuff. Like, Ms. Allard ain’t even here because it’s makin’ her
sick. I want to transfer to an arts charter school or somethin’. Johnson, it’s just not
me. I’m better than this so I want to graduate from a better school.
Brian: Yeah, it’s too late though. I mean, we are in 10th grade.
Joseph: My parents can’t really help me so I guess I’m staying here. (Fieldnote,
10/1/13)
In the middle of this conversation, Joseph turned to me and asked, “Ms. Julie, do you
think you could help me apply to a charter school? We don’t have the counselor this year
to help us.” Telling him that I was not familiar with the charter school lottery process and
that I would look into it for him, I still felt conflicted. Privy to the principal’s worries that
students might leave, I didn’t want to encourage students to flee the school in search of
the greener pastures of a charter. At the same time, I wanted them to know that their
grievances with the “shit on the floor” and their perceptions of the quality of the
education they were receiving did not fall on deaf ears.
This conversation however pointed to a larger problem – that students like James
and Joseph felt the stigma of attending a “neighborhood school” based purely on the fact
it was non-selective. Their feelings reflected Mr. Keo and the teachers’ views that the
schools’ non-selectivity and its inability to completely exclude “problem kids” made it
difficult to appear valuable and worth saving as an institution. Collectively these
responses raised questions about deservingness and public education. First, what message
does increasing educational “choice” send to students like James and Joseph, that,
because of their parents’ inability to send them somewhere else, have no choice but to
attend an increasingly underfunded neighborhood school? Second, what other recourse
did educators like Mr. Keo have but to compete in the marketplace?
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The American Dream Denied: ELL Student Perspectives
While native-born students like James and Joseph certainly voiced criticisms
about the ways in which the budget cuts and school closures imperiled their education,
they always dismissed the crisis as just another district-produced calamity that would
come and go. Eric, the senior that opened the chapter, when questioned about the budget
cuts, would constantly say, “You play the hand you’re dealt” (Interview, 2/20/14),
accepting his lack of control over the state of his school. However, the responses and
perspectives of diverse first-generation immigrant population, students that were coming
into contact with the American education system for the first time from a multitude of
contexts, differed in their level of shock and alarm. These students, arriving at Johnson
High from refugee camps, war zones, and collapsed economies, compared the
educational quality their schools to Philadelphia’s in essays, senior projects, and districtbudget meetings, voicing their concerns about the potentially false promise made to them
through the Horatio Algiers narrative.
Lila , a Pakistani student from the Swat Valley, a contested territory in northern
Pakistan near the Afghan border, immigrated to the United States because extremist
groups closed the schools in her region. Hell-bent on making it to college, she battled her
family to attend public school in Philadelphia and even convinced them to allow her to
apply to community college. At an SRC meeting, she stood in front of 200 people, after
having only learned English 9 months prior, and rebuked district and state officials for
the current state of the system.
You need to do better. This school district is one of the biggest in the United
States and you should not cut the budget because the education is the most
important. I mean, in Pakistan, we studied a lot of science classes and I don’t have
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as many here. We had books for everyone. Here, 4 of us have to share in class. In
our ELL classes, we should not have 35 students. What do you want for your new
citizens? This is a developed country! There is no excuse! (Fieldnote, 4/14/14)
Several other students took on the district budget crisis and mass school closures in their
senior projects. Barat, a Bangladeshi student that force-transferred to Johnson High in
September of her senior year after her former high school closed, lamented that not only
had the school closures hurt her support network as she applied for colleges, but that it
had ended her family’s history in the school.
I was surprised, because in my country they don’t shut down schools. When I
heard it’s the whole school, I mean, I know we didn’t have enough students. I was
disappointed because a lot of my favorite teachers got laid off. It was my first
kind of home when I came. My uncle went and a lot of my family and community
went to that school and they have good careers now – pharmacist, finance. So
they all got like a good education there. (Interview, 4/15/14)
Both Barat and Lila ’s quotes reflect a general incredulity among the immigrant students
that the state of public education in the U.S. could be worse than their own countries.
Though many appreciated the fact that school was “free”, grateful for the opportunity to
attend school without paying fees, they frequently felt resentful that educational
attainment, their ticket to upward mobility and the primary reason for their family’s
migration, could be subject to such political whims. Many students echoed the “hierarchy
of schools” discourse deployed by many native-born students, citing the shame they felt
for attending a neighborhood high school. David, a recent Tunisian immigrant, explains
his disappointment when he discovered the meaning of a “neighborhood school.”
I have a lot of friends in charter schools and I feel like they have their education. I
think that their students are different in that they are chosen. But in here, it’s a
neighborhood school, so whoever wants to come, Mr. Keo has to accept them. It’s
like the reputation of the school you see? So when I first came here, a lot of my
father’s friends were like, “David, what high school are you going to?” and I was
like, “Johnson High School.” And they were like, “Johnson? It’s a bad school
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right?” But the thing is, like when I came here, I wasn’t so excited to be honest
because they made me feel like I was going to a horrible school, but I didn’t know
about the schools here. Why should it matter so much? (Interview, 4/10/14)
David “didn’t know about the schools” but learned through interactions with other
students and family friends that the non-selectivity of his high school qualified it as a
“bad” school. Thus, he entered Johnson High feeling like it could not provide him with a
decent public education. However, in later conversations and informal interviews with
David, an active member of several partners’ programs as well as the National Honor
Society, he said that his experience at Johnson High did not warrant its reputation. Citing
to caring, hard-working teachers, and the numerous partnerships Mr. Keo and Mr.
O’Donnell had brought into the school like Service for Salvation and College Dreams,
David said that he felt the opportunities were available if students applied themselves.
Again, David points to the central issue of perceptions of value driving the
enrollment in neighborhood schools. As a recent immigrant, he initially felt that a free
public education was a blessing bestowed upon him. The discourse of choice that
influenced his extended family’s conversations over school value tainted his own faith in
the school until he could see opportunities expressed through his personal experiences
with faculty. He remained in the school through senior year even after receiving an
opportunity to leave for a special admission school across the city (Fieldnote, 11/13/12).
However, the administration’s fear of losing students like David to charter and magnet
schools prompted them to both continue seeking out private partners to increase the
school’s appeal, and minimize the risk that particular student populations posed to the
school’s reputation.
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Student Critiques of Community Partners
Noting the Fissures
While most students, first-generation immigrant and native-born alike, praised the
school for allowing private providers to fill the gaps in services pre and post-budget cuts,
several criticized the accessibility of those programs and their overall diagnoses of the
schools’ needs. Sondra, one of the few white senior female students, came to Johnson
High from South Jersey after her mother and four siblings moved in with their aunt
following her parents’ divorce. In between the move to the neighborhood and the divorce,
her family lived in a Red Roof Inn by the airport and then a shelter in Center City. At the
time of her interview in early 2014, she lived with her siblings, three cousins, and aunt.
Working at a grocery store as a cashier a few blocks from Johnson High, her mother
struggled to establish an independent household. When I met Sondra in a calculus class at
the beginning of the 2013 school year and asked her about her future plans, she planned
to attend a college in central Pennsylvania where she would study to become a veterinary
technical assistant. In continuous conversation with Mr. Lytle, the coordinator of College
Dreams, Sondra received his help with the applications for the college as well as financial
aid.
However, when it came to funding the trip out to take the placement test in
November, Mr. Lytle could not directly provide the funds for the $60 round-trip bus
ticket or the hotel costs. Not able to ask her mother for help, Sondra forwent the
placement test and decided to apply for a job at the local grocery store with her mother.
In a conversation in Mr. Lytle’s office, she sighed.
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I mean, what can I do? I can’t ask my mom for the money because she doesn’t
have it. And then what would I do if I got out there? How would I afford to get
home if I had to? Also, with my migraines and eating stuff, I don’t know if I
could even make it on my own there. The doctors at the clinic here know my case.
I appreciate all Mr. Lytle can do, but he can only do so much, ya know?
(Fieldnote, 11/10/13)
I learned later in a formal interview that Sondra suffered a serious carbon monoxide leak
in her home several years ago has left her with chronic migraines and an inability to keep
food down. She felt that between her responsibilities at home caring for her siblings
while her mother worked, her relationship with several doctors at the public clinic, and
the prohibitive living costs of attending a college so far away, that the barriers to pursuing
a career as a vet tech were too steep.
Even though Mr. Lytle provided information and assistance through the
application process, Sondra points out that sometimes the keys to persistence go beyond
the program’s capacity. Perhaps Mr. Lytle could help her navigate a university
admissions website, but he could not resolve the difficult realities introduced by her
family’s poverty (i.e. $60 bus ticket). Sondra was additionally vocal about the
discrepancy between partners’ constructions of student needs and consequently, their
programming, and what she perceived as their actual needs. Nostalgic for her earlier high
school years before the budget cuts, she complained,
I don’t mind community service, it’s fun an all, but I already do a lot of service on
my own. All of these [community partners] want you to do service after-school
and on the weekends. Like that’s going to get me into college? I mean, ya know,
yes and no right? It’s really about money for me. They want us to do so much
community service. You go home, you gotta work and take care of other people,
but then you also have to take care of your community. It’s overwhelming for
kids. Sometimes you just need to do somethin’ artsy. You wanna do somethin’
with your inner self and not always help other people. (Interview, 2/7/14)
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Sondra specifically refers to the mission of Service for Salvation that ran after-school and
weekend service programming for students. Service for Salvation, a national organization
founded by a finance executive, rooted its mission in addressing poverty and illiteracy by
“breaking the cycle of low expectations” in poor communities in the U.S. and abroad
through service education (Interview, 1/10/14). This particular organization constructed
the “education crisis” as a global struggle, framing service education as antidote to
structural educational deficits in both urban areas of the United States and developing
countries. Sondra directly critiques this construction of the education crisis and more
importantly, the remedy they propose to solving it: service. Pointing to her unrecognized
forms of service (i.e. childcare for siblings, responsibilities in a single-parent household),
Sondra finds fault with Service for Salvation’s failure to recognize the impediments
imposed on her trajectory not from her “low expectations” of herself but because of the
structural constraints of living in poverty.
Partner Instability
Sondra ’s testimony, in addition to pointing out the organization’s misdiagnosis of
students’ needs, laments the loss of teacher-led creative after-school programs that she
enjoyed prior to the budget cuts. “Sometimes you just wanna do somethin’ with your
inner self and not always help other people,” referenced the outlet that a music teacher
provided her through an in-school choir to express herself through song.
Yeah, I mean, we don’t have as many things like we used to in the 9th grade. I
used to be in choir, ya know? We still got chess club but Mr. Lytle [College
Dreams coordinator] runs it but he’ll be gone next year. And all of the sports got
cut. Like everything we used to have in 9th grade, there’s nothin’ anymore. And I
think that’s what’s really hurtin’ the school. Nobody wants to be here because it’s
like borin’ – there’s nothin’ to do after-school and there’s nothin’ to do during
school. Even the Work Ready folks, they’re leavin’. I came here for that program
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and they’ll be gone next year. There’s nothin’ really to do except go to class. I
mean, granted that’s what school’s for, but you always want to look forward to
somethin’. (Interview, 2/7/14)
Even though the school had 16 community partners, many of whom provided afterschool programming either at the school or a neutral site, Sondra felt like “there’s really
nothin’ to do.” This comment points to two issues: 1) partners missing of the mark 2)
their instability. One of the reasons Sondra attended Johnson High was to benefit from
Career Ready’s “academy” programming, a combination of in-school and after-school
curriculum and internship experience intended to prepare students for careers in specific
fields like hospitality and tourism and urban education. Throughout Sondra’s time at
Johnson, Career Ready had truncated their funds and staff dedicated to implementing the
program, culminating in mass pull out from the school at the end of AY 2013-2014
(Fieldnote, 6/18/14). Understanding partner programming as unstable as the
extracurricular funding, Sondra’s critique draws attention to the ways in which partner
programming exacerbated the instability of the school’s resources.
Selective Service Provision
A final yet ubiquitous critique of the community partners industry, shared by both
native-born and specific groups of ELL students, stressed how partners’ narrow
constructions of the problems of the school and the missions of their organizations
rendered visible certain groups for targeted services, and invisible others. In a community
partner meeting in February of 2014, Mr. Keo asked the community partners whether
they would like to function as class sponsors for the following year. With no
extracurricular budget to pay teachers to take on the additional responsibilities, Mr. Keo
implored the non-profit staff to volunteer their labor.
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We don’t have enough money to pay for a sponsor for every grade. I barely have
enough money to buy envelopes. The District is broke. Next year’s budget is
coming out and it’s not going to be pretty. There isn’t going to be money for the
teachers’ pensions, so there isn’t going to be any for class sponsorship for sure.
Several of the partners raised their hands as potential volunteers for next year with the
caveat that should their grants elapse and not be renewed, they might not be employed by
their organization and able to take on the responsibility. Listening intently to the
conversation, an invited student to the meeting, Jorie, voiced his frustration with the
proposed arrangement.
I think it’s a problem that we don’t have a sponsor for the junior class so that we
can come together and plan events. We don’t get anything. It also bothers me that
the seniors get everything. Everyone wants to help them. Like, Mr. Lytle helps
them and he won’t help me. Isn’t that what we need for a quality education? Isn’t
that what we need to learn to lead? Is this America? Really? Equality for all?
Mr. Keo responded,
Yes, you’re right, the seniors are spoiled because they get College Dreams, but
you have to remember that he’s paid for by a grant and not by us. Mr. Lytle isn’t
my employee so I can’t control whom he decides to help. As long as our
educational system is based on taxes, this is the America you’re going to get.
You’re going to have to take it up with the governor. (Fieldnote, 2/20/14)
Jorie furrowed his brow and put his hand in his chin. While Mr. Keo continued on with
the meeting, David, who had also been invited to attend the meeting, turned to me and
confessed,
To be honest, I wish I lived I the suburbs. I hear a lot of good things about the
schools. I like Johnson but I don’t feel like I have an advantage. I’m an immigrant
so I don’t know a lot of things. I want to go to Drexel for engineering but I need
to find information and Mr. Lytle [College Dreams coordinator] isn’t allowed to
help me. And Refugee Support, they can’t help me because I don’t qualify.
This idea of seeing resources in the school and not being able to access them because of
partners’ stringent qualifying criteria frustrated both ELL and native-born students.
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Because College Dreams targeted only the senior class, other students did not have the
option of receiving help from the coordinator. In addition, the case managers and tutors
provided through Refugee Support only offered services to students that qualified for
their program. David and Jorie alike, both first-generation immigrants, did not have
parents that worked with raw food products. Their fathers drove cabs and their mothers
ran their households. Without a counselor that year and no promise of that position
stabilizing with the budget in the coming year, David and Jorie were incredulous that
such inequity could exist in the system. Jorie in fact asked, “Is this America? Really?
Equality for all?”
Racial Triangulation and Peer Relations
The Performance of Care
Juan: I hear that many schools are closing and all of that stuff, but I also know
that many American students don’t want to study. The people who care are the
immigrant students. When I was in Mexico, if you’re a good student, they send
you to another school to study. I mean, I don’t know if they can do that here, but
if the school is getting so poor or old, they can close it, and the students who care
can move to another school. I think that’s a good idea because they’re going to a
school that has students that care about what they’re going to be. (Interview,
4/7/14)
Juan’s recommendation encapsulates the rift in student categorizations that the
school traded on in its branding process of Johnson High. Not dissimilar to the ways in
which teachers and the administration differentiated between student “types”, the
injection of increasing numbers of immigrant students to boost enrollment numbers and
improve perceivably mutable statistics like “school climate” exacerbated the social
distance between ELL and native-born students (i.e. “Americans”). Students took up
these discourses and circulated them amongst each other, immigrant students oftentimes
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characterizing “American” students, as lacking reverence for both their education and
their teachers. Such insubordination, as Juan explained, warranted the closing of schools
disproportionately attended by students who don’t “care about what they’re going to be.”
This imperative to perform “care” for one’s education intensified as resources
disappeared and the punishment for appearing apathetic as a collective student body
loomed.
Immigrant students oftentimes cited shock at the “behaviors” of “Americans” and
feared them in their classrooms and hallways. They also saw them as a threat to the
“quality” of the education they were receiving. One day in the back of a calculus class I
was observing, I spoke with a first-generation Vietnamese student about my project. I
told him that I was interested in immigration and education and thought that Johnson
High would be a good place to conduct the project because of its diversity. He responded,
Oh! That’s a big issue here. The problem in this school is that there are a lot of
students that don’t care. You know, the ones that are born here, they say bad
things, are loud, and fight. Some of the Asians were born here, so maybe they’re
just like African-Americans, like cursing, beating people up. Like the Chinese
boys, you know, with the yellow hair and earrings. They fight with the Black kids.
I don’t understand. How can you not care? The Cambodian girls are pregnant and
think that Obama is going to take care of them. Every day I go home, I see
Cambodians walking with a baby stroller. It’s like Asian minds right, Asian
people, like teach their kids to look toward the future. Our parents teach us that
education is important and that’s why we came here. I’m not their friend because
they destroy my education. They’re why they think we have a bad school and they
want to close us (Fieldnote, 12/18/13)
Peter, by linking behavior and race, constructs a particular kind of student that poses a
threat to the “quality” of his education. Students that “say bad things, are loud, and fight”
demonstrate a lack of “care” for their education and in turn dilute the quality of the
education he and his parents “came here” from Vietnam to attain. Through association
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with students demonstrating these problematic behaviors (i.e. “beating people up,
cursing”, teen pregnancy, dress), Peter feels that the value of his high school is
diminished.
Like Juan, Peter tethers a deficit analysis of his peers to the school’s overarching
categorization as a “bad school.” Their perspectives demonstrate that perceptions of value
of the neighborhood are highly racialized, indexed by their feelings toward students that
exhibit behaviors that they find unbecoming. Again, the term “American” becomes
slippery as Peter notes is disdain for “Asian students” that were “born here” and act “just
like African-Americans”. Asserting that he’s “not friends with them because they destroy
[his] education” he harbors resentment for the students that “don’t care” and refuses to
associate with them. Like Mr. Keo and Success Academy teachers in Chapter 2, secondgeneration Cambodians that rely on public assistance (i.e. “think that Obama will take
care of them”) are equally indictable for threatening Johnson High’s reputation. Both
Peter and Juan assign blame to “American” students for diluting their perceived “quality”
of their education and bringing risk to the sustainability of the institution.
It Ain’t About Race?: December 2013
This idea that the “American” students were responsible for degrading
perceptions of the school therefore was not limited to the administration and teaching
staff. First generation immigrant students consistently asserted that abstaining from
contact with “Americans” was the best policy. This included not only African-American
students, but also “dangerous Asians” like Cambodians as well as White students that
they felt exhibited the same behaviors. Aware that the school had also suffered at the
hands of the budget cuts, oftentimes first-generation students eschewed blaming he
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district for Johnson High’s predicament and instead villainized their native-born or
“American” peers.
As the school became a pressure cooker throughout the fall with so few staff,
morale dropped and tensions began to mount in hallways, classrooms, the lunchroom,
and schoolyard. By December, several skirmishes between students in the hallways
escalated into violent incidents after school. By the end of the month, questions over
whether the incidents were “racially motivated” circulated amongst the staff,
administration, and study body. Given the violent events several years prior at Johnson’s
sister neighborhood school where African-American students allegedly attacked Asian
students, Mr. Keo worried that should the media construe the incidents as “racial”, that
the school would further increase its consideration for closure. Calling a meeting of the
community partners and the police chief, Mr. Keo addressed the room:
Johnson is very quiet. We usually don’t have racial conflicts. For some strange
reason this December we had four incidents. These incidents were inside and
outside the school to the point where some of our students, low-level ELL
students who speak limited English, were being targeted. I don’t believe that we
have any hate-crimes going on but I want to make sure that if there is a
perception that we address it. December 5th, we had an incident at after-school
with a Chinese student having his cell-phone stolen by African-American
students from here. On December 13th we had an incidents with Nepali students
and two African-American students. On December 17th we had a fight involving
a transfer white student on his first day here that was challenged by an AfricanAmerican student. The last fight was an unusual incident in the cafeteria: an
African-American student decided to take a Chinese-American student’s lunch.
I’m bringing this up because I can understand where this perception comes from.
In each of those four incidents, we suspended the students who committed the
crime. Because many have heard about what transpired at [sister high school],
the lower level students expressed concerns. (Meeting Recording, 1/6/14)
The ambivalence in Mr. Keo’s account of the problem pervaded the rest of the school as
labeling the incidents as “racial” might influence perceptions of the school as hostile to
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vulnerable “ELL” students, the primary pillar of the first strategy to keep the school open.
As Mr. Keo points out, even though he doesn’t “believe” that “hate-crimes are going on”,
should perceptions of the school as “dangerous” travel through the neighborhood, both
enrollment and their climate evaluation would drop.
When the teachers and principal got word that several of the ELL students, mostly
first-generation Asians, and their parents were reconsidering sending their kids to school
out of fear that they might be attacked by “Americans”, in the following violence
prevention meeting Mr. Keo and the superintendent begged partners to draft a “climate
improvement plan” to evaluate whether the tensions in the school were in fact, “racial.”
Mr. Keo enlisted Ms. Shore and Ms. Crowley, the partner coordinators of Service for
Salvation and Career Ready, as well as myself to implement a staff and student survey
and focus groups to gage perceptions of racial tensions school-wide. My responsibility
was to gather representative groups of students from a range of categories – racial, ethnic,
English-language status, generation, and grade – to conduct focus groups around issues of
peer relationships.
In five hour-long focus groups with heterogeneous sampling across grades, I
found remarkably similar patterns in student perceptions of race tensions. All groups
admitted that large increases in the number of ELL students in recent years, the
bifurcated curriculum put in place to address linguistic differences between the nativeborn and ELLs, and the favored treatment of ELL students by staff, teachers, and
administrators exacerbated the segregation and relations between “ELL” students and
native-born students. It was also apparent that ELL students felt more strongly that
tensions existed between the native-born and themselves than the native-born. The
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native-born however reported, particularly the seniors, feelings of exclusion and a
devaluing of their contributions to the school community in the last several years. These
trends mirrored survey results that suggested that ELL students were more likely to report
feeling respected by their teachers than non-ELLs and that they felt that their culture was
valued (Survey Results, 2/20/14). In a senior focus group with five students – Sondra
(white-female), Eric (African-American male), Michael (African-American male), Sally
(African-American female), and Sam (second generation Cambodian-American) – these
students processed their opinions around these issues.
Sam: Well, I think it’s because those ELL teachers are nicer.
Sondra: Well at the end of the year there’s like this award ceremony that we all
have, and we all come to get our awards, but then it’s like all the Asians. They get
all of the awards and we don’t get nothin’. Don’t they care about what we do?
Sally: I mean, I think they deserve it because they work hard. I would never work
that hard (laughing).
Eric: Yeah, because like I said, that’s what they be comin’ here for! We in
general take education more lightly because it’s like, education.
Sondra: What are you talkin’ about?! I take it seriously! I get straight As and I
was homeless for like 2 years! I work my butt off.
Sam: I try hard too because I want to be an inspiration toward my younger
siblings but yeah, sometimes I feel like everybody in this school likes the ELL
students more.
Michael: Yeah, the ELL teachers give em’ whatever they want. They give em’
breakfast and stuff. We don’t get no breakfast. We gotta be somethin’ special to
get breakfast.
Eric: They might nurture the ELL students a lil’ bit more because they not from
here, and maybe the American students don’t understand. I don’t have a problem.
They just wanna welcome ‘em to America.
Sondra: I mean, yeah, they do get help a lot, like from the partners right, but I
don’t take offense to it because sometimes they do need it. Because like, I do the
IDs and stuff, and most of the kids don’t know what I’m sayin’ and I am real glad
that they have someone to help them learn English and stuff. (Focus Group,
1/18/14)
This focus group, while admitting that they felt that the ELL students had more caring
teachers and received most of the accolades at the beginning of the year, overwhelmingly
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respected the work ethic of the ELL students and appreciate their need for extra “help”
from the partner staff and teachers because of the language barrier that they faced.
However, Sondra asks, “Don’t they care about what we do?” pointing to a sensed
marginalization as the school became increasingly ELL-dominated.
In a focus group of heterogeneous, native-born sophomores, their analysis of the
source of the violence between the native-born and ELL students in December centered
much more around perceptions of weakness and not necessarily “race.” In focus group,
Sean is a White male, Kevin is an African-American male, Nina is an African-American
female, and Jackson is a Cambodian-American male.
Julie: What do you think about the ELL students in this school?
Kevin: They be easy targets.
Julie: Because of their race?
Kevin: People see ‘em walking home and they think they weak and won’t fight
back so they just want to go and jump ‘em. I don’t be havin’ classes with ‘em
though, so I don’t know.
Sean: The Pakistanis be [referring to Bhutanese refugees] smellin’ and loud and
they be aggravatin’ us so people bang their heads in lockers.
Nina: Yeah, but people always be messin’ with people. It ain’t about race though.
They can be like disrespectful because we don’t know what they sayin’, and they
be laughin’ at you and lookin’ at you.
Julie: Do you think if they mixed the classes and lunches more, things would be
better? Like you could communicate more and get to know each other?
Jackson: It would be way worse. The hallways ain’t got like, no teachers, so you
would have kids fightin’ in class and then callin’ ‘em into the hallways. If the
schools keep closin’ and we get more, it’s gonna be bad up in here. (Focus Group
Recording, 1/30/14)
This conversation spoke to several additional issues that complemented the seniors’
perspectives on ELL-native-born relationships in the school. The students deployed terms
like “us” and “them” to signify two crystallized categories of students: “American” and
“ELL.” As Jackson points out, these categories gained traction as the administration
deliberately enacted practices to enroll ELL students from both closed schools and other
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neighborhood high schools across the city. Without additional staff, an increasingly
isomorphic curriculum, and no resources to implement programming that would facilitate
sustained conversations between these groups of students, the students, both ELL and
American were left to develop their own judgments of “the other.” Perceiving ELLs as
“weak” and unable to defend themselves, Kevin underscores an opportunism that nativeborn students saw in bullying ELLs. Jackson warns that “should school keep closin’ and
we get more, it’s gonna be bad up in here”, pointing to his fears that further injections of
ELL students might exacerbate relations between the two groups.
The students of this group stayed close to the notion that the treatment “ain’t
about race” but rather based on expression of an identity through particular behaviors.
While ELLs at Johnson were overwhelmingly of Asian descent, that category broke
down across a wide range of ethnic groups and generational statuses. Lydia, a collegebound African-American senior and a transfer student from another closed high school,
explained the linkage between behavior and race.
And it’s also not even about race, because the Asians—the foreign Asians, they
don’t communicate with the American Asians at all. So it’s much more about
behaviors and actions. I don’t care what race you are, if I can’t connect with you,
it’s hard. Like—Cambodians come here and they have American Cambodians.
The American Cambodians, they live their lives the American way and haven’t
had the chance to experience their original culture where their parents came from.
I see the tension between those two groups also. Our culture is totally different –
like the way we talk, what music we listen to, who we see on TV. Because even in
my old school, which was majority black, we had a lot of Haitians and Jamaicans
and it was still separate. They stuck with themselves; we stuck with ourselves,
even though we quote-unquote look the same. So I don’t think it’s race at all. It’s
like how you represent yourself. (Interview, 4/11/14)
Lydia introduces the generational status differences that obscured simple breakdowns in
race-relations at the school level. Drawing on her experiences as an African-American
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student with many first-generation black immigrant populations, she compares first and
second generation Cambodian relations at Johnson to her old high school. Arguing “it’s
so much more about behaviors and actions…it’s like how you represent yourself,” Lydia
echoed Peter and several ELL students claims that race in this context was permeable
based on the kinds of behaviors that a student exhibited, specifically for the secondgeneration Asian students of Cambodian and Vietnamese descent that they felt did not
align themselves with the values of ‘authentic’ Asianness.
*********************************************
It depends, if they’re parents are born here, they’re probably like the Americans,
but if they were born in other countries, they’re probably harder workers.
(Interview with Miguel, 4/1/14)
Being “ELL” or “Asian” among the students meant consistent performances of
hard work, self-discipline, compliance, and passivity. “Americanness”, conversely,
indexed an opposite set of behaviors: laziness, unruliness, defiance, and brashness. As
demonstrated in previous chapters, the administration and teachers understood the latter
set of behaviors attached to “Americanness” to endanger the school’s collective
performance via the district’s evaluative criteria (i.e. climate statistics, utilization) for
closure consideration. In other words, the conflation of “risk” and “Americanness” at the
school-level was driven by the school’s response to the district’s definition of failure. The
branding process of the school as a response to this interpretation of the policy, traded on
the category of “ELL” or “immigrant” to both enroll less risky students and attract private
partnerships.
However, by reifying these categories through closure resistance strategies,
American students largely felt marginalized as a result. As a school, deep fears that
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“Americans” posed a danger to their safety as well as the school’s fate still permeated the
ELL student body. First-generation immigrant students like Juan and Peter criticized
these “types” of students for bringing a “bad” reputation to their school. Others like
David felt that the non-selectivity of the school made it less appealing to attend. The
ways in which the strategies to “brand” Johnson High as school worthy of remaining
open exacerbated relations between “ELL” students and “American” students, manifest
in December 2013’s violence and students’ narratives “othering” each group. The
racialized pitting of “risky” students against “model” students within these strategies
represents what scholars have termed “racial triangulation”, or the relative valorization of
“Asianness” over “Blackness” (Kim 1999; Tang 2011). Few native-born students in
interviews, focus groups, and informal interactions expressed overt hostility toward ELL
students and oftentimes expressed both how grateful they felt to meet students from
diverse origins. In fact, they internalized the valorization of ELL students, underscoring
their hard work ethics and persistence in learning English. On several occasions in the
hallways, I witnessed African-American students saying hello to ELL students in passing
(Fieldnote, 2/4/14). In the College Dreams class, friendships blossomed between ELL
and American students as they enjoyed the rare opportunity to interact on a daily basis in
group-work.
While many ELL students attributed the “poor quality” of the school to the
American students, ELL and American students alike also felt that with the proliferation
of school choice in Philadelphia, attending a neighborhood school meant that they had
failed, that they weren’t receiving the same kind of education as their peers that went to
charter schools or, in David’s case, like the students in affluent suburban schools.
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Internalizing notions of themselves as “failures” without choices, students like James
lamented that even though he attended one of the “better” neighborhood schools, the
budget crisis and his school’s consequent resource deprivation symbolized a lack of
investment in schools attended by students like him. First-generation ELL students’
contrasted their educational experiences in their countries of origin, disbelieving that in
America, public schools could be worse than their own. The fact that their parents had
“come here” to better their lives vis-à-vis the immigrant bargain magnified their
resentment.
Together, ELLs and American students also critiqued the school’s reliance on
partnerships, stressing the incongruity between partner constructions of the students’
needs and their actual needs. Students like Sondra felt that organizations like Service for
Salvation proposed an all too simple solution, “community service”, to the structural
issues of poverty embedded in her day-to-day life. Other students like David and Jorie
highlighted the selectivity and instability of these partners in their services by targeting
only students that met particular categories of difference, and/or losing grants and having
to withdraw from the school. Overall they felt that partners could not serve as stand-ins
for teachers and that the discrepancies between their construction of students’ and
consequently the school’s needs and their inability to consistently and equitably provide
services to all of the students, rendered problematic the strategy to mobilize them
compensate for absent state-funded supports.
Across ethnographies of educational policy, student voices are relatively absent as
researchers have tended to focus more on “official” policy making bodies and adults as
actors exercising power. I showed in this chapter that students generated sophisticated
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analyses of the unintended effects of the school closure policy as it related to their
school’s strategies to remain open. I further demonstrate that student perspectives on
school closure are not divorced from larger trends in the district like charter school
expansion that degrade the value of the traditional neighborhood school through
stratification of school types. BY including their voices, I hoped to illuminate the ways in
which students make meaning of these reforms in their lives, crafting critiques that shed
light on issues of equity and choice as they relate to the current direction of education
reform in Philadelphia.
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION: THE BRAND UNRAVELS
I concluded my full-time data collection in June of 2014 with plans to write this
dissertation during 2014-2015. However, through social media, personal relationships
with Johnson High’s staff and teachers, and my home being in close proximity to the
school, I have continued to receive updates regarding the school’s climate and everyday
anecdotes about its activities, events, and problems. Within this final chapter I want to
use the developments following my fieldwork to trouble the notion that the branding of
neighborhood high schools is a sustainable, just process for institutions struggling to
establish their value in an education market that renders them substandard. Further, I
want to use Johnson High as a cautionary tale to illustrate the problematic, long-term
effects of treating the traditional public school like a commodity that requires branding in
order to compete in the marketplace.
Disbanded Success Academy
In the beginning of AY 2014-2015, Ms. Betty alerted me further budget cuts
required the Mr. Keo to dismantle the Success Academy (Fieldnote, 9/23/14). The
principal cited that he could not commit to two teachers to only 38 students as other
classrooms in the building had close to 40 students with 1 teacher. Reactions to this
development were mixed. At a soccer game that I officiated17 later that year for many of
Johnson High’s first-generation immigrant youth, Kai, an Burmese-Karen refugee senior,

17

The neighborhood in which I live and Johnson High is located has a thriving soccer community.
Leagues at local parks and rec centers host players from a range of countries, including many of Johnson
High’s first generation Latino youth and refugee youth from South and Southeast Asia. I serve as a referee
for these leagues and therefore keep close contact with these youth through bi-weekly contact at their
games.
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a student that had graduated from the ELL program and now took classes with nativeborn students, said that the school was “getting bad”.
Yeah, there are fights everyday in the hallway. The kids are scared and there
aren’t enough teachers to do anything about it. All of the crazy kids are upstairs
now. Kids be starting to leave this school soon. (Fieldnote 3/13/15).
While racially skewed, discriminatory, and illegal, the Success Academy served as a risk
management mechanism within the Johnson High’s branding process. The closing of the
Success Academy reintroduced students, overwhelmingly African-American, but several
White and racially mixed students, that exhibited behaviors associated with “urban
deviance”, to overcrowded classrooms. As many of my participants noted, the school’s
labeling and tracking of these students as “failures” or “dangers” was highly racialized
but did reflect a painful reality that many of them had prior records of violent outbursts
and arrest (Interview, 1/16/14).18 Minimizing the risk of “serious incidents” remains
today an essential task for schools like Johnson High that are always at risk of closure. As
Kai explains in his statement, “kids be starting to leave this school soon”, serious
incidents not only jeopardize the school’s hard climate data that the School District of
Philadelphia collates to score and prioritize school’s for closure, but also fuels the
damage that the media can inflict on the school’s reputation and enrollment. In spite of its
racialized effects, school leadership like Mr. Keo faced a real hazard in integrating
students with potentially undiagnosed socio-emotional issues with the necessary supports
like reasonable teacher to student ratios and staff like counselors, nurses, and school
psychologists.

18

I would like to note that I do not accept the terms or strategies that leadership employed to describe an
track Success students, nor do I condone its illegality.
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Partnership Recession
In Chapter 5 I described a length the network of private resources accomplished
through the recruitment and admission of non-profit partners to the school. Of the sixteen
in the school, I followed five more closely to understand how they came to affect the
distribution of resources within the school and students and families’ understanding of
the “quality” of the education that was possible at the neighborhood school. I further
described the fraught relationships that teachers and leadership had with these
organizations, boasting strong friendships with many of their coordinators and benefitting
from the resources they contributed to the void left by budget cuts, yet resenting the need
for them. A central tension also surfaced between these organizations’ selective missions
and the non-selective mission of the neighborhood school, exacerbating students’ and
staffs’ perceptions that first-generation Asian students were “getting more” than nativeborn students.
As my fieldwork concluded, several coordinators of non-profits voiced their
organization’s plans to withdraw from the school as grants funding their work elapsed.
College Dreams, an organization that provided essentially a full-time college counselor
for the senior class and resources for college trips, financial aid workshops, and
information sessions, ended its activities in May as the students graduated and the grant
concluded (Interview, 5/16/15). While College Dreams made its temporality more
explicit from the onset, other organizations achieved more surprise in their decision to
leave. By June of 2014, Career Ready, a non-profit that had had the longest standing
relationship with Johnson High, of over two decades, ceased its operations within the
building after truncating their resources committed for several years. Citing that the
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school’s potential for closure and also their central organization’s loss of philanthropic
and corporate grants, the school opted to “consolidate” their investments in two other
high schools that seemed more “promising” in their futures (Fieldnote, 6/8/15).
Even with both College Dreams’ and Career Ready’s withdrawal from the school,
teachers and students still felt encouraged by the contributions of the three remaining
central non-profit partners, namely Service for Salvation that offered two full-time staff
and an annual supply budget of $150,000 for service programming within the school,
including a service trip to a developing country every spring for 8 outstanding students to
build a school. Service for Salvation avowed an impressive following of over 200
students, the largest of all of the non-profits, and the least selective in its criteria for
participation. Interviews with their staff in AY 2013-2014 foreshadowed a continued
commitment to the school, financial health, and promise as a non-profit that had logged
thousands of service hours for Johnson’s students. However, by December of 2014, just
18 months after Service for Salvation had forged this partnership, rumors circulated that
they too would withdraw before the end of the school year. In March, I sat in on a Skype
conversation with the national director as students pleaded with him to continue their
program in Philadelphia. He explained,
Last year we spent about $300,000 more than we were able to raise which is very
difficult because we’ve been doing that in Philly since 2002. Over the years it has
added up because since 2002 we have invested a little more than $4 million in
running and operating our programs in Philadelphia. Since we weren’t able to
raise the dollars in Philly, we raised it from other regions. We just can’t sustain it
that way and if we keep doing it, it’s going to cause us to be in a challenging
financial situation. Some people have asked why we are expanding our programs
in Boston and closing them in Philly and that’s a very good question. People in
the Boston community started reaching out last year and were able to get major
funding they raised about half a million dollars for the programs even before we
agreed to come up there. The philanthropic community really rallied there. They
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were able to raise the money. You have changed the landscape in Philadelphia
through your service. You have changed communities around the world. Nobody
can take that away from you. We did not do 148,000 hours of service in
Philadelphia: you did. Please keep going and serving your communities. You can
do it without us. That’s who you are. (Phone Call Recording, 3/5/15)
Not only did the loss of Service for Salvation result in bottom line resource losses,
but their two coordinators also lost their positions. Given their reach in the school to so
many students and staff, morale plummeted, reinforcing the notion that Johnson High
was an unworthy institution. As one student, Miguel, put it, “Nobody, if they have the
choice, sticks around here for long” (Fieldnote, 10/9/13). The two remaining non-profits,
Refugee Aid and Hoops and Dreams, while providing essential resources for targeted
populations (i.e. refugees), work with narrow reach. Refugee Aid has strict criteria for
qualification for their services while Hoops and Dreams has a limited number of slots
available. As an employee in Refugee Aid’s summer English immersion program, I
witnessed firsthand the financial instability implicating their organization as block grants
from the state suffered from partisan gridlock in Pennsylvania’s Congress, and
philanthropic funding sources threatened to pull out unless their students demonstrated
measurable growth in their standardized test scores.
Therefore, in the short year since the end of my “official” data collection, Johnson
High watched three of their five major non-profit partners leave for reasons endemic
within the non-profit community: cyclical grant funding, consolidation of resources, and
mission change. The literature on the non-profit industrial complex corroborates these
findings, citing the unstable, oftentimes competitive nature of the non-profit world and its
insufficiency in delivering services formerly provided by the state (Smith 2007; Finley,
Esposito, and Hall 2012). While the School District of Philadelphia continues to
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encourage struggling neighborhood schools to become more porous through the
recruitment of partnerships, the strategy becomes a smokescreen for a more insidious
problem: that without steady funding from the district and state, partners reify and
exacerbate the instability in staffing and resources. Moreover, using partners as a way of
“branding” the school ultimately results in the funneling of resources toward select
populations deemed “worthy” of service and care in accordance with the missions of the
non-profit organization. If one likens this strategy to the approach that charter schools
take to developing partnerships with outside organizations to supplement their budgets, it
sets up a false expectation as charter schools are guaranteed per capita funding from the
state in a way that neighborhood schools are not. In turn, the fallout from developing
internal networks of private capital adversely affect neighborhood schools that cannot
rely on consistent funding, resources, and staffing through both the state and their
partners.
Further Segregation
Related to sustained austerity at the district level, class sizes surged in AY 20142015 and several teachers pointed to increased segregation between the ELL and nativeborn populations in classes. To deal with potential friction from the disbanding of the
Success Academy, one teacher, Ms. London, noted the administration and several ELL
teachers’ efforts toward spatial management of conflict.
This year, all "American"/non-ELL 9th graders are in the 2nd floor wing with the
doors. So, they are isolated all day from the rest of the school. ELL 9th graders
are not. The numbers are stark in the AP classes. Even in 2012-2013, there were
only Asian students in Calculus. This year there are 4 students in Calculus - all
Asian. Same with physics. They have had some push back this year and it has
gotten nasty. An honors writing class was started this year and people from
outside of the school had to argue for including students who aren't Asian. Kids
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notice it whether or not the adults admit it. The demographics are also changing.
Fewer Asian students in 9th and 10th grade. (Email Correspondence, 11/20/15).
Ms. London points out that not only are there separate classes for ELL and native-born
students (i.e. “American”, non-ELL), but that the school has taken steps to place them in
an entirely different part of the building to discourage contact between the populations. In
the same vein as before, only Asian students populate the most advanced courses in the
school.
While consistent with observations during my fieldwork of those classes, the
“pushback” that Ms. London cites in parents and teachers arguing for the inclusion of
non-Asian students in an honors writing class is unprecedented. While students noticed
the exclusion in Chapter 6 and many teachers in Chapters 3 and 4 were critical of de facto
segregation as a strategy to maintain attractive climate numbers, business as usual carried
on throughout my fieldwork. With budget cuts, resource scarcity and rising stress levels
among the staff, resistance to these branding strategies from within rarely amounted to
more than a frustrated comment in passing or a diatribe in an interview. The fact that
“people outside of the school” such as community members and parents began to
question the racialized direction of internal reform raise questions about how brands and
their perceived “value” mutate when consumers begin to magnify their contradictions.
The looming paradox of the construction of a selective, racialized identity in a nonselective neighborhood school – rationalized as part of an institutional strategy to survive
a competitive urban education market – ironically has brought into question the “value”
of the neighborhood school when the premise of its very establishment is violated.
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Current Moment
As I move into the completion of this dissertation, Johnson High’s fate as a
neighborhood school in an increasingly menacing district climate is far from conclusive.
The School District of Philadelphia announced in October 2015, during the final drafting,
that it would be voting on recommendations in January to close and or convert 15 schools
to charters (Mezzacappa 2015). Cited as chronically “low-performing”, “under-enrolled”
and in “urgent” need of “change”, district officials have advertised these conversions and
closures as a necessary step for offering low-income children access to “high quality”
schools closer to their homes (Community Meeting, 11/17/15). After attending several
meetings with parents and teachers in an 100 percent African-American elementary
school slated for charter conversion, officials have made it clear that school communities,
parents, and staff will only be involved in decision-making to the extent that they will
have input over which charter provider will come take over the building. Ultimate
authority over the fate of these schools rests with the School Reform Commission (SRC)
this coming January.
The lack of democratic participation in a process designed to dramatically
reconfigure Philadelphia’s landscape is both a mechanism and symptom of the market
fundamentalist logics that I have argued have been both taken up and resisted at
traditional public schools like Johnson High. The education market, created through
policies in the last 20 years to privatize and deregulate urban public education, is not
guided by principles of democracy and collective decision-making, but the codes of
“good business.” School communities are expected to control their “performance” and be
held accountable for their “failure”, yet the resources and participation necessary to
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establish stable, consistent, educational environments for children to thrive hinge on the
whim of policymakers at the state and district levels that both define the parameters of
success and failure and the coffers available for its remediation. Facing this lack of
control over the ability to plan and/or define their own goals and possibilities for their
students within this framework, school communities like Johnson High’s respond like
actors in an education market – they chart their own paths based on assessments of risk
and value as they compete with charter and other traditional schools to keep their doors
open.
At Johnson High these assessments translated into reading students as posing
degrees risk to the climate, performance, and reputation of the school instead of
evaluations of pupils’ potential and promise. It meant relying on model minority
stereotypes and building a school brand around first generation Asian youth that would
circulate notions of “education quality”, “opportunity” and “safety” beyond the school’s
bounds to attract larger enrollments and private resources through community partners. It
meant segregating African-American students and other native-born students from their
peers in order to “protect” their valued customers: Asian families. As critical policy
scholarship argues, policies like school closure that extend the marketization of public
education operate as live “texts”, negotiated, contested, and struggled over between
groups both within and outside the formal machinery of official policy making (Ozga and
Jones 2006; Shore, Wright, and Però 2011). They create new relationships and semantic
spaces based on the politics, value and risk regimes that they invoke in their rollout. At
Johnson High and in urban districts across the country where closure and charter
conversions are imminent, school-level actors like administrators, teachers, parents,
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students, and community members do no interpret these policies in a vacuum. Drawing
on their own understandings of risk and value, their communities’ histories,
contemporary social dynamics, and politics, they craft ethically fraught responses from
backed corners.
Policy Implications
As I have demonstrated, these ethically fraught responses challenge the
foundations of the traditional public school, the institutional fruit of historical battles for
mass public education. Within the mainstream of education policy research, ethnographic
studies that challenge the status quo are oftentimes criticized for not offering specific
policy recommendations. While this may be true for some studies, I contend that this one
is rife with recommendations to alter the machinery and assumptions of current
educational policymaking in U.S. cities. Policies that marry markets to reform stratify
youth along lines of race and class, not just between charter, magnet, and neighborhood
schools, but also, as Johnson High shows, within schools. They encourage zero-sum
competition between institutions in environments of resource scarcity and need, inducing
leadership and teachers to work toward marketing their schools and not necessarily
improving them. Based on the oftentimes perverse motivations encouraged by closure-asreform, I make several more targeted recommendations.
1) Suspend the closure of neighborhood schools until the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania has established a funding formula that allows neighborhood schools the
same advantages afforded to charter schools.
At the moment, neighborhood schools do not receive per capita funding for their
students, allowing them to receive students exiting mid-year from charter schools without
245

supplemental funding. Legislative stalemates also have prevented the passing of an
education budget and consequently have deprived neighborhood schools of teachers and
supplies since 2011. Closing and converting schools to charters based on
“underperformance” places the onus for “failure” on teacher and administrators
negotiating the effects of austerity at ground-zero. Copious studies, both quantitative and
qualitative alike, have pointed out how flawed the use of purely numeric systems of
evaluation for “quality” schools can be for poor urban schools (Bryk 2010). The
quantification of failure therefore does not necessarily measure performance but the poor
conditions under educators and students operate as well as the income-levels of students’
homes. Issuing punitive measures like closure and conversion does not only destroy
schooling communities but also misdiagnoses the roots of underperformance: poverty and
underfunding.
Further, research on the effects of school closures on children who transfer
(achievement/socioemotional), neighborhood communities, property values, and the
vacant buildings is still nascent. Existing research shows that the cost savings of
consolidating and closing schools falls far short of what districts have predicted (Pew
Charitable Trust and Philadelphia Research Initiative 2011; Jack and Sludden 2013).
Emergent research also suggests that low-income, largely black neighborhoods are
disproportionately targeted by closures (Research for Action 2012; Bierbaum 2014). In
light of limited empirical work on the reform, coupled with the overwhelmingly negative
impact that this work suggests for students and communities, moving forward with plans
for more mass closures and charter conversions is shortsighted at best, irresponsible and
impulsive at worst.
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2) Build democratic participation and local control into the process of potential charter
conversion.
My goal in this dissertation was not to indict charter operators, teachers, and the
families that choose to enroll their charter schools. Many charters do right by their
students and push the limits of innovative praxis. My qualm lays in the risk that charter
schools as well as their unfettered expansion in Philadelphia poses to the fiscal and
political health of democratic institutions like public schools. In AY 2014-2015, the
School District of Philadelphia allowed two district-run elementary schools to vote
whether they would like to become charter schools the following year. Overwhelmingly
the parents, staff, and students decided against the recommendation and remained
neighborhood schools (Medina 2014). In October 2015, the SDP removed this option for
15 schools by vesting the SRC with the decision-making power. If communities decide
that they would like a charter operator, they could broach the district and the district
decides to work in conjunction with them to match a provider. Unilaterally leveling a
school community, firing teachers, and holding schools accountable for their performance
in this climate wrecks both irrevocable damage on neighborhood schools and is wholly
unjust.
3) Restore funding to neighborhood schools. And then some.
I would like to issue a disclaimer that I have not argued for the sufficiency of current
neighborhood school conditions or their historical performance in the service of poor
black and brown children. There is no “golden age” for the neighborhood school in the
last 50 years for poor youth of color, largely due to chronic underfunding and budget
crises that have plagued districts like Philadelphia’s. I also realize that suggesting equal
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or more funding (provided vis-à-vis the state) is a politically charged issue without much
support across the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. However, equity in funding is both a
material and symbolic starting point for Philadelphia’s public schools. Without a formula
that overly relies on property taxes and/or hinges on the political whims of conservative
legislators in Harrisburg, Philadelphia’s neighborhood schools will continue to languish
and decline in infrastructure, morale, and sustainability. Students and families also lose
confidence that the traditional public school is stable enough to provide the “thorough
and efficient” education promised by the state, and will continue to flee the district for
charters or the suburbs.
4) Identify and employ more holistic evaluation systems of schools and teachers.
Pulling hard data on climate, test-scores, and enrollment and scoring neighborhood
schools’ quality has obfuscated the increasingly difficult contexts in which educators and
students work. A recent report prepared by Research for Action, an independent, nonpartisan Philadelphia-based research firm, stated that 90 percent of school profile scores
throughout Pennsylvania rely on standardized test scores in spite of the original intention
to incorporate a wide array of measures (Chute 2015). This reliance on test scores to
develop “quality” ratings, favors more advantaged schools. It further punishes
neighborhood schools coping with the effects of austerity and unable to plan for the
future. These metrics both drive and warp perceptions of school quality, unfairly earning
educators and students in these schools “failing” labels and shuttering their doors as
consequence. Systems that more accurately capture the social and political dynamics that
come to influence a school’s performance are sorely needed.
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A Note on the Educators in this Study
Before moving into final comments, I would like to issue a note regarding my
profound concern for the ways in which readers might construe the actions of the
educators in this book. I have used only a small fraction of the mountain of data to frame
the argument for this dissertation. Among that data are anecdotes and demonstrations of
courage, integrity, and resilience as teachers and administrators worked amidst not only
budget cuts but pay freezes and assaults on their pensions and healthcare. I watched them
cry as they spent 6 weeks proctoring tests to frustrated students that they could not help. I
saw them dip into their own pockets to make proms, school traditions, and back-to-school
nights possible. They were passionate but tired, caring but discouraged, compassionate
but fatigued. While the branding of Johnson High certainly manifested racial tensions and
service inequities, at the heart of these educators’ efforts was a belief in the neighborhood
school – that if they could just save it, albeit for a selective population, they could
preserve a space to create a more inclusive educational environment in the future.
My biggest concern is that in sharing their testimonies, readers will label my
participants as racists – as individual perpetuators of educational practices that
marginalize black and brown children. This narrow reading would preclude a deeper and
more important criticism of the disturbing racism in the reform movement at large,
robbing low-income communities of color of the ability to participate in the fate of their
schools; a movement predicated on narrow self-interests that allow families and children
to flee a public system for charters instead of strengthening precariously divested
neighborhood schools. Reform efforts that deprive communities of color of participation
in determining the direction of their schools presume that these same communities and
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their educators do not know how to properly educate their children. Further, these
reforms break teacher unions and close schools in cities’ poorest neighborhoods. By
treating neighborhood schools and their employees like dying businesses, they respond
like dying businesses: with desperation.
As I conclude this note, I am reminded of an interview with Mr. Raymond, the AP
biology teacher in Chapter 4 that lamented internal organization changes like the Success
Academy and their long-term effects on the mission of the school. Later in his interview,
he explained,
I don’t see the District lasting 5 years, honestly. I warn students that are
considering teaching to maybe look for a different [field] because right now it’s
tough. They don’t honor any kind of advanced degrees anymore and there’s been
a pay-freeze for about five years. This district isn’t unique in its problems but
there’s a big push for the disposable teacher that comes out of some kind of
certification program, like [Teach for America]. It’s just a stepping stone in the
path to your next career. You can say that “I taught” and “I know what it’s like to
be a teacher” and now “I’m going to be a bank executive or a politician”. It
deprofessionalizes us. It think I’m ok now just because I’m younger. I can’t
imagine doing this with kids or even starting a family with the kind of stuff that I
do now. As a single person, unattached with lots of energy, supporting myself on
this salary, it barely works. I don’t have an extravagant lifestyle. But a lot of the
other teachers have been in the game a lot longer than I have and [more
responsibilities]. They can’t afford to stay in it. (Interview, 4/10/14)
Mr. Raymond’s testimony highlights the difficult choices facing public educators as they
wade through uncertain waters in their career trajectories. Popular media and political
pundits oftentimes villainize teachers for “not putting the kids first” but I would like to
challenge the notion that “what’s good for the kids” and “what’s good for the teachers”
are mutually exclusive. Imperiling the livelihoods of public school administrators and
their staff, blaming them for society’s ills, and requiring them to work in progressively
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more difficult conditions with less pay, disintegrates morale, leaving educators no other
option but to pursue different professional paths.
I therefore want to preempt essentialized interpretations of these staff and
administrators as racist, unethical individuals that deserve shame. Johnson High’s
educators are my friends and have taught me a great deal about persistence in the face of
awesome adversity. I have a deep respect for them and would encourage my readers to
see them as actors operating in a sociopolitical field of constraints that force them into
both complicity and resistance to the market fundamentalist project to decentralize and
privatize public education. In spite of their faults, at the heart of their work is a concern
for the wellbeing and lives of the youth that they serve. I entreat my readers to
foreground their compassion and understanding for the multitude of challenges that face
educators in schools like Johnson High, but not to excuse the racist implications of their
strategies.
Future Research
I ethnographically capture in this dissertation how the threat of closure shifts the
organizational mission of neighborhood schools from the non-selective service of all
youth to the selective service of those that enhance their imagined brand’s value.
Emergent literature looking at the impact of school closures on districts and communities
has not yet explored school closures as an agent of educational commodification, nor the
effects that this policy has on the organization and governance of existing neighborhood
schools. Thus, unlike the bulk of research on this policy that looks at the impact of
closures on districts and communities, I uniquely explain how risk, uncertainty, and
value-creation, induced by closure-as-policy, shift the practices and purposes of public
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educators’ work from pedagogical and democratic, to entrepreneurial and managerial.
Moreover, understanding how those practices embed racialized notions of risk and value
illuminates how school branding processes, prompted by closure threats, exacerbate and
extend inequities in educational opportunities. Tethering notions of “value” to their
strategies to purge the school of Black children, school actors appropriate anti-black
logics to structure their responses to market competition. This study is therefore first of
its kind to understand how perceptions of potential closure become a catalyst for
problematic cultural and ethical changes that neighborhood schools make in order to
“merit” staying open. Moreover, this study uniquely captures what happens when
policymakers relinquish responsibility for defining and structuring a school’s failure by
placing the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of students and educators.
This final chapter has also demonstrated that school brands, like those of
commodities, are fragile. They remain susceptible to media and public discourse that
frames them as factories of failure, dropout, and violence; as bastions of lazy, unionprotecting teachers and administrators; as outdated institutions that promote complacency
and stagnation in praxis. Neighborhood schools are also at the mercy of top-down,
accountability directives from the district and state that unabashedly move forward with
assumption-laden, context-devoid education reform that further deprives them on the
resources that they need to improve. Therefore, the branding processes neighborhood
schools engage become merely stop-gaps, staving off closure temporarily but
compromising their missions in the interim and exacerbating the treatment of native-born,
Black children.
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The School District of Philadelphia’s recent announcement to close 15 more
schools and convert many to charters makes the reality of closure ever more prescient for
neighborhood schools district-wide. In the coming years, I plan to initiate ethnographic
research in additional schools in Philadelphia to gather comparative data for a book on
variegated responses to school closure policy as a way to explore responses to the
deepening marketization of public education in American cities. I hypothesize that
schools with different demographics, needs, leadership, and histories will invoke and
enact problematic and fraught ethics around their strategies to compete in the market and
remain open, raising questions about the racial, ethical, and political dimensions and
unintended implications of market-driven reforms like closures in low-income, urban
contexts.
This is the first ethnographic case study for this book project, laying the
foundation for further inquiry in future years into the consolidation of public
infrastructure through school closures and its implications for democratic governance and
social welfare in post-industrial cities more generally. As high-poverty urban school
districts across the U.S. like Philadelphia’s continue to grapple with discordant pressures
to stabilize their finances while simultaneously enabling the expansion of charter schools,
closures will also continue to implicate all urban schools. This study is central to
understanding not only how school closure as policy, as a signifier or the deepening
marketization of public education, transforms educational practice in schools under
consideration, but more importantly, how the racialized and classed processes that the
policy sets into motion potentially undermine the public entitlement to equality of
educational opportunity promised to vulnerable youth.
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